

POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

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RG: 059
ENTRY: 1613

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POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

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RG: 059
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POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

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W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059
ENTRY: 1613

BOX: 2659

TAB #: 15
1 / 4 / U /

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POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

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ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 12 UR

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RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

A-125

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINT, UY

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: Sept. 1, 1973

SUBJECT: Anti-Administration UNR Current Emerges

REF : MVD-2446

SUMMARY:

Former Senator Raumar JUDE and 12 ex-deputies from the Colorado Party's National Reelection Union (UNR) have formed an anti-Administration current within the UNR. In a letter to former President and UNR leader Jorge PACHECO ARECO, this UNR group argues that President Bordaberry has allowed himself to become politically isolated, that there is growing opposition to the Administration, and that the UNR (and Pacheco) should assume a posture of defending constitutionality.

* * * * *

Highlights of the letter, a copy of which is attached, include:

"The Political Isolation of the President"- President Bordaberry, since the beginning of his Administration and with only a few exceptions, has "totally ignored" the UNR. The President's disregard for political groups intensified after the February civilian/military crisis. The UNR was not consulted on, or even "seriously" informed of the agreement reached by Bordaberry and the military - an agreement

Encl. No. 1 - Letter
Encl. No. 2 - List of Signers

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In Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:AHEisner:bjs

8-27-73

Contents and Classification Approved by: Charge: Mr. Ortiz

Clearances: POL: Mr. Olson

ADCM: Mr. Steins

POL-12

URU

9-1-73

POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

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which has led to a complete disregard of the recommendations of his political supporters in the appointments to the autonomous state agencies and finally to the dissolution of the Congress.

"Reactions to the Golpe" - The President's actions have been directed at "insulting, degrading and subduing the politicians and political activity". An additional justification for the closing of the Congress was provided by Communist agitation within the labor sector. The consequences have been to fortify and increase support for the National Party.

With the closing of the Congress, the President's antagonism towards the politicians has become open. This animosity has been reciprocated by all political groups (with the exception of the Blanco Party's Alianza faction) and by workers and students. There is also the "sure prospect" of a confrontation between the Administration and the Rural Association (the principal representative of Uruguay's large ranchers) because land taxes are scheduled to significantly increase in October, November and December of this year.

"Expectations" created by the golpe and the "mystique of change" which the Administration has sought to use to justify the golpe, are "rapidly going up in smoke". Political distrust and economic problems are multiplying. Opposition to the Government is increasing and the nation's problems are accelerating.

"Our Aims" - Given the existing crisis it is the "firm and decided resolution" of the signers of the letter to support the earliest possible return to the legal forms of government. While the signers were prepared to support a golpe, had it been necessary, the situation in the country did not justify such drastic action. The signers purpose is to establish a "new political current within the UNR" distinct from those who "hastily" and "unnecessarily" offered to collaborate with the Administration. Their purpose is to provide Pacheco with a constitutionalist "banner" that he can raise to re-enter Uruguayan politics.

The Signers - In addition to Senator Jude, ten of the 28 former UNR deputies and two former UNR Under-Secretaries are reported to have signed the letter. A list of those who signed is attached. Absent from the list of signers are the UNR's other six former Senators and Vice President Jorge SAPELLI. Most

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of the Senators are still seeking some accommodation with the President. Sapelli, who has issued his own personal declaration criticizing Bordaberry (see MVD 2362), prefers to maintain an opposition position independent of Jude.

The signers, who are awaiting Pacheco's response, are presently keeping the existence of the letter a secret.

Comment: This is the first organized demonstration within the UNR of disaffection from the Administration. Their opposition is largely a reaction to President Bordaberry's having rejected their overtures for cooperation and their desires for patronage.

As of this moment the letter's bleak portrayal of the political and economic situation is exaggerated and the signers' own influence very limited. However, we believe that the letter reflects growing concern within the UNR over this faction's future. They are concerned that President Pacheco (who is among those who "hastily" offered support to Bordaberry after the closing of the Congress - see MVD 2056) may not be allowed by the military to run again for the Presidency. Pacheco's charisma and popular support was largely responsible for the UNR's electoral success in 1971. Without his candidacy, each Reelectionist will have to establish his own clientele. Since Bordaberry has rejected supporting the UNR's political ambitions in the past, opposition to the Administration increasingly appears to many UNR members to be the only alternative in any future appeal for votes.

ORZ 12

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Drafted 8/7/73
Dated 8/17/73

Enclosure No. 1 to A-125
MONTEVIDEO

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Señor
Embajador del Uruguay en España
Don Jorge Pacheco Areco
Presente

Querido amigo y caudillo:

Los abajo firmantes integrantes de la U.N.R. frente a los hechos que se han venido sucediendo en nuestro País, hemos resuelto integrarnos como celula política coherente y homogénea, que responde a tu inspiración y a tu conducción, pero que, naturalmente, frente al golpe de estado, no puede llevarnos a prestar nuestra colaboración, por las razones que te vamos a exponer.-

LA PRESCINDENCIA POLITICA DEL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA.-

Desde la instalación de este gobierno, el Presidente ha sido totalmente no ya prescindente, sino que ha ignorado la vigencia de nuestro sector político. Ya en la constitución del gabinete fue apreciable esa posición espiritual, situación que a usted no le es ajena, pues en algún momento derivó en un intento de acercamiento, que posibilitó el ingreso de Rovira al ministerio del Interior. Luego de ello, el Presidente descansó en la conducción política de la quince. El mismo criterio se utilizó, posteriormente, para la designación de los jefes de Policía.

Producida la detención de J. Batlle, aparece una nueva apertura política en la que otra vez somos desplazados.

Los sucesos de febrero, y en especial el "Pacto de Boisso Lanza", se llevó a cabo con la sola presencia de Bordaberry, excluyendo por decisión expresa suya, a sus colaboradores más cercanos - Ravenna, Blanco, Dalparda-- los cuales habrían querido acompañarlo y les fue impedido. De este acontecimiento nunca tuvimos un informe /////

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serio y pormenorizado, salvo las conclusiones de funcionamiento del Parlamento hasta el fin de su mandato y elecciones libres en 1976. Este ciclo de ausentismo del proceso político nacional culmina con la designación de los Entes Autónomos. Y, finalmente, la disolución de las Cámaras, decisión inconsulta en la que naturalmente no participamos y de la que hasta el momento, tampoco nos ha expresado las metas que se propuso con esa decisión.-

CARACTERISTICAS DEL GOLPE.-

Es evidente, desde todo punto de vista, en las decisiones tomadas, que éstas estuvieron dirigidas a denostar, inferiorizar y destacar como subalterna, la figura del "político" y de la actividad política. Esta tesitura intelectual, coincide con los viejos postulados del ruralismo, enquistado como consejero en este gobierno. La otra bandera levantada para sostener la adhesión a la quiebra institucional, fue la agitación obrera provocada por la incesante actividad y prédica del comunismo. Con esta perspectiva fue dable ver, con claridad, como en cada decisión que se tomaba, la misma provocaba un mayor deterioro del "acuerdo nacional" y consecuentemente una mayor adhesión y fortaleza del Partido Nacional. Disuelto el Parlamento, las críticas, veladas antes, se vuelven, definitivamente, desembozadas. Se desprecia, naturalmente, todo apoyo político y la conducción se realiza con soberbia. Ello apareja, desde luego, radicalización en todos los partidos políticos, salvo las adhesiones que son meramente personales. Como consecuencia de esto, ahora, el gobierno tiene en su contra a los partidos políticos, salvo un sector de la Alianza, a los obreros, a los estudiantes y la perspectiva de un enfrentamiento seguro con la Asociación Rural cuando en los meses de octubre, noviembre y diciembre, la campaña deba anticipar el pesado gravamen del IMPROME.

La expectativa creada con el golpe, que pretendió ampararse en la mística del cambio, se va esfumando, rápidamente.

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El País vive angustiado, la gente está recelosa y la incomunicación se acentúa. El saldo visible ya, es nuestro creciente deterioro económico, en todos sus aspectos, desaprovechando una coyuntura internacional óptima, como no hemos tenido en muchos años. Con los cimientos que este gobierno se ha dado, y las oposiciones que se ha creado, no es difícil colegir que nuestras dificultades se van a ir acentuando, en todos los órdenes; y que la bonanza prometida para el final del camino, será sólo de dolor y frustración. Ello creará, sin dudas, obstáculos y dificultades a la movilización y prédica de las ideas y de los hombres, dentro de los partidos políticos.-

NUESTROS PROPOSITOS.-

Somos casi todos hombres jóvenes que hemos asimilado dentro del Partido Colorado y en el batllismo, un acendrado concepto de la legalidad y del respeto a la misma. Por ende, la crisis de ésta, nos ha acicateado en una firme y decidida resolución de poner nuestros mayores esfuerzos, para que, en el menor tiempo posible, se restablezca el imperio del estado de derecho. Podemos entender, aunque no justificar, el golpe de estado, como una solución de cirugía mayor, que represente la supervivencia del enfermo. Pero no estaba el País en esa encrucijada. La decisión se tomó en base a un juego de mentiras, en las que, a cada protagonista se le anticipó la adhesión y la colaboración que se iba a prestar en la "reconstrucción". Descartamos que en este camino de soledad voluntaria que ha elegido Bordaberry, su final se precipitará y con él, desgraciadamente, el País.

Aspiramos con nuestro planteo, a abrir un surco político nuevo dentro de la U.N.R., en el que se nos diferencie de quienes, apresuradamente, están prestando una colaboración que no les fue requerida, y que por tanto les perjudica, para que, en el esfuerzo común que harán todos los orientales por el restable-

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...cimiento del orden jurídico, usted tenga abierta una puerta de
retorno, por la que pueda levantar, nuevamente, como lo hizo duran-
te su gobierno, los estandartes sagrados del imperio de las nor-
mas constitucionales y la plena vigencia de las libertades e
instituciones, que tradicionalmente ha gozado el Uruguay.- La op-
ción que se le plantea responde, crudamente, a la realidad actual;
y se irá consolidando con el transcurso del tiempo. Con ella que-
remos seguir a su lado, posibilitando alternativas que nos convo-
quen, durante su transcurso y al final del camino, en una biena-
venturanza común, que permita cumplir con los anhelos que usted
desarrollara durante su gobierno, lamentablemente interrumpidos,
ahora, y que a la postre lo devuelvan al lugar natural para que
ellos se concreten y materialicen con el triunfo del Partido Co-
lorado.-

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POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

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Enclosure No. 2 to A-125
MONTEVIDEO

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Partial List of UNR Supporters Reported to Have Signed
August 17 Letter to Pacheco

Ex-Deputies:

Juan Justo AMARO, Deputy from the Department of Durazno
Arturo CUEVAS Caceres, Flores
Fernando ELICHIRIGOITY, Montevideo
Angel FACHINETTI, Montevideo
Juan Jose MARTINEZ, Cerro Largo
Julio OLIVAR Cabrera, Canelones
Carlos RODRIGUEZ Cal, Treinte y Tres
Edgardo VAZQUEZ Ledesma, Canelones
Maximo XAVIER, Rivera
Bernardo PORRAS Larralde, Colonia

Ex-Under Secretaries:

Victor CORTAZZO, Education and Culture (also former Deputy
from the Department of Durazno)
Jaime LOPEZ Barrera, Public Works (also former Deputy from
the Department of Rocha)

Others:

Maximo GURMENDEZ, Electoral Court Minister

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6	E	IO	TO : Department of State			SEP 17 1 13 PM 1973		
1	L	AID	E.O. 11652: N/A			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
			TAGS: PINT, UY			BUREAU OF		
						INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS		
						SEP 24 1973		
			FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO			DATE: Sept. 1, 1973		
			SUBJECT: Anti-Administration UNR Current Emerges			ANALYSIS BRANCH		
			REF : MVD-2446					
			SUMMARY:					
			Former Senator Raumar JUDE and 12 ex-deputies from the Colorado Party's National Reelection Union (UNR) have formed an anti-Administration current within the UNR. In a letter to former President and UNR leader Jorge PACHECO ARECO, this UNR group argues that President Bordaberry has allowed himself to become politically isolated, that there is growing opposition to the Administration, and that the UNR (and Pacheco) should assume a posture of defending constitutionality.					
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			Encl. No. 1 - Letter Encl. No. 2 - List of Signers					
			FORM 4-62 DS-323			LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		
			Drafted by: POL:AHEisner:bjs 8-27-73			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out		
			Clearances: POL: Mr. Olson ADCM: Mr. Steins			Contents and Classification Approved by: Charge: Mr. Ortiz		

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ESTADO DE URUGUAY
REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY
MINISTERIO DE INTERIORES
BO. 10000
MONTEVIDEO

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"Reactions to the Golpe"- The President's actions have been directed at "insulting, degrading and subduing the politicians and political activity". An additional justification for the closing of the Congress was provided by Communist agitation within the labor sector. The consequences have been to fortify and increase support for the National Party.

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Authority NND 969045

Drafted 8/7/73
Dated 8/17/73

Enclosure No. 1 to A-125
MONTEVIDEO

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Señor
Embajador del Uruguay en España
Don Jorge Pacheco Areco
Presente

Querido amigo y caudillo:

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LA PRESCINDENCIA POLITICA DEL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA.-
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Producida la detención de J. Batlle, aparece una nueva apertura política en la que otra vez somos desplazados.
Los sucesos de febrero, y en especial el "Pacto de Boisso Lanza", se llevó a cabo con la sola presencia de Bordaberry, excluyendo por decisión expresa suya, a sus colaboradores más cercanos - Ravenna, Blanco, Balparda-- los cuales habrían querido acompañarlo y les fue impedido. De este acontecimiento nunca tuvimos un informe /////

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serio y por menorigado, salvo las conclusiones de funcionamiento del Parlamento hasta el fin de su mandato y elecciones libres en 1976. Este ciclo de ausentismo del proceso político nacional culmina con la designación de los Entes Autónomos. Y, finalmente, la disolución de las Cámaras, decisión inconsulta en la que naturalmente no participamos y de la que hasta el momento, tampoco nos ha expreado las metas que se propuso con esa decisión.-

CARACTERISTICAS DEL GOLPE.-

Es evidente, desde todo punto de vista, en las decisiones tomadas, que éstas estuvieron dirigidas a denostar, inferiorizar y destacar como subalterna, la figura del "político" y de la actividad política. Esta tesitura intelectual, coincide con los viejos postulados del ruralismo, enquistado como consejero en este gobierno. La otra bandera levantada para sostener la adhesión a la quebra institucional, fue la agitación obrera provocada por la incesante actividad y prédica del comunismo. Con esta perspectiva fue doble ver, con claridad, como en cada decisión que se tomaba, la misma provocaba un mayor deterioro del "acuerdo nacional" y consecuentemente una mayor adhesión y fortaleza del Partido Nacional. Disuelto el Parlamento, las críticas, veladas antes, se vuelven, definitivamente, desembozadas. Se desprecia, naturalmente, todo apoyo político y la conducción se realiza con soberbia. Ello apareja, desde luego, radicalización en todos los partidos políticos, salvo las adhesiones que son meramente personales. Como consecuencia de esto, ahora, el gobierno tiene en su contra a los partidos políticos, salvo un sector de la Alianza, a los obreros, a los estudiantes y la perspectiva de un enfrentamiento seguro con la Asociación Rural cuando en los meses de octubre, noviembre y diciembre, la campaña deba anticipar el pesado gravamen del IMPROME.

La expectativa creada con el golpe, que pretendió ampararse en la mística del cambio, se va esfumando, rápidamente.

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El País vive angustiado, la gente está recelosa y la incomunicación se acentúa. El saldo visible ya, es nuestro creciente deterioro económico, en todos sus aspectos, desaprovechando una coyuntura internacional óptima, como no hemos tenido en muchos años. Con los cimientos que este gobierno se ha dado, y las oposiciones que se ha creado, no es difícil colegir que nuestras dificultades se van a ir acentuando, en todos los órdenes; y que la bonanza prometida para el final del camino, será sólo de dolor y frustración. Ello creará, sin dudas, obstáculos y dificultades a la movilización y prédica de las ideas y de los hombres, dentro de los partidos políticos.-

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...cimiento del orden jurídico, usted tenga abierta una puerta de retorno, por la que pueda levantar, nuevamente, como lo hizo durante su gobierno, los estandartes sagrados del imperio de las normas constitucionales y la plena vigencia de las libertades e instituciones, que tradicionalmente ha gozado el Uruguay.- La opción que se le plantea responde, crudamente, a la realidad actual; y se irá consolidando con el transcurso del tiempo. Con ella queremos seguir a su lado, posibilitando alternativas que nos convoquen, durante su transcurso y al final del camino, en una bienaventuranza común, que permita cumplir con los anhelos que usted desarrollara durante su gobierno, lamentablemente interrumpidos, ahora, y que a la postre lo devuelvan al lugar natural para que ellos se concreten y materialicen con el triunfo del Partido Colorado.-

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Partial List of UNR Supporters Reported to Have Signed
August 17 Letter to Pacheco

Ex-Deputies:

Juan Justo AMARO, Deputy from the Department of Durazno
Arturo CUEVAS Caceres, Flores
Fernando ELICHIRIGOITY, Montevideo
Angel FACHINETTI, Montevideo
Juan Jose MARTINEZ, Cerro Largo
Julio OLIVAR Cabrera, Canelones
Carlos RODRIGUEZ Cal, Treinte y Tres
Edgardo VAZQUEZ Ledesma, Canelones
Maximo XAVIER, Rivera
Bernardo PORRAS Larralde, Colonia

Ex-Under Secretaries:

Victor CORTAZZO, Education and Culture (also former Deputy
from the Department of Durazno)
Jaime LOPEZ Barrera, Public Works (also former Deputy from
the Department of Rocha)

Others:

Maximo GURMENDEZ, Electoral Court Minister

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E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: MINT, OTRA, UV, US
SUBJ: VISIT TO U.S. BY DR. JULIO SANGUINETTI

FOR ARA/APU STEDMAN FROM CHARGE

1. BY SEPTEL, EMBASSY IS REQUESTING DEPARTMENT'S ASSISTANCE REGARDING FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK OF DR. JULIO SANGUINETTI, INFLUENTIAL COLORADO PARTY LEGISLATOR AND SUB-DIRECTOR OF JORGE RATLLE'S LIST 15 DAILY, "ACCION" AND HIS WIFE.

2. ALTHOUGH SANGUINETTI STRESSED TO ME THAT U.S. LEG OF HIS CURRENT TRIP WILL BE PRIVATE AND THAT HE DID NOT SEEK FULL PROGRAM, HE CLEARLY HOPES THAT WE CAN HELP HIM WITH INTERPRETER AND SOME VISITOR ARRANGEMENTS.

3. SANGUINETTI IS ONE OF URUGUAY'S MOST INFLUENTIAL AND INTELLIGENT POLITICAL LEADERS. IT WAS HIS ALMOST SINGLE-HANDED EFFORT WHICH SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC OF THE NEED TO CONFRONT THE "POLITICIZATION" OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM THROUGH THE NEW EDUCATIONAL REFORM LAW. HE IS CLOSELY INFORMED ON THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE STILL-DELICATE MILITARY/CIVILIAN POLITICAL BALANCE. I AND OTHER MISSION OFFICERS CONSIDER SANGUINETTI TO HAVE A VERY DEFINITE PRESIDENTIAL POTENTIAL.

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 01109 132492

AND IS ONE OF THOSE WHOSE ACTIVITIES WILL STRONGLY INFLUENCE THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS HERE.

4. I STRONGLY HOPE THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE CAN BE DONE TO ASSIST DR. SANGUINETTI ON HIS WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK VISITS. HE SHOULD NOT BE "OVER-PROGRAMMED", BUT I THINK WOULD ENJOY A SMALL LUNCH IN THE DEPARTMENT AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH SUCH SENIOR OFFICIALS AS YOU THINK APPROPRIATE. IF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRIMMINS COULD FIND TIME TO MEET BRIEFLY WITH SANGUINETTI, I THINK THIS WOULD BE VERY BENEFICIAL.
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NO. *Alto*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

AUG 30 1973

TO : Department of State
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS : PINT, UY

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO DATE: August 18, 1973

SUBJECT : A Profile of the Democratic, Anti-Marxist Opposition

REF : MVD 2447

SUMMARY: The new Democratic Front has attracted a number of distinguished politicians from the traditional Colorado and Blanco parties as well as some prominent independents. Its public proclamation is mildly critical of the Administration while at the same time hostile to any common opposition with the Marxist left or far right. Its objective is to act as a pressure group for an eventual restoration of the Congress and the withdrawal of the military from politics. The Front is less likely to serve another objective of some of the signers -- as a vehicle for a new and strong political movement to exploit any resurgence of civilian rule. END SUMMARY.

Attached is a copy of the full text of the August 9 Democratic Front proclamation. The signers of the proclamation represent a good profile of the democratic, anti-Marxist political groups who are openly opposed to President Bordaberry's decision to close the Congress.

Those who signed.

The following moderate, anti-Administration groups are represented in the proclamation:

1. Colorado Party List 15 (Unity and Reform). Jorge BATLLE, leader of List 15 and Director of the suspended newspaper

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Drafting Date: 8/13/73 Phone No.: 319 Contents and Classification Approved by: *MO*
Charge: Mr. Ortiz

FORM 10-64 DS-323

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ESTADO BOLÍVAR

Montevideo A- 116

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Accion, heads the list of his faction's adherents. Other prominent List 15 signers are former Deputy and Minister of Education Julio María SANGUINETTI and former Senators Héctor GRAUERT, Luis HIERRO Gambardella and Eduardo PAZ Aguirre. Aquiles LANZA and Didier OPERTTI (who resigned from their positions in the educational system at the time of the closing of the Congress) and Adela RETA (President of the Children's Council) are additional List 15 adherents to the proclamation. A List 15 supporter told an Embassy Officer on August 10 that the entire congressional representation of the faction supported the proclamation, but that only the most "prestigious" of the faction's members signed in order to avoid "overwhelming" other groups supporting the declaration. Thus, absence from proclamation of such names as former deputy Luis POZZOLO, who in the past has been critical of Batlle for having been too moderate in his criticism of the Administration, apparently does not indicate disagreement among "hard line" List 15 elements with the proclamation.

2. Colorado Party List 14. Representatives from this group include the entire directorate of the Colorado Party newspaper El Día: Eduardo ACEVEDO Alvarez, José PEREYRA Gonzalez, Leonardo GUZMAN and José Lorenzo BATLLE Cherviere. Batlle Cherviere is a grandson of José BATLLE y Ordoñez, the Colorado Party's most influential caudillo of this century, and a cousin of Jorge Batlle.

3. Colorado Party List 315. Former Senator Amílcar VASCONCELLOS and deputy Ponciano TORRADO, the only two representatives of this faction in the dissolved Congress, are both signers. Other prominent Vasconcellos supporters adhering to the proclamation are Juan Carlos MASTALLI and Jorge VILA.

4. Blanco Party National Blanco Union. Washington BELTRAN, former Senator and Director of the newspaper El País, together with his brother Enrique BELTRAN and Ariel DE LA SIERRA (both former deputies), are the most prominent signers from this faction. The above comprises all but one of the former Congressmen from the National Blanco Union. But noticeably absent from the signers are Beltran's two fellow directors from the newspaper El País, Martín AGUIRRE and Daniel RODRIGUEZ Larreta, who continue to support the Administration.

5. Blanco Party Herrera-Heber. Former Senator Mario HEBER, leader of the faction, is a signer of the proclamation, together with former Minister of Industry and Commerce Luis BALPARDA Blengio. However,

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none of the five former Herrera-Heber deputies joined their leader, some apparently because they found the declaration too moderate, others because they are prepared to cooperate with the Administration if asked. But most noticeable omission from proclamation signers is Mario Heber's brother and former co-leader of the faction, Alberto. Relations between the two have been strained in recent months and Alberto has increasingly taken a pro-military position.

6. Blanco Party Por la Patria (PLP). Some five followers of former Senator and Blanco Party leader Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate signed the declaration. Most prominent Ferreira ally is former Senator Dardo ORTIZ. But also included among the signers are four former Por la Patria deputies: Julio MOREIRA Parsons, Rubens FRANCOLINO, Hugo RODRIGUEZ Carrasco and Alcides ALONSO Martinez. This group comprises some, but not all, of the more conservative wing of Ferreira's faction. Their adherence to the declaration gave rise to a decision on August 8 by the Blanco Party Directorate, which is controlled by supporters of Ferreira, that henceforth no party members would associate himself in joint declarations with other political groups. The Directorate, however, according to a Blanco Party leader, exempted the actions of Ortiz, the four Por la Patria deputies and other Blanco politicians from the "no alliance" decision, since they had signed the Democratic Front proclamation prior to the Directorate's August 8 decision. (The proclamation was released on August 9, but signatures had been collected during the previous three weeks.)

7. Blanco Independents. Among prominent Blanco Independents who signed the proclamation are Pedro Prudencio BERRO, former Ambassador to the UN and heir to one of the oldest family names in Uruguay, and Alberto GALLINAL Heber, one of the nation's wealthiest ranchers and famed for his personal and political honesty. Another independent Blanco signer is Adolfo TEJERA, a former Blanco Minister of Interior noted for his strong anti-Marxist stance.

8. Radical Christian Union (URC). This small political group, which comprises scions of old Catholic families who left the Christian Democratic Party because they found it to be too radical, is well represented among the signers: Daniel PEREZ del Castillo, URC Presidential candidate in 1971; Miguel SARALEGUI, Vice Presidential candidate; Joaquín SECCO García, former Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the Pacheco government; and José ROBAINA Ansó, the recently resigned Minister of Education. Horacio TERRA Arocena, the father of PDC leader Juan Pablo and uncle of Bordaberry's new Pro-Secretary of the Presidency, is another URC signer.

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9. Independents. Among the more prominent independents are José SERRATO Aguirre, Minister of Public Works under President Pacheco, Mario CAPURRO Etchegaray, an Under Secretary of Agriculture under Pacheco and former President of the powerful Rural Federation, Eduardo CORSO, distinguished conservative El País columnist, and Justino JIMENEZ de Aréchaga, distinguished jurist.

Those who did not sign.

Three groups have no significant representation among the signers: The Colorado Party's National Re-election Union (UNR), and the Blanco Party's Alliance and Rocha Movement factions. Former President Jorge PACHECO Areco, UNR Chief, has publicly supported President Bordaberry and his followers, whatever their personal attitude toward the closing of the Congress, have largely accepted his lead. Former Senator Martin ECHEGOYEN, leader of the Alliance faction, can also be considered in the President's camp and Echegoyen's chief lieutenant, Minister of Transportation, Communication and Tourism, Francisco Mario UBILLOS, remains in the Cabinet.

Carlos Julio PEREYRA's Rocha Movement, which generally continues to support Ferreira, refused to sign what they consider to be a "weak" document. They argue, correctly, that the proclamation is little more than a statement of personal belief in democracy and without commitment to any course of action to defend or restore it. But in addition, the Rocha Movement (and the majority of Por La Patria political leaders) are not prepared to accept the Democratic Front's implicit denouncement of the leftist Frente Amplio. The Rocha and PLP groups, while uninterested in any formal alliance with the Frente Amplio, remain eager to keep open a "dialogue" with the left in the hope of attracting eventual support from individuals within this group.

The Democratic Front is also "weak" in another sense. All the political factions which are significantly represented in the Front were "minority" groups in the 1971 elections (they were not the most voted faction within their respective parties), and alone they have little prospect of becoming the "majority" faction and electing a supporter as President. Thus, these minority factions have a greater incentive to seek strength through new coalitions than either the UNR or the PLP/Rocha, groups which were the "majority" factions in their respective parties in the last elections and which hopefully can rely on electively strong, charismatic candidates in Pacheco and Ferreira in any future presidential vote.

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
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A modest beginning.

But the effort by some Democratic Front sponsors (most notably by List 15 politicians) to emphasize the political coalition nature of the new movement failed. Those supporting the coalition concept wanted the proclamation signed in the name of the various political factions represented. The heterogeneous group of Colorados, Blancos and independents who signed were not, however, prepared to submerge their other political divergences, and it remains doubtful whether they ever will. For the moment at least the Democratic Front appears destined to be little more than a pressure group rather than an embryonic political movement.


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POL 702 12

Llamamiento a Integrar un Frente Democrático

Por Retornar a la Vigencia de la Constitución

Los ciudadanos abajo firmantes, en esta hora del país,

PROCLAMAN:

1º — Que solo el ejercicio efectivo del sistema democrático-republicano-representativo ofrece el ámbito adecuado para la convivencia del pueblo uruguayo;

2º — Que más allá del juicio que la historia reserve a cada uno de los grupos o personas que han sido actores en el proceso de esta grave crisis que vive la República, consideran imprescindible un superior entendimiento nacional para la libertad y la democracia que permita, con la vigorización de los partidos políticos, resolver con eficacia los problemas que enfrenta nuestro pueblo;

3º — Que esta profunda convicción nos impulsa a hacer pública la voluntad común de luchar cívicamente por conjugar esfuerzos para que el Uruguay reencontré su mejor tradición en el pleno ejercicio de los derechos constitucionales;

4º — Que sin perjuicio de la identidad en los expresados objetivos, cada uno de los firmantes conserva su independencia

de acción personal o en sus respectivos partidos o movimientos;

5º — Que esta declaración, a la vez que una definición y un compromiso, constituye un llamado abierto a todo ciudadano o núcleo de opinión que siendo auténticamente democrático y no estando por consiguiente alineado con fórmulas marxistas-leninistas o fascistas, coincidan con los propósitos de luchar con desinterés y patriotismo para que la República retome, en el más corto plazo posible, la senda de normalidad institucional que entregue su destino en manos de la voluntad popular libremente expresada". El texto de la declaración es el que

fundido por la prensa nos obliga a encuadrar su redacción dentro de las limitaciones impuestas por el decreto del 27 de junio.

Montevideo, 9 de agosto de 1973. — Dr. Eduardo Acevedo Alvarez, Dr. Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, Dr. Alberto Aguilar, Dr. César Luis Aguilar, Esc. Leonardo Arroyo Torres, Dr. Julio Arocena Folle, Esc. Angel Aroux Negeml, Alcides Alonzo Martínez, Luis Artigaveytia, Ing. Luis A. Balparda Biengio, Dr. Anibal Luis Barbagelata, Esc. Julio R. Bardallo, Dr. Jorge Battie, José Lorenzo Battie Cherviere, Dr. Enrique Beltrán, Dr. Washington Beltrán, Dr. Pedro P. Berro, Dr. Juan Carlos Bracco, Sra. Blanca Berreta de Brause, Dr. Eugenio Bonavita Pérez, Dr. Alfredo Cambón, Ing. Agr. Mario Capurro, Dr. Jorge Carve Gurméndez, Dr. Héctor J. Cerruti Alcará, Esc. Saúl Cestau, Humberto Ciganda, Dr. Eduardo J. Corso, Elías Croci, Pintor José

Cúneo, Dr. Ramón Chapper Laborde, Dr. Juan Vicente Chiarino, Escritor Julio C. da Rosa, Julio Daverede, Dr. Julio César De Gregorio, Dr. Ariel de la Sierra, Ing. Héctor del Campo, Dr. Nicolás del Castillo, Dr. Angel de la Fuente, Dr. Luis A. Delfino Cazet, Dr. Gervasio A. de Posadas Belgrano, Esc. Mario Durán Rubio, Juan Carlos Elizalde, Educacionista Eulalia Estrampes Laxalde, Arq. Juan E. Fabini, Arq. Jorge Faget Figari, Arq. Eustaquio Fernández, Dr. Orestes Fiandra, Ruben Francolino, Dr. Alberto Gallinal, Dr. Pablo García Pintos, Ing. Agr. Salvador García Pintos, Dr. Felipe Gil, Dr. Héctor A. Grauert, Dr. Leonardo Guzmán, Mario Heber, Luis Herrer Gambardeña, Dr. Cyro Jaumandreu, Dr. Aquiles B. Lanza, Dr. Carlos M. Larghero, Dr. Julio Lorenzo y Deal, Dr. Augusto Martínez, Esc. Juan Carlos Mastali Luis R. Molinari, Dr. Eustaquio D. Monteto, Dr. Julio C. Moreira Par-

sons, Arq. Alberto Muñoz del Campo, Jorge Muñoz Muñoz, Dr. Didier Operti, Esc. Dardo Ortiz, Dr. Eduardo C. Palau, Ing. Juan Carlos Patetta, Eduardo Paz Aguirre, José Pereyra González, Dr. Evangelista Pérez del Castillo, Esc. Daniel Pérez del Castillo, Esc. Erasmo Petinzi, Dr. Carlos Pfeiff Larraide, Dr. Manuel Queiruga, Dr. Carlos Queraltó, Dra. Adela Reta, Dr. Bibiano Riet Velasco, Dr. Héctor Lorenzo Rios, Dr. José María Robaina Ansó, Dr. Hugo Rodríguez Carrasco, Renán Rodríguez, Dr. Santiago L. Rompani, Esc. Rafael Ruano Fournier, Dr. Jorge Rodríguez Cubillo, Prof. Clemente Ruggia, Dr. Federico S. Salveraglio, Dr. Miguel Saralegui, Dr. Julio M. Sanguinetti, Dr. Angel Mario Seelza, Prof. Oscar Secco Ellauy, Dr. Joaquín Secco García, Ing. José Serrato, Dr. Angel Silvartio, Jorge Silveira Zabala, Dr. Luis Alberto Solé, Julio Solsona Flores, Adolfo Tejera, Arq. Horacio Terra Arocena, Ing. Pnciano Torrado, Roberto Varela, Dr. Carlos A. Varela Rodríguez, Dr. Amílcar Vasconcelos, Dr. Carlos Viana Aranguen, Dr. Jorge L. Vila, Escritor Arturo Sergio Visca, Dr. Carlos Vlahussich, Dr. Roberto Zetterino, José Víctor Zerbino, Dr. Manuel Rodríguez López, Dr. Antonio Canellas, Dr. Eduardo C. Palma.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 585
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SUBJ: FRENTE AMPLIO'S HIGH-RISK STRATEGY UNFOLDS
REF: A) MVD-519 B) MVD-040

1. SUMMARY: LAST WEEK HAS SEEN OUTPOURING OF CRITICISM BY LIBERAL AND ULTRA-LEFT SECTORS OF THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" AGAINST WHAT IS SEEN AS CYNICAL SELLOUT BY "FRENTE" LEADERS TO THE MILITARY (REF A). THESE DIVISIONS WITHIN "FRENTE" HAVE FORCED THE LEFTIST ALLIANCE'S LEADERSHIP TO EVOLVE A MORE ACTIVIST PROGRAM IN AN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE MILITARY. END SUMMARY

2. DIVISIONS WITHIN THE "FRENTE": LIBERAL AND FAR LEFT SECTORS OF THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" ASSOCIATED WITH THE "CORRIENTE" GOUP (REF B) HAVE DENOUNCED THE DECISIONS OF THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" LEADERSHIP TO SUPPORT THE MILITARY'S NEW PROMINENT ROLE IN URUGUAYAN POLITICS. THE PUBLIC RUPTURE WITHIN THE FRENTE BEGAN WITH A FEBRUARY 16 LEAD EDITORIAL IN PROMINENT LEFTIST WEEKLY "MARCHA". CARLOS QUIJANO, "MARCHA" EDITOR AND DUYEN OF THE LEFTIST URUGUAYAN INTELLECTUALS WARNED THAT URUGUAYAN MILITARISM WAS LIKELY TO LEAD THE COUNTRY DOWN THE SAME "RUINOUS" ROAD OF ARGENTINE MILITARISM. ON

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NO. **A-12**

TO: *VED: Department of State*

DATE: *11 PM '73*

FROM: *Amembassy MONTEVIDEO* DATE: **January 25, 1973**

SUBJECT: **Biographic Information on Communist Party Leaders**

REF:

Leadership of the Uruguayan Communist Party is reported to be passing from the hands of Rodney ARISMENDI, who has been First Secretary of the Party since 1955, to Jaime PEREZ, a dynamic labor leader elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1971. This report supplements Biographic Handbook profiles on these two men prepared in 1967. Recent newspaper photographs are attached.

RODNEY ARISMENDI

In 1967, Arismendi traveled to the Soviet Union both before and after attending the conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization in Havana. At the LASO Conference, Arismendi tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the more radical pro-Cuban delegations and the Soviet-line Communists. The conference declaration, which criticized the Soviet Union and endorsed revolutionary violence, was a defeat for the Uruguayan Party leader, who has throughout his career been a slavish adherent of the Moscow line. Arismendi has nevertheless maintained contact with Fidel Castro. He visited Cuba in 1970 and 1972 and visited the Soviet Union in 1969, 1970 and 1972.

In the 1971 elections, Arismendi was re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies. During the campaign he vigorously attacked the activities of the American Embassy and he listed several present and former Embassy officers as "CIA Agents". Arismendi also attacked the Embassy in 1969 when a telephone tap on the Soviet Embassy was discovered.

Attachments: *ag-vt*

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Arismendi has translated three books from the French. In 1972, he added another work to his long list of publications, "Uruguay and Latin America in the 1970's". In it, he considers the role of guerrilla movements in Latin America and reacts to common criticism from the more radical left that the Communist Parties are counter-revolutionary because they do not support violence. Arismendi asserts that violence is useful at a certain stage of the revolutionary process, but that, as recent guerrilla defeats show, the conditions under which violence is productive do not now exist in most areas of Latin America.

This is the same line that Arismendi has followed with Uruguay's own Tupamaro guerrilla movement. While expressing admiration for their "heroism", he has criticized their lack of an ideological base and concluded that the hard blows they have suffered in the past year vindicate the Party's attitude toward violence.

Arismendi impresses an Embassy officer who has met him as a pretentious pseudo-intellectual. He affects upper class mannerisms, is impeccably tailored and enjoys social occasions. He is rumored to have a drinking problem.

JAIME PEREZ

Perez is touted as the "man to watch" in the Party. His background is in the Communist trade union movement. He had an early reputation as a street brawler and was involved in the death of a rightist demonstrator in a fight in front of Party headquarters several years ago. Perez looks working class. He has a strong presence and impresses those who meet him with his intelligence and dedication. He is married and has four children.

Perez was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the 1971 elections. He continues to serve as the Secretary of the Party's Central Committee and the First Secretary of the Montevideo Department Committee. Shortly after the election campaign, he accused the United States Embassy of directing a smear campaign against the Frente Amplio presidential candidate Liber SEREGNI.

Perez would probably be a more effective party leader than Arismendi among the urban proletariat but he would not have the same sense of identification with the intelligensia that has marked Arismendi's long career as Moscow's man in Uruguay.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES, CINCSO for POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: December 16, 1972

SUBJECT: The Left Takes a Second Look at the Military

REF :

SUMMARY:

Opinions expressed so readily three months ago by Frente Amplio politicians that the military might act as a "progressive force" are now being modified. Recent leftist public statements again see the military as a traditional conservative force aligned with the status quo and against the "sweeping structural reforms" which the Uruguayan left favors.

* * * * *

"Coincidence":

Last September-October, the military's new found interest in the investigation and prosecution of economic crimes was widely-hailed on the Uruguayan political left as a harbinger of a "progressive mentality" within the Armed Forces. Christian Democratic leader, Juan Pablo TERRA, speaking on the floor of the Senate, in late September, could assert that the military was gradually veering toward support of some objectives also held by the Frente Amplio, and foresaw that eventually the military would share the left's critical

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appraisal of the need for "sweeping structural reforms." In his view, there was a growing "coincidence" between the military and the Frente.

Two Blows:

In recent weeks, however, the left has begun to reappraise its assessment of the military. Two events in particular appear to have led to a substantial modification of their earlier optimistic view and a return within leftist sectors to the traditional fear of the military as a conservative, anti-leftist force.

The "Vasconcellos" Document:

The first major shock to the left was the public release on November 30 by Colorado Senator Amilcar VASCONCELLOS of extensive excerpts from a document circulated within the Armed Forces in early October of this year. The military document (reported separately in DATT report 6 900 0257-72) acknowledged that there has been an enormous deterioration of moral values and an economic stagnation which have led to "social problems, self-serving political policies which ignore greater national interests, an alarming ideological penetration in the educational system and labor movements, and a seditious movement". The document goes on to note that this situation is the result of the failure of the civilian political sector to consult the Armed Forces who, by technical capacity, unity of criteria and popular support, are best able to determine and defend what is in the overall national interest. The document states that military leaders have decided to take a more active and supervisory political role in the future.

Minister of Defense Armando MALET and Army Commander-in-Chief Cesar MARTINEZ discussed Vasconcellos' document as a "study" and not reflective of official Armed Forces' policy, but civilian political sectors have generally accepted the document as representative of the thinking of top military leaders.

Fuss Over FUS:

The second major shock came on December 4 when the Director of the Defense Intelligence Service, Colonel Ramon TRABAL, requested the prosecution of officials of the Federation of Health Workers (FUS) for "contempt" of civil law (desacato)

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: BORDABERRY BLASTS COMMUNISTS AND OPPOSITION BLANCOS

1. PRESIDENT BORDABERRY USED OCCASION OF MEMORIAL TRIBUTE TO DECEASED LEADER OF RURAL LEAGUE, ENITO NARDONE, TO LEVEL DIRECT ATTACK ON COMMUNISTS AND OPPOSITION BLANCO SECTORS (LED BY SENATOR WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE) IN STRONGEST TERMS HE HAS USED TO DATE. PRESIDENT SPOKE TO CROWD OF APPROXIMATELY 2000 IN CARDONA IN DEPARTMENT OF SORIANO ON DECEMBER 2. OTHER SPEAKERS INCLUDED NARDONE'S WIDOW, OLGA CLERICE DE NARDONE AND "RURALISTA" LEADER, JUAN JOSE GARI, WEALTHY LANDOWNER AND BUSINESSMAN, AND CLOSE FRIEND OF PRESIDENT.

2. BORDABERRY RECALLED NARDONE AS GREAT ANTI-COMMUNIST AND SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO HONOR NARDONE'S MEMORY BY "OPPOSING COMMUNISM IN ALL ITS FORMS". MAIN PROBLEMS COUNTRY FACES, ACCORDING TO BORDABERRY, ARE, "SEDITION, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL AND LABOR SECTORS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT". PRESIDENT SAID, HOWEVER, THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WILL NOT ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING IF THE OTHER PROBLEMS ARE NOT SOLVED.

3. BORDABERRY STRESSED NEED FOR UNITY BETWEEN COLORADOS AND

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BLANCOS. "A STAND MUST BE TAKEN; EITHER ONE IS WITH THE NATION OR AGAINST IT." HE PRAISED THOSE SECTORS OF BLANCO PARTY WHICH HAVE "DISINTERESTEDLY" SUPPORTED HIS ADMINISTRATION AND THEN BLUNTLY ATTACKED OPPOSITION BLANCOS LED BY FERREIRA. REFERRING TO UNSUCCESSFUL OPPOSITION BY "FRENTE AMPLIO" AND FERREIRA SUPPORTERS TO CONTINUED SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PRESIDENT SAID, "THERE WERE OTHERS WHO DID NOT WANT TO DO IT (COOPERATE); THE SAME ONES WHO A FEW DAYS AGO JOINED THE COMMUNISTS TO (ATTEMPT TO) DENY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES THEIR LEGAL INSTRUMENTS TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT AGAINST SEDITION". BORDABERRY DECLARED THAT IT WAS NOT HIS PLACE TO JUDGE THE BLANCO OPPONENTS, BUT RATHER THAT SUCH WOULD BE RENDERED BY THEIR OWN POLITICAL SUPPORTERS AND BY HISTORY.

4. WHILE PRESIDENT REFERRED LITTLE TO THE ARMED FORCES, HIS CLOSE FRIEND AND ADVISER, GARI, PRAISED THE MILITARY IN HIS ADDRESS, DECLARING, "SOVEREIGNTY IS ROOTED IN THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE AND THE ARMED FORCES ARE ITS GUARDIANS".

5. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT'S RANKING OF THE NATION'S PRIORITIES (FIRST, ANTI-SUBVERSION AND THEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT) WAS UNCHANGED FROM HIS MARCH INAUGURAL, HIS SLAP AT BLANCO OPPONENTS LUMPING THEM WITH THE COMMUNISTS REFLECTS HIS IRRITATION AND ANGER OVER A SERIES OF RECENT ATTACKS ON HIS ADMINISTRATION, PARTICULARLY FERREIRA'S CHARGES THAT THE NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY HAD BEEN "BETRAYED" (MVD 3034). UNLIKE HIS EARLIER SPEECHES, BORDABERRY'S ADDRESS CONTAINED NO CONCILIATORY REFERENCES TO "DIALOGUE" OR "COMPROMISE". AS SUCH, IT REFLECTS THE HARDENING ATTITUDE OF THE PRESIDENT TOWARD CRITICISM OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND WOULD APPEAR TO CLOSE THE DOOR FOR THE PRESENT ON ANY RECONCILIATION BETWEEN HIM AND FERREIRA.

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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3305

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 3083

SUBJECT: NEW MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2762

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1. PRESIDENT BORDABERRY NOVEMBER 28 APPOINTED DR. JOSE MARIA ROBAINA ANSO HIS NEW MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE. ROBAINA REPLACES JULIO MARIA SANGUINETTI, WHO HAD RESIGNED ON OCTOBER 28 IN PROTEST OVER THE DETENTION OF COLORADO LIST 15 LEADER JORGE BATLLE BY THE MILITARY (RETEL). MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, LUIS BALPARDA BLENGIO, HAS OCCUPIED THE POSITION ON AN INTERIM BASIS SINCE SANGUINETTI'S RESIGNATION.

2. ROBAINA WAS PREVIOUSLY UNDER-SECRETARY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE. HE HAD BEEN APPOINTED ON MARCH 1, 1972, WHEN JORGE ECHEVARRIA LEUNDA WAS NAMED MINISTER. ECHEVARRIA AND ROBAINA HAD BOTH BEEN MEMBERS OF THE OLD CIVIC UNION PARTY, THE CONSERVATIVE PREDECESSOR OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), NOW ONE OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE LEFTIST "FRENTE AMPLIO" POLITICAL COALITION.

3. ROBAINA WAS BORN IN THE INTERIOR CITY OF SALTO ON DECEMBER 30, 1923. HE RECEIVED HIS LAW DEGREE FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF THE REPUBLIC'S FACULTY OF LAW AND SCIENCES IN 1960. HE IS MARRIED TO THE FORMER CELIA PIEGAS DOTTA AND HAS SEVEN CHILD-

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: FERREIRA-MILITARY CONFRONTATION DEFUSED

1. SENATOR WALTER SANTORO, MEMBER OF SENATOR WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE'S BLANCO PARTY FACTION, TOLD FMROFF NOV. 27 THAT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT SENATE WOULD BE REQUESTED TO LIFT PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES OF WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE. SANTORO SAID THAT FERREIRA ON NOVEMBER 21 MET WITH CHIEF OF JOINT STAFF, GEN. GREGORIO ALVAREZ, TO EXPLAIN HIS POSITION CONCERNING ISSUE OF INFRINGEMENT OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN TERRITORIAL WATERS. WHILE, ACCORDING TO SANTORO, ISSUE IS BASICALLY A POLITICAL ONE FOR FERREIRA, LATTER WAS ABLE TO EXPLAIN TO ALVAREZ THAT IS ALSO LARGE SMUGGLING PROBLEM INVOLVED AND THAT FORMER PRESIDENT PACHECO HAD BEEN PROTECTING IMPORTANT URUGUAYAN OPERATORS. THIS REVELATION CONCERNING PACHECO'S ROLE, ACCORDING TO SANTORO, HAS CAUSED ARMY TO CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD FERREIRA, WHOSE FACTION AS GESTURE OF GOOD WILL TOWARD MILITARY DID NOT SUPPORT RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES FOLLOWING INTERPELATION OF DEFENSE MINISTER MALET (MYD 3030).

2. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION SANTORO STRESSED THAT "URUGUAYAN SOLUTIONS" WOULD BE FOUND TO CURRENT PROBLEMS. THIS MEANT THAT CONSTITUTION WOULD BE RESPECTED, ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD BE STRAINS

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TO : Department of State
INFO: Amembassies BRASILIA, BUENOS AIRES, CINCSO for POLAD
FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO
SUBJECT: Concerned Reeleccionistas Want Pacheco Closer to Home
DATE: Nov. 11, 1972

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NOV 21 1972 *JHR*

SUMMARY:

Followers of ex-President PACHECO are deeply concerned over the state of military/civilian relations. They have decided to ask Pacheco to accept the Uruguayan Ambassadorship to Brazil so that he might be closer to developments in Uruguay and in order for him to influence the Brazilian Government to support a stable civilian government here.

* * * * *

Flight to Madrid:

Colorado Senator Raumar JUDE flew to Madrid on November 5 to discuss with ex-President Jorge PACHECO Areco growing concerns among Pacheco's supporters over civilian/military relations in Uruguay. Jude is Secretary General of the Executive Committee of Pacheco's "National Reelection Union" (UNR), the largest faction in the Colorado Party. Jude took with him as talking points a paper prepared

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Enclosure: UNR Paper

Classified by *Juan G. Tully*
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Automatically downgraded at two year
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December 31, 1978.

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Chargé: *M. Ortiz*

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within the UNR (largely by Jude himself) on the current state of Uruguayan politics. A copy of this document has been provided to an Embassy officer.

Apparent generalized deterioration:

Jude's paper begins by stating that recent developments, to all public appearance, have resulted in a "generalized (political) deterioration without apparent benefit to anyone". Jorge Batlle's List 15 is viewed as deeply confused following Batlle's arrest, President Bordaberry as having lost a large measure of public confidence, Blanco leader Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate as having provided weak leadership in this moment of crisis, and other civilian sectors as unable or unwilling to influence developments.

In the meantime, the UNR believes the military is seeking positions in the Bordaberry Administration ("co-government" with the civilian politicians), with the potential consequence of a de facto military golpe.

The UNR to the Rescue:

The UNR paper goes on to argue that although the moment is critical, it is still possible for the Bordaberry Administration to extract a spectacular success from the situation. The paper notes that civilian politicians of necessity have turned to President Bordaberry to prevent further encroachments by the military. The President, with the UNR's support, can use this apparent institutional insecurity to forge a "grand National Accord" (e.g., bringing Wilson Ferreira Aldunate's supporters into the Administration) while limiting and directing opposition groups (e.g., offering the opposition little in the way of patronage for their cooperation). The UNR recommends a major campaign to publicize the Administration's energetic governmental program. Also recommended are an increase of civilian judicial investigations of economic crimes (in order to deny this banner to the Armed Forces) and early appointments to the autonomous state agencies (before new military pressures limit the Administration's flexibility to appoint civilians to these posts).

Brazil as a Key:

In the final section of the paper, the UNR argues that Uruguay, because of its small size, is highly dependent upon foreign factors. But support from international agencies

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such as the IMF, IDB and the OAS, while often positive from an economic point of view, have "disadvantageous and remote political consequences". An alternative to these distant influences is greater reliance on Uruguay's two powerful neighbors, Brazil and Argentina. Argentina, however, is seen as having lost influence within Latin America and, in different ways, both the Tupamaros and Jorge Batlle have closer ties there than the UNR. On the other hand, Brazil is now the leader of this region and has always been concerned over developments in Uruguay-- witness what the paper termed Brazilian military activities along its frontier with Uruguay at the time of last year's elections. President Bordaberry's economic policies are predicated on closer cooperation with prospering Brazil.

The paper concludes that it is essential for the UNR to be able to "orient Brazil's influence", since no military golpe is possible in Uruguay "if the Government has the full support of Brazil". The paper recommends that Pacheco move from his present position as Ambassador to Spain to Ambassador to Brazil in order that he might be the moving and decisive force in influencing Brazilian policy towards Uruguay.

Comment:

The UNR paper contains several questionable points. After the leftist Frente Amplio coalition began last year to exploit local nationalistic reactions over reports of Brazilian troop movements, Brazilian authorities publicly denied that such movements had occurred or that they were seeking to influence the course of the Uruguayan elections. Jorge Batlle's "ties" with Argentina appear to go not much further than connections through his wealthy industrialist Argentine in-laws.

Some of the UNR's recommendations are also doubtful. The UNR's call for greater publicity for the Administration's activities is hardly a new or effective substitute for strong civilian leadership. President Bordaberry has, for the time being, quashed prospects for a "Grand National Accord" including Wilson Ferreira Aldunate's supporters -- an accord which the Blanco factions presently cooperating with the Government were reportedly against as it would have eclipsed their own influence in the Administration.

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That Pacheco is prepared to move from Madrid to Brasilia is another question mark. We doubt that this would be in the ex-President's own best interest, given the continued ability of the left to exploit Uruguayan nationalistic sentiments, whenever even rumors of Brazilian intervention occur.

Nevertheless, the UNR paper is important as a reflexion of the views of this major pro-Administration political faction. Clearly evident, even in this moment of political "crisis", is the continued UNR rivalry with Batlle's followers in the Colorado Party, and concern lest present problems encroach on the UNR's "bread and butter" political patronage. The UNR's desire to have Pacheco in Brasilia also suggests concern within this faction over its own lack of influence with President Bordaberry and the hope that a Pacheco nearer-to-home might rectify this situation. This paper is also significant as evidence of the UNR's belief in the growing influence of Brazil on domestic events and the tendency of local politicians to further invite such Brazilian/Argentine interest.

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LOS ULTIMOS ACONTECIMIENTOS, ANTE LA OPINION PUBLICA, FORJARON UN DETERIORO GENERICO SIN BENEFICIO APARENTE PARA NADIE

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A- LISTA 15

- 1- Contradicción Jorge Batlle detenido pide apoyo al gobierno:
- 2- debilitamiento de actos públicos partidarios: convenciones, caravanas, etc.
- 3- Retiro de ministros con renuncia y no obstante apoyo parlamentario.
- 4- Grauert: exposición en el Parlamento (pérdida de lentes)
- 5- En síntesis. existe un absoluto y agudo confucionismo crítico, dentro del sector para afrontar los acontecimientos actuales.

B - BORDABERRY

Deterioro de su presencia, frente al pueblo se captó la gravedad de la crisis por el gobierno enfrentada. (momentos críticos)

C - REELECCIONISMO

La posición más congruente, pero nada más que en el ámbito formal, pues pretendió negar la existencia de un antagonismo real entre el poder civil y militar.

D WILSON

- 1- marcha sin ninguna eclosión popular:
- 2- alocución televisiva pidiendo a Dios que ilumine los actos del Presidente.
- 3- problemas internos por la juventud adoptados.
- 4- En síntesis : baja de guardia como líder opositor

E - Los otros sectores blancos: presencia XIX, frente a la opinión pública

F FRENTE AMPLIO

Imposibilidad de definición frente a dos fuerzas para ellos adversas el gobierno y el ejército.

G EJERCITO

La actitud enfáticamente enérgica del mismo puso en guardia y sembró el temor de un sector de la opinión pública civilista y antimilitarista.

ESCALADA DE PODER EL EJERCITO

Están integrados dentro de una progresiva y programática intención de integración del Poder Civil. Enfatizados por la lucha antisubversiva donde su triunfo se debió a eficacia, moralidad y disciplina, hoy promueven ante el agotamiento del primer rubro, su permanencia ante la opinión pública acogiendo como temática los ilícitos económicos. En esta segunda etapa buscan afianzar ante la opinión pública su eficiencia y moralización al mismo tiempo que el deterioro del Poder Civil, haciendo aparecer al político como responsable pasivo o copartícipe activo de una aparente pauperizada moral pública.

Hasta ahora actuaron y actúan en circunstancias represivas, pero es de lógica pensar que también aspiran a la actuación positiva en el co-gobierno administrativo del Poder Político. La co-participación del Ejército en el ejercicio de la Administración Pública resulta negativa por las siguientes anotaciones: a) en nada los obliga y responsabiliza, pues siempre pueden invocar la responsabilidad de civiles co-actuantes:

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Fig. en el Montevideo A 185. (2)

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b) la intronización de la Administración del gobierno los hace titulares de funciones típicas del poder político, produciéndose una paulatina pero creciente traslación del Poder; c) los incentiva en una programática donde el acto de gobernar converge para ellos como hecho viable y lógico y necesario; d) imbuidos a esta altura de cierta praxis de gobierno, si a ello se le añade el rudimentario y particularísimo medio subjetivo que tienen para crearse depositarios de la adquisencia de la opinión pública, (ya que ni noción tienen de la convergencia del sufragio a través de las decisiones libérrimas del cuerpo elector) resulta fácil concluir que de ese orden piramidal del Ejército como Institución, pueda desembocar en un golpe de facto del cual solo ellos serán artífices y potestarios.-

CONSECUENCIA DE LOS HECHOS ANTERIORES

- 1) Nunca como hoy confluyen de distintos sectores políticos, un apoyo mayor a Bordaberry, acaso por simbolizar éste la última carta que pueda preservar la preexistencia del Poder Político, de los Partidos y del Estado de Derecho.
- 2) Existe una enorme distensión del antagonismo político para preservar el orden público. Nunca como hoy está de hecho ofrecida una amnistía de la lucha de la oposición, que acaso se extienda hasta la fecha en que se restablezca la plena vigencia y vigor del poder político civil.-
- 3) Tenemos hoy la oportunidad de hecho de forjar un gran Pacto Nacional sin repercusiones públicas, que obligue a las fuerzas opositoras del gobierno a morigerarlas o templarlas en sus posturas, sin que pidan por esta aporte nada, quedando indirectamente obligadas con el gobierno para que pueda éste cumplir con sus funciones específicas.
- 4) Debemos pues jugar esta aparente inseguridad institucional en nuestro favor, limitando y dirigiendo a nuestros propios opositores; paradójicamente solo nosotros les podemos ofrecer a ellos la garantía de una Institucionalidad futura, cosa imprescindible para sus sendas supervivencias. En estos momentos el triunfo de la orientación del Gobierno es la única meta que puede garantizar la concreción de una próxima elección nacional.
- 5) De las peculiares características de este momento político debemos sacar un provecho espectacular como único medio para preservar la legalidad Institucional y la vigorización de nuestra corriente política. Inserto en esta orientación cabe: a) una orgánica y unitaria campaña publicitaria de todos los actos del gobierno que lo lancen a la opinión pública como mentor y gestor de reformas estructurales: imprescindibles, rápidas y asequibles al querer de la colectividad ciudadana; b) movilización de las fuerzas vivas del País y captación de sus voluntades, a través de las leyes ya radicadas en el Parlamento y de otras futuras que conjuguen una a ción dinámica del Gobierno; c) captación de los ilícitos económicos (bandera hoy del Ejército) por el gobierno dinamizado y agilizándolo a toda la justicia ordinaria, forjando desde la Suprema Corte un nuevo ritmo procesal en la sustanciación de este tipo de delitos socio-económicos; d) movilización política por parte de nuestro grupo tendiente a recabar el apoyo del pueblo para los actos de gobierno; e) identificación de Bordaberry como expresión de civilismo a través del Reeleccionismo movilizándolo a todo el País en torno a una pragmática precisa eficiente y popular; f) integración de los Entes Autónomos, antes de

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que se produzcan nuevas presiones Militares y con esta tácita aceptación de la oposición; dando en el ámbito de la opinión pública la imagen de un Gobierno de coherencia administrativa con una nueva fachada pronto para ir a la inmediata recuperación de la Administración Pública hoy deteriorada.

COYUNTURAS DEL URUGUAY Y APOYO EN EL AMBITO EXTERIOR

Parecería que el marco de nuestra lucha política solo se dirime dentro de los confines de nuestros límites geográficos, resultando intrascendentes las secuencias del orden jurídico internacional.

Deuda externa, Fondo Monetario, BID, ALALC, GAT, OEA, etc., etc., parecerían los únicos elementos de confluencia externa capaces de influenciar el quehacer Nacional. Su nominación hace innecesaria la apreciación de que si bien inciden dentro de nuestra coyuntura económica, sus secuencias políticas resultan desvanecientes y remotas. No obstante esto, no nos puede hacer olvidar la peculiar situación geográfica y geopolítica del Uruguay. Enmarcado entre dos gigantes, Brasil y Argentina, desde las Convenciones Preliminares de Paz de 1828 hasta hoy, resulta en múltiples aspectos efecto recurrente de las políticas de estos dos grandes países. Obvio resulta constatar que hoy Argentina ha decaído en su transcendencia de líder Latino-Americano; no obstante ello y para advertir la significación presente de la vigencia de la historia digamos que los Tupamaros tenía y tienen hermanadas confluencias de apoyo en Argentina. Notoria también es la vinculación política del Dr. Batlle con la Argentina y si él hubiera accedido al Gobierno es lógico suponer que integraríamos ese frente económico y político.

Brasil, hoy líder de América, es su espectro geopolítico, nunca le podrá resultar el Uruguay indiferente; no solo por razones de límites, sino y también pues es el puente con la Argentina, puente que ahora con la afloración de políticas dispares resulta objeto de prolifísimos análisis.

Brasil tiene dispuesto hoy en el Uruguay, con distinta perspectiva política, el mismo interés que siempre informó la historia. Por ello podemos decir que siempre directa o indirectamente frente a estados de crisis del Uruguay, Brasil invariablemente se sintió interesado en los mismo.

Toda esta vieja experiencia histórica recobra cruenta vigencia inexorable, cuando supimos la interesada y dinámica acción del 3er. Ejército brasileño vigilante frente al acto eleccionario de noviembre pasado y ante la eventual perspectiva del triunfo del Frente Amplio. Aunque sea penosos, resulta obvio advertir que frente a toda crisis política del Uruguay, Brasil siempre resultará particularmente interesado.

Ante este hecho político terminante creamos importante que debemos crear las condiciones para que si acaece un resquebrajamiento institucional de nuestro País, podamos nosotros orientar las influencias brasileñas en torno al diferendo. La legitimidad ~~de~~ constitucional de nuestro Gobierno es inquebrantable en todo plano si tiene vigencia plena el apoyo de Brasil. No existe colpismo posible si el Gobierno tiene el apoyo pleno del Brasil

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Nunca como hoy resulta imprescindible repensar las relaciones íntimas con el Brasil.

El problema es como crear las condiciones de entrelazamiento Uruguayo-brasileño en torno a la plena vigencia y resguardo de nuestro orden jurídico.

Por ello creemos que sería importantísimo la presencia de Pacheco Areco de Embajador ante Brasil. Este Embajador resalta condiciones especiales: el hombre político más votado; el máximo líder del mayor sector político del País; el líder que eligió al actual Presidente con el cual comulgan los mismos creos y los mismo ideales de Patria, Libertad y Democracia. El gobierno brasileño le abriría a Pacheco Areco todas sus compuertas pues sería importantísimo para Brasil en estos particulares momentos que vive América, tener proximidad total con el político más importante del Uruguay.

Pacheco podría así ser el rector decisivo de la influencia brasileña en el Uruguay, en el plano económico, social y político, justamente en el momento en que Brasil fue elegido por Estados Unidos para regimantar su cooperación en América.

Resulta innecesario advertir que Bordaberry proyectaría a nuestra economía con la llave maestra del éxito brasileño.

En síntesis, pensamos que la presencia del ex-Presidente Pacheco Areco en la Embajada del Brasil puede resultar de incalculable valía para la proyección de nuestro orden económico y de apoyo rector para la vigencia irrestricta de nuestro orden jurídico legalmente instituido por nuestro Estado de Derecho.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

OCT 16 1972

TO: Department of State
INFO: Amembassy BRASILIA
Amembassy BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO FOR POLAD

DATE: October 7, 1972

FROM: Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT: The Military Emerges as a Political Pressure Group

REF: Summary

After almost 70 years of political anonymity, the Uruguayan military has emerged as a political pressure group. Two decades of economic stagnation sharpened political differences and made some civilian politicians more inclined to invite increased military political influence. Leftist terrorism has provided the immediate catalyst. At first reluctantly drawn into the fight against the terrorists, the Armed Services' spectacular success catapulted them into the political arena and led them to view more critically the performance of the civilian political sector. Many officers, including key commanders, appear more convinced that they have special qualities of integrity, discipline and leadership which qualify them to act in other areas and that their mission as preservers of the Republic imposes this obligation upon them.

In recent months the military has extended its responsibilities to include an active role in suppressing economic corruption and officers appear to be pressing for the elimination of "subversive" influence in the national education system and in the Congress. The military's

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schedule of Executive Order 11652.
Automatically downgraded at two year
intervals and declassified on
December 31 1978.

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Clearances: POL: JLTull E/A: Mr. Morgan DAO: Capt. Walsh

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anti-subversive and economic roles have brought the military more equipment and personnel. The military institution now has access to public funds previously not available to them. The new popular respect for the military facilitates its assumption of a wider role which the institution can be expected to defend.

As a result, Uruguayan politicians increasingly accept as a fact the military's new political influence and it is a growing consideration in their own calculations. They, like we, are questioning how profound the adjustment of the traditional civil government must be to accommodate the military's new influence. Few, including this Embassy, have definite answers. The military's new political role is still formative. The pull of traditional loyalty to civilian government, reinforced by President BORDABERRY's success in achieving a working congressional majority, remains strong. A military coup at this writing appears unlikely. At the same time, the military is likely to continue to act against individuals seen as subversive or corrupt. Over the long run, the military's new political influence could increase, were the Administration to continue to flounder in resolving Uruguay's economic problems and were civilian consensus to erode further.

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A History of Loyal Professionals

Character, but no Reputation: Less than a decade ago, a prominent author wrote that the Uruguayan "people have no respect for their Army, Navy or Air Force". While the military officer was frequently viewed as a man of character - honest and dedicated - he lacked an organizational mission and the reputation and social status which goes with the successful accomplishment of a job.

Militarily, the Uruguayan Armed Forces had the unequal task of defending the country against major Latin American powers, Brazil and Argentina. Neither they nor the public expected them to fulfill this task and both were generally agreeable to providing only the limited resources necessary to maintain the facade of a military organization. While Argentina and Brazil were expending 16-17% of their public income on the military, Uruguay rarely budgeted more than 11% for this purpose. Even by the reduced standards of Latin America, the Uruguayan military's equipment was antiquated and little used.

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Politically, for almost 70 years the military has been loyal supporters of civilian government. They failed to develop a separate caste, distinct and outside the main stream of political life. The military did not, as in other Latin American nations, view itself as the almost exclusive guardians of domestic political tranquility or as the arbiters of civilian political differences.

Functioning Civilian Government: Behind the military's lack of a separate political identity was a functioning civilian governmental system. Important opposition groups were assured a hearing and often participation and a percentage of patronage in this system. This in turn assured a high level of civilian consensus, consensus which effectively avoided the alienation of important political sectors from the system and their resort to inviting military intervention in their behalf. Military officers themselves were often members of the leading government and opposition parties - Colorados and Blancos. Newspaper articles on the military noted not only the rank and position of the officer mentioned but, of equal importance, his political affiliation. Senior officers were frequently promoted and posted according to their political party membership. Political considerations also influenced assignments of military officers to autonomous state enterprises. But just as in the functioning civilian governmental system, military officers who were partisans of the opposition party were provided with sufficient inducement to retain their loyalty to a civilian-dominated system.

Over time, the military tended to take comfort in the anonymity of a secure if inglorious professional role. Civilian politicians absorbed the brunt of controversy. Nationalistic pride reinforced the military's anonymous political role as they looked across the River Plate with disdain at the more obvious and controversial political role of the Argentine military. As late as January 1968, the majority of officers voting at the Centro Militar (the major Uruguayan Army social organization) refused to take a stand extolling Latin American military officers who had died fighting guerrilla movements out of fear that such an act would be interpreted as political.

Changing Circumstances

More than a decade of social and economic distress, sharpening political differences and new security challenges have begun to erode the traditional basis of Uruguayan society. The military has also been affected:

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New Role - Anti-Subversive: By the late 1960s, the Uruguayan Government was more and more occupied with the subversion threat of the Tupamaros and other terrorist groups. Nevertheless, during this period, combatting terrorism was seen as essentially a police matter, with the military remaining largely on the margin of the fight. By mid-1970, however, with the massive robbery by the Tupamaros of arms from the Navy Training Center, some officers within the military became convinced that the Armed Services would have to become fully committed to the anti-subversive campaign. More importantly, key Administration civilian leaders themselves reached the same conclusion. The military was increasingly called upon to provide personnel to supplement police patrols. After the September 1971 escape of 106 Tupamaros from the Punta Carretas prison, President PACHECO assigned the Armed Forces with responsibility to coordinate and lead the effort. When President Bordaberry became president on March 1, 1972, he further increased the military's police role by appointing active duty military officers to head 18 of the nation's 19 police departments. The military at first reluctantly accepted its new anti-subversive responsibilities. But as their successes began to mount, military officers have identified more and more with this effort.

New Role - Economic and Legal: The expanded anti-subversive role has been paralleled on a smaller scale by increased military concern with economic activities, especially illicit operations. In part, leads developed by the military during their anti-subversive operations directed their attention to economic abuses. But there is also a growing feeling that economic corruption is at the root of subversion and that the battle against subversion will be incomplete unless the Armed Forces also become active in this field.

In order to coordinate and institutionalize military efforts in the economic sphere, President Bordaberry revived the Commission to Suppress Illicit Economic Activities (CRIE) in September. Four of the seven CRIE directors are military officers and the Armed Services are instructed to assist the Commission in the elimination of "all activities which injure the national economy". In recent months, military-led operations have ranged from crushing a counterfeiting ring to arresting a number of prominent businessmen charged with illegal foreign exchange operations. Military officers have also opened up a number of investigations into the economic activities of politicians, including a controversial inquiry into the business dealings of pro-Administration political leader, Jorge BATLLE.

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The military's economic role has expanded in other ways. Traditionally, military officers have been assigned to autonomous state enterprises. In recent years there are indications that the number of officers so assigned has increased. In one case, the Air Force has taken over the domestic air routes of the state airline (PLUNA) when the latter proved unable to provide satisfactory service. An enlarged military judiciary has been mainly engaged in processing the large number of imprisoned subversives. However, military judges have also accepted legal jurisdiction over a recent assault on the National University. Further afield, the military judges have processed cases involving economic abuses.

Growth and Diversification: These new military roles have provided the impetus for an increase in military personnel, for materiel gains and for the development of more sophisticated administrative abilities.

Under the 1967 Constitution, Congress authorized a gradual increase in military personnel. Appropriations that would allow for such increases, however, only began to appear as the military's role itself increased. Thus, from a relatively small base, the military has significantly expanded in recent years.

Military Personnel Strength

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Army	12,470	13,680	14,530
Navy	2,594	2,846	3,500
Air Force	1,639	1,793	1,935
Total	16,703	18,319	19,965

Source: DAO

The growing size of the military is also manifest in the Army's interest in increasing recruitment of junior officers. The Army academy which in recent years had graduated some 50-sub-Lts. per year is now expanding and senior officers hope to be graduating 100 new officers annually within the next few years.

In terms of materiel, the military's status has also measurably improved in recent years. Largely with the help of external assistance, the Army (the key military service and the leader in the anti-subversive fight) has been re-equipped with small arms and transportation. The

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Navy and the Air Force, to a lesser extent, have received newer equipment. The U.S. in particular has contributed to this materiel renewal program. From an annual level of about a million and one-half dollars in the mid-1960s, total assistance to Uruguay increased to over 7 million dollars in 1971 and is currently running at the level of about 3 million dollars annually. This is in addition to substantial deliveries of excess U.S. military equipment.

As expenses for personnel operations and the maintenance of equipment have increased, the military's budget has also gradually risen in recent years. From a level of 11% of total public expenditures, the budget has gone up to approximately 13% and in 1972 will probably exceed 14%.

Military Budget

	1961	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Current Pesos (millions)	-66	3,501	5,918	10,208	13,585	16,266
Constant 1961 Pesos (millions)	307	356	267	381	435	422
% of Total Public Expenditures	11.2	12.4	11.5	13.0	13.4	12.5

Source: USAID

Reflecting the military's new importance, the 1973 draft budget for the first time raises military salaries to a par with those of civilian functionaries. The draft budget, in an effort to finance some US\$4 million of additional expenses this year for anti-subversive programs, also contains a one-time 50% increase in certain taxes.

As its role has increased, the military has also begun to diversify and specialize in order to fulfill its more complex tasks. The military's intelligence and coordination capacities have increased and it has developed rudimentary media and public relations programs in order better to explain its anti-subversive efforts. To meet its increased responsibilities the Army is presently studying the creation of service corps - adjutant general, military police, medical, and signal - to better organize and institutionalize personnel now providing these services.

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New Respect: Military success in its anti-subversive efforts has led to the emergence of a new popular image of the military. Until this year, public opinion surveys noted that the average Uruguayan believed that the Tupamaros were more intelligent and able than the police and military services. By July of this year, however, a Gallup poll found that 64% of the population was favorably impressed with the Armed Services' anti-subversive activities and for the first time the public felt that the military was more intelligent and able than the terrorists.

"The most intelligent and able are . . ."

	<u>Jul '72</u>	<u>Jan '71</u>	<u>Aug '70</u>	<u>Apr '69</u>
Joint Forces ^a	33%	17%	24%	25%
<u>Tupamaros</u>	20%	45%	42%	30%
No Opinion	47%	38%	24%	45%

Source: Gallup, July 1972

^a Police only prior to September 1971. Since then police and military under the latter's direction.

Esprit de corps: The military's success has also enhanced its self-image. In a country where so much seems to stagnate or not get done, their accomplishment has been measurable. The shared danger in the "war" also has contributed to a new sense of military fraternity - a closing ranks at the forefront of the fight to save Uruguay. Cooperation and coordination between the various services has been institutionalized for the first time in the Armed Forces Joint Staff established after the September 1971 Tupamaro jailbreak.

Recent key military appointments appear to reinforce further this sense of separate military identity. President Bordaberry, although a Colorado, traces his roots back to the Ruralista movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s. As a senator in the Blanco-Ruralist Party, Bordaberry was a leader in the 1964 congressional fight to confirm the promotion to general of Blanco military officer Mario AGUERRONDO. As President, Bordaberry has turned to a number of officers closely associated with Aguerrondo and the Blanco-Ruralist movement for important commands: General Esteban CRISTI, Chief of Military Region I;

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General Eduardo ZUBIA, Chief of Military Region II; General Gregorio ALVAREZ (appointed by President Pacheco but retained by President Bordaberry), Chief of the Armed Forces Joint Staff; and Colonel Mario BARBE, Chief of the President's military household.

We still do not know enough about the motivation and philosophy of Aguerrondista officers and it is incorrect to view them as a single and coherent political current within the military. But relative to other senior officers, the Aguerrondistas have a more provincial concept of civilian-military cooperation. As Blancos, they were often posted to the less desirable interior posts where barracks life played a more prominent role in their social and daily activities and where they tended to identify with the virtues of a separate military ethic.

Fissures in Civilian Consensus

Probably the most notable evolution, however, is the increased tendency for civilians to invite military involvement in day-to-day political life. As economic and social issues have made political differences more acute, both the right and the left and the Administration and its opposition increasingly have sought to use military support for their particular political purposes.

Politization: During the late 1960s, the military was frequently brought into politics by its use to break strikes. During the 1969 strike by private bank employees, President Pacheco finally placed these employees under military authority and discipline. Some 200 workers became subject to court-martial for desertion when they failed to appear for work. When Congress indicated that it might overturn the mobilization of these workers, then-Minister of Defense General Antonio FRANCESE warned legislators that such action would be considered "an insult to the military". President Pacheco's frequent resort to executive decrees rather than to legislative procedures also served to alienate his political opposition and erode the Government-opposition consensus which has been the traditional basis for stable civilian government. The 1971 elections tended to check further erosion within the major parties. But on the right and left, new forces of alienation have emerged.

Brazilian vs. Peruvian Models: During the last year, the rightist publication Azul y Blanco has openly pumped for military political intervention à la Brazil. The triad of the right's targets have a Brazilian flavor - Communism, corruption and economic mismanagement. Though President Bordaberry is exempted from criticism, politicians in general

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and some Ministers (especially Ministers of Finance Francisco FORTEZA and Education Julio Maria SANGUINETTI who are identified with Jorge Batlle's List 15 political faction) are attacked as corrupt or secret "Communists". The military is lauded by Azul y Blanco as alone having the moral authority to end these national ills.

The left also has sought to identify the military with its goals. For doctrinaire reasons and probably out of fear that the military in power might outlaw their parties, Frente Amplio politicians deny that they favor a Peruvian-type military coup. But the Peruvian model is foremost in their minds and is frequently referred to as evidence that the left and the military are not natural enemies. It is indicative of the Marxist left's aspirations that they chose as their presidential candidate for the 1971 elections a politically-motivated retired army general, Liber SEREGNI.

In recent months, as the military has shown increased interest in economic affairs, leftist hopes have grown that the Armed Services might act as a pressure group in behalf of reform it favors. Frente Amplio Senators Zelmar MICHELINI (ex-Colorado), Juan Pablo TERRA (Christian Democrat), Frente Deputy Jaime PEREZ (Communist) and writer Mario BENEDETTI (who is closely associated with the MLN terrorist organization) have each publicly noted that in the military's fight against the terrorists, many officers have acquired a better appreciation and sympathy for leftist revolutionary goals. Thus, Benedetti recently asked if the military's violence against the MLN might not now be turned, "against the profound causes that have brought so many youths to risk all for their convictions". Terra has noted a growing "coincidence" between the Frente and the military.

From Loyal Defenders to Loyal Critics

Nationalist military officers reject efforts to mold them in the image of Brazil or Peru - these are categories rarely heard within the military. There are considerable differences of philosophies and personalities in the officer corps. And there is still much that we do not know about the attitudes of key officers - especially the Aguerrondistas who so recently have come to prominence. Even as a corporate body, the military still appears surprised at its sudden prominence and uncertain as to how active it should be in its new roles.

But the military's defense of its increased role and the appeals of civilian groups have not been without effect. Having taken the brunt of the sacrifices in the anti-subversive campaign, the military now feels it has the right and duty to express concern lest civilian politicians

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fail to resolve the underlying problems which created the subversion. Their spectacular success against the Tupamaros, in an otherwise dreary political and economic scene, has also led them to postulate that they might have some special attributes of integrity, discipline and leadership which qualify them to counsel on other problems. They have departed from their role as silent political participants for one as an independent pressure group.

Defense of Their Honor: Their new tasks have exposed them to unaccustomed criticism. The military has been outspoken and indignant in its reaction to this criticism. When Congress authorized an investigation of alleged torture in military units, the Centro Militar (which five years earlier had refused to take a stand on an issue that might be considered political) now ignored a specific request from Army Commander in Chief General Florencio GRAVINA to avoid any pronouncement. Instead, on July 4, the Centro denounced any effort to impune the military's reputation as "complicity with the enemies of the nation". Subsequently, Air Force, Navy and retired officers' clubs issued similar denunciations directed against any effort to question the military's honor.

Moralization: Central to much of the military's criticism is a revulsion against corruption in Uruguayan political and economic life. The Navy Club in its resolution of August 4 condemned not only terrorists but also "those who exploit the national economy, usurp from the people the product of their work, promote moral corruption whether it be administrative or political, and engage in speculation to the detriment of the population". Air Force Brigadier José P. JAUME repeated this theme when, as spokesman for the Armed Services at the annual September 23 commemoration of the death of Artigas, he condemned "usurers", "contrabanders", and "speculators" and concluded that the battle against subversion has not and would not end until the nation "undertook with equal energy the patriotic task of removing the causes of violence".

To a large extent, the military's frustration over corruption is vented against politicians who are seen as having brought the country to the current impasse. Many officers, but particularly Blancos who have served the longest periods in the interior, have absorbed the rural area's distrust of Montevideo's political and economic domination of the nation and of the "corrupted", citified politicians who live in the capital. Moreover, though as individuals many officers have their own and differing views on the needs for social and economic reform, as an institution the need to end moral corruption is a unifying banner.

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Politicians are very sensitive to this criticism. Opposition Blanco leader Senator Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate was sufficiently concerned that in August he publicly defended the honesty and patriotism of civilian politicians. In the same month, civilian Minister of Defense Augusto LEGNANI warned his fellow politicians and the political parties of the need for greater public honesty, lest the credibility of civilian government be undermined.

Uruguay's Montevideo-based business community also is subject to a portion of the military's suspicion. Again the military, with its rural experience, often accepts the interior's critical view of the debilitating national influence of Uruguay's high cost financial and industrial enterprises. And in Uruguay's complicated and bureaucratic economy, business survival has often been dependent on operations at the margin of the law - operations that are suspect in the eye of the military.

Defense of Their Accomplishments: Military criticism is particularly intense toward politicians and, somewhat less so, toward political groups which they associate with subversive organizations. In the heat of the anti-subversive "war", trafficking with individuals who have apologized for the terrorists has been seen as disloyalty to their slain military colleagues. Elements within the military continue to press for the lifting of the congressional immunities of legislators closely linked with the MLN. Condemnations of "demagogues and agitators who sell false illusions and propagandize utopias" (oblique references to Frente Amplio politicians and labor leaders) have crept into the public jargon of military speakers. The Uruguayan educational system has been another target of military suspicion, linked as it is in the public mind with terrorist movements and street agitation.

Frente Amplio politicians have been acutely sensitive to these military sensitivities. There was considerable distress and friction within the Frente Amplio in July and August when the pro-MLN faction of Senator Enrique ERRO provoked a confrontation with the military by seating Deputy Washington FERRER in the Congress at a time when he was being held as a subversive suspect (a controversy which eventually ended with the lifting of Deputy Ferrer's immunity in order that he might be tried for subversive activities). Even more moderate political groups such as Senator Wilson Ferreira Aldunate's Por la Patria movement have sought to avoid positions where they must oppose or appear to oppose the military. Ferreira was also incensed by the Ferrer incident as he felt that both the left (which had brought Ferrer into the Congress) and the right (which had pushed the lifting of Ferrer's immunity only days before his temporary congressional term ended) were seeking to embarrass

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him and his supporters by forcing them to take sides. Concern over the possible harsh reaction of the military also appears to be an element moderating the actions of leaders of the Communist-dominated National Labor Convention (CNT). On a number of occasions, leftist publications have felt it necessary to debunk the possibility of a military coup because fear of such action was overly restraining leftist labor and political leaders from fulfilling their political programs.

Defense of Their Perquisites: The military's new prominence has led to a number of material gains for officers and enlisted men. The military believes that it has earned a greater participation in the distribution of public resources. Augmented manpower, higher salaries, new military judgeships, and greater inter-service cooperation are realities which they want to preserve.

A Long Term Problem

The concerns and interests of the military do not coalesce into one monolithic military political policy. The pull of traditional loyalty to civilian government is still strong. Military officers with important command and staff responsibilities are quick to reaffirm their own loyalties to the Constitution and often credit democratic processes with contributing to the popular support which has made possible their success against terrorism. Few officers are eager to accept direct responsibility for Uruguay's multiple problems. Even those officers associated with the Ruralista movement, despite their tendency to be more critical of the political sector, closely and personally identify with President Bordaberry. President Bordaberry's success in obtaining a congressional majority is a further element in maintaining civilian consensus and discouraging military concerns. Equally important, the Administration's major political opposition comes from the democratically-oriented majority faction of the Blanco Party. These are important elements in the continuing military support for civilian rule.

At the same time, the military's new political interest and influence is likely to remain. The military will actively seek to maintain its new status and reputation and to pressure the civilian political sector in areas of concern. Uruguayan political leaders of all persuasions are now accepting the military's political role as a permanent factor - a problem which will require adjustments in Uruguay's traditional civilian political system. Both the military and civilian politicians are asking themselves exactly how and in what manner these adjustments will be made.

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Our own estimate is at best preliminary. Uncertain as the military is in its still formative political role, it will be wary of pressing for policies which cannot command the full support of officers or which do not appear of direct interest to the Armed Forces. Action against speculators and those who can be closely tied to leftist terrorists thus are likely to continue as the prime areas of military concern and initiative. Civilian politicians, in turn aware of cleavages within the military, are likely to resist Armed Forces' pressures when the latter are poorly founded (e.g., likely Congressional resistance to lifting the immunity of a legislator on the basis of inconclusive charges).

In the short run, the major danger of this adjustment process is that one or the other participant may overreact - a particular problem given the military's sensitivity to criticism and the increased willingness of some civilian sectors to invite military intervention. But the longer run and more important problem lies with the quality of Uruguayan government - for the Administration's success or failure in resolving Uruguay's long-standing problems (about which the Armed Services are now deeply and actively concerned) will in large part determine the extent to which the military feels compelled to exert its new political voice.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02577 062137Z

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ACTION ARA-17

INFO OCT-21 CU-24 NIC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2970
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: THE "NATIONALIZATION" OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

REF : A. MONTEVIDEO A-162 — *EDU 9 UR*
R. MONTEVIDEO A-163 — *EDU 9-3 UR*
XR POL 13-2 UR

1. PRESIDENT BORDABERRY AND MINISTER OF EDUCATION SANGUINETTI IN OCTOBER 5 NATION-WIDE TELEVISION & U RADIO BROADCAST OFFICIALLY FORWARDED TO CONGRESS EXECUTIVE'S PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM. BILL MAINTAINS PROVISIONS OUTLINED REF "A". IN ADDITION IT PROVIDES FOR SECRET AND COMPULSORY VOTING DURING ELECTIONS FOR STUDENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES AT UNIVERSITY OF THE REPUBLIC.

2. AS EXECUTIVE REQUESTED "URGENT" CONSIDERATION OF BILL, CONGRESS WILL HAVE 45 DAYS TO ACT ON PROPOSAL (A PERIOD WHICH UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE EXTENDED ANOTHER 40 DAYS) BEFORE BILL AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES LAW.

3. IN RADIO/TELEVISION STATEMENT, BORDABERRY UNDERLINED HIS PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION WITH BILL AND THE PUBLIC COMMITMENT OF HIS ADMINISTRATION TO INSURE AN IMPARTIAL AND NON-IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM. MINISTER SANGUINETTI CHARACTERIZED BILL

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POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

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POL 23-8 UR
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TELEGRAM

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ACTION ARA-17

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-02 PM-02 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
P-02 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 SY-03 OMB-01 RSR-01

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2853
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UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 2422

CINCSO FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS OVW UED#SY/FO

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

1. GOU HAS ANNOUNCED CAPTURE OF "TUPAMARO" LEADER GABINO FALERO MONTES DE OCA AND PRISON-ESCAPEE ANDRUBAL PEREYRA CABRERE IN SECRET ROOM BENEATH HOUSE IN CERRO DISTRICT OF MONTEVIDEO.
2. GOU ALSO ANNOUNCED INDICTMENTS BY MILITARY COURTS OF TWENTY-SEVEN SUBVERSIVES, INCLUDING "FRENTE AMPLIO" DEPARTMENTAL LEGISLATOR FOR MONTEVIDEO KLEBER VAZQUEDKCUIMARAENA. VAZQUEZ WAS ELECTED IN NOVEMBER 1971 TO REPRESENT FACTION LED BY SENATOR ENRIQUE ERRO.
3. GOU HAS ARRESTED PILOT AND YOIZED CESNA 310 AIRCRAFT BELONGING TO "TUPAMARO" ORGANIZATION. PLANE WAS BASED AT COMMERCIAL AIRFIELD IN INTERIOR CITY OF TACUAREMBO.
4. GOU HAS ARRESTED TWELVE SUSPECTED "TUPAMAROS" IN MONTEVIDEO, SEVEN IN COLONIA, FOUR IN PASO DE LOS TOROS, AND FOUR IN SALTO.
5. ON SEPTEMBER 17, MOLOTOV COCKTAILS WERE THROWN AT HOME OF

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

JUL 26 1972

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JUL 21 4 48 PM '72

TO : Department of State

INFO : CINCSO for POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

RS/AN DATE: July 5, 1972

ANALYSIS BRANCH

SUBJECT: CNT: Pressures From the Left

REF :

✓ RS/R

1972 JUL 21 PM 5 02

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Despite words of protest, street meetings, and limited work stoppages, the Communist Party and its labor arm, the CNT, have reacted to the Government's campaign against the Tupamaro terrorists with restraint. Doctrinally, the Communist Party considers the Tupamaros as "deviationists" and "petits bourgeois" but has avoided frontally attacking the terrorist organization. The attempt to take a middle position by damning the violence of the Government as well as the MLN carries the risk that the Communist Party and the CNT will make themselves targets of the GOU's anti-subversive attacks. Alternatively, too "conservative", "establishment" position invites criticism of the Communist Party and the CNT from the left.

According to an Uruguayan trade unionist who is actively involved in the Marxist Frente Amplio coalition, discontent with the CNT's conservatism peaked during the last week of June. A group of Frentistas met to decide whether to form another central labor body which, freed of the dominance of the Communist Party, could show the militancy and power of the labor movement "in the streets". The idea was rejected, presumably because the proponents recognized the difficulty in displacing the Communists as the leaders of organized labor in Uruguay at this time, but they decided

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Subject to general declassification
schedule of executive order 11652.
Automatically downgraded at two
year intervals and declassified
on Dec. 31, 1978.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

LABATT: SMBlock: bjs

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM: Mr. Stiz

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Page 2 of A-116
MONTEVIDEO

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to carry on the "struggle" from within the CNT. In the view of our source, now is the time for unions to make their maximum demands, as the Government is too preoccupied with the Tupamaros to take on the labor movement as well.

The participants in this meeting to form a rival labor confederation are not known, although it is likely that many of the organizations which criticized the "obsession" of the Communist leadership of the CNT with national elections at the June 1971 Congress of the CNT (A-122 of July 18, 1971) were represented. This would include the FUNSA (tire and rubber products) union whose four senior officers are being detained by the Government as suspected subversives. To protest the arrests, the union has been occupying the plant for almost two weeks.

Another likely participant in the last week's meeting was the Federacion de la Bebida (soft drink bottlers). According to our source, this was the only organization that actively protested the shooting of the eight Communist workers on April 17 in a confrontation with the military (MVD 0885). The Federacion decided to refuse to deliver soft drinks to the Army and to the estancia of President Bordaberry. The gesture - which lasted a very short time - was particularly significant as the leadership of this union does not include members of the Communist Party. This union has been especially acid in criticizing the Communist leadership of the CNT for its "timidity", even when the lives of its fellow members are involved.

Those union leaders hostile to Communist control of the CNT find the confederation's protest activity inadequate. In their view, the CNT's "march" on June 19 to protest the "repression" of civil liberties was perfunctory. Our source claims that the Party used strong arm methods to maintain discipline during the manifestation, and that one worker who shouted Tupamaro slogans was beaten up.

Comment: At the last CNT congress, the critics of the Communist Party's domination of the confederation who

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urged a more "militant" program did not have sufficient strength to bring their case before the convention floor. While this group may have grown since June 1971, the fact that the plan to form a rival organization was rejected suggests that the opposition to the Communist leadership of the CNT still remains small. Nevertheless, we would expect the Communist hierarchy of the CNT to make some concessions to the left. These will not, however, be sufficient to satisfy the critics, as the CNT presumably does not wish to share the military spotlight with the Tupamaros. The Government has repeatedly recognized the CNT as the labor organization most representative of Uruguayan labor and thereby entitled to nominate the Workers' Delegate to ILO conferences. The Communist leadership does not wish to jeopardize that status.

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INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 1271

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION AGREEMENT APPEARS NEAR

1. FOLLOWING ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR MEETING MAY 25 BETWEEN PRESIDENT BORDABERRY AND OPPOSITION BLANCO LEADER FERREIRA ALDUNATE, PROSPECTS APPEAR BRIGHT FOR PRESIDENT'S LONG SOUGHT EFFORT TO REACH A POLITICAL AGREEMENT WITH OPPOSITION BLANCOS WHICH WOULD ASSURE HIS ADMINISTRATION LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY. FOLLOWING INTERVIEW, FERREIRA AGAIN DECLARED THAT HIS COALITION DOES NOT SEEK JOBS OR PATRONAGE IN EXCHANGE FOR COOPERATION, BUT ADMITTED THAT HE AND PRESIDENT HAD FOUND MANY POINTS OF AGREEMENT IN DISCUSSING NEEDED LEGISLATION. FERREIRA ALSO DECLARED THAT HE THOUGHT IT ONLY QUESTION "OF HOURS" UNTIL SOME TYPE OF FORMAL AGREEMENT IS ANNOUNCED.

2. SINCE TAKING OFFICE MARCH 1, PRESIDENT BORDABERRY HAS CONTINUOUSLY PRESSED BLANCO PARTY TO JOIN HIS ADMINISTRATION IN "GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY". ALTHOUGH INITIAL BLANCO REACTION WAS LIMITED TO PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FOR LEGISLATION "IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS".
BORDABERRY REFUSED TO TAKE "NO" FOR AN ANSWER. HE SUCCEEDED IN HEARING DOWN BLANCO RELUCTANCE TO POINT WHERE BLANCO MINORITY FACTIONS OF SENATORS ECHEGOYEN AND ALBERTO HEBER ARE OPENLY CALLING FOR

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Montevideo 1271
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-72 NO. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES, CINCSO FOR POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO DATE: May 3, 1972

SUBJECT: Inner-Party Conflict Provokes Blanco Convention

REF : A-40 of March 15, 1972

HANDLING INDICATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
MAY 9 - 1972

1. Background

As noted in the referenced airgram, the Blanco Party coalition led by Senator Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate, which represents two-thirds of the Party's seats in the Legislature, differs substantially from the minority factions of Senator Martin ECHEGOYEN and Alberto HEBER on the extent of cooperation which should be offered by the Party to the Bordaberry Administration. Ferreira successfully led an effort early in March to reject President BORDABERRY's offer of "co-participation" in his Administration in exchange for Blanco political backing. Although pledging legislative support for those Bordaberry initiatives considered "in the national interest", Ferreira has attempted to establish a much more independent stance than Echegoyen and Heber, both of whom favor a closer working relationship with the President's Administration. Despite the Party Directorate's earlier refusal of "co-participation", President Bordaberry has continued to keep Blanco unity under pressure by offers of patronage and governmental positions to the minority Echegoyen and Heber factions in return for their support. A case in point which for a time threatened the delicate fabric of Blanco unity is the Administration's effort to secure a venia, or confirmation from the Senate, for the naming of ex-President Jorge PACHECO as Ambassador to Spain.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: Mr. Ortiz

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2. The Venia Issue

Although Ferreira and his coalition voted to permit Pacheco to leave the country before the constitutional six month limitation had expired, Ferreira made it vehemently clear that he did so on the basis of his view that the farther Pacheco was from Uruguay, the better it would be for the country. He made several bitter personal attacks upon the ex-President, charging that Pacheco had assumed "dictatorial" powers and declaring his adamant opposition to the confirmation of Pacheco as Ambassador. In mid-March, all Blanco Party legislators met and agreed to oppose the confirmation motion. With the certain opposition by the Frente Amplio coalition, it appeared the ex-President's venia was doomed. Pacheco supporters in Congress were visibly upset by this turn of events and charged that President Bordaberry had "mishandled" the venia request. At this point, however, Vice President Jorge SAPELLI, who as president both of the Senate and General Assembly has been a very active lobbyist for the President in Congress, held several private meetings with representatives of the Heber and Echegoyen factions. According to one report, the Administration offered an important ambassadorship to Heber faction Senator ZORRILLA de San Martin. This would permit faction leader Alberto Heber to enter the Senate as Zorrilla's suplente or substitute. Rumors of similar offers to the Echegoyen faction were also heard, as both Echegoyen and Heber openly began to soften their opposition to Pacheco's confirmation. The venia issue began to take on aspects of a major test of Ferreira's domination and leadership of the Blanco Party. Ferreira's response to the looming defections of Echegoyen and Heber was to seek a meeting of the Directorate of the Blanco Party designed to proclaim opposition to the venia as a "political issue". By Party statute, this would have made it obligatory for Blanco legislators to vote against Pacheco's confirmation. To the surprise and dismay of the Ferreira coalition, the Directorate split 7-7, with Party President Homero MURDOCH refusing to break the tie. An angered and wrathful Ferreira coalition thereupon called for a meeting of the full 600 member Party Convention to consider the issue. Obviously, Ferreira and his supporters, certain of their overwhelming position in the Convention, hoped to use this device as a means of whipping minority dissidents back into line.

3. The Convention

By the time the Convention met on April 19, however, several events had changed Ferreira's prospects. First,

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Echegoyen and Heber dissidents remained defiant and their delegates boycotted the Convention session. Second, events of the previous week - the barbarous murder by MLN/Tupamaro terrorists of four officials followed by Congressional approval (with full Blanco support) of a "state of internal war" on April 15 - had altered the political situation of the country considerably and the Pacheco confirmation no longer appeared even to its most staunch opponents as the burning issue it once had been. In fact, shortly before the Convention opened, the single point on its agenda, consideration of the venia, had been changed to call simply for a general review of the political situation of the country.

Despite the absence of Echegoyen and Heber delegates, the Convention met with over 400 delegates participating - a clear operating majority. The Convention itself was a one man show - Ferreira's. He was its only speaker on matters of substance, as he held forth for over one hour reviewing the general situation in the country and the Party's position. He pledged full Blanco support to the Government in defense of the country's democratic institutions. He reiterated his earlier position that the Party was not interested in Cabinet positions or other government jobs, but added the qualification that government agencies and enterprises should have the services of the best qualified men available. He also spoke of his high personal regard for President Bordaberry. He then presented an eight-point declaration of Party principals which was immediately adopted by acclamation. By all accounts, it was a masterful performance.

The declaration itself also expressed the Party's determination to defend the nation's democratic institutions. It condemned the use of violence by both the left and the right. It called upon Party members to denounce public and private corruption and condemned the economic policies of the previous government which it claimed were being continued by the present Administration. It called for the re-establishment of social peace by the joint action of all institutions and individuals and promised support for government positions clearly identified with the best interests of the country. It also pledged to support proposals for social and economic reform to improve the quality of life in Uruguay. Separate from the main declaration, the Convention also passed a resolution urging Blanco senators to vote against the confirmation of Pacheco. However, the almost off-hand, pro forma

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treatment of this formerly explosive theme showed how far Pacheco's confirmation had dropped as a major Party issue. Since the Convention did not declare the matter to be a subject of Party discipline, dissenting factions were freed to vote as they wish. Most informed observers believe that if a vote were taken, the Senate would approve Pacheco's appointment with Blanco defections assuring its passage. Indeed, it now appears likely that Pacheco's confirmation may never come to a vote at all. As a face-saving compromise to avoid further Congressional debate, the Senate may simply take no further action on the matter, in which case Pacheco's venia would be automatically approved on May 6, the end of the sixty-day deadline for Senate review.

COMMENT: There are several conclusions which can be drawn from the venia episode. First, we believe that Ferreira erred in allowing Pacheco's confirmation to become a vehicle for a major show of his strength. His strong personal attacks on Pacheco made him appear personally vengeful and spiteful in many eyes. The issue obviously had no great political significance either for the country or the Party itself. Second, Ferreira's softened attitude regarding the need for all Blancos to oppose the venia appears to be a recognition by him that the Party has an intransigent minority which he cannot control and which could break the Party's unity, something Ferreira wishes to avoid. During the days immediately prior to the Convention, reports began to circulate of an imminent agreement between Blancos and the Bordaberry Administration for a broad "national agreement" which would establish common positions on the nation's most basic problems. Ferreira himself has made several general but favorable comments on such an accord. Although the Convention clearly underscored Ferreira's leadership of the Party's majority, he appears determined not to let the Party's dissidents wander too far off the reservation toward the Bordaberry camp. If any type of understanding is to be reached with the Bordaberry Administration, Ferreira will wish to influence it and have a decisive voice in the resulting quid pro quo.

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RS/AN HALL-26

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TO : Department of State

INFO: CINCSO for POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT: Frente Amplio Renews Charges of USG Involvement In "Death Squad"; Requests List of Embassy Employees

REF :

DATE: March 22, 1972

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
MAR 30 4 15 PM 1972 APR 4 1972

RS/AN ANALYSIS BRANCH

Earlier this month, a new element was added to the current efforts of the Marxist-dominated Frente Amplio coalition to connect the USG with rightist terrorist groups and allegations of police torture. On March 8, Frente Deputy Jorge DURAN Matos, a member of radical leftist Senator Enrique ERRO's faction, formally requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide him a list of officials assigned to the British and U. S. Embassies here, as well as the length of assignment of each official.

Duran gave no explanation for his request, but CAS sources indicate that his intentions are to expose the intelligence activities of the U. S. Embassy. A British Embassy source told us privately that he believes his Embassy was included in this request because of a recent visit here by a four-man team to train the Embassy's Uruguayan guards in protective measures. The Uruguayan Foreign Ministry was officially notified of the visit of this team (without specifying their duties) and this could have been made known to Duran, although we have no information which would substantiate this. Foreign Minister MORA Otero subsequently told the Ambassador that he believed the Ministry could respond to Duran's request without giving him grounds for further attacks on us.

During the past month, members of the Frente Amplio have renewed the campaign which they began during last year's Enclosure No. 1-A/S

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Group 3 - downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:JLTull:bjs

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: Mr. Ortiz

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Page 2 of A-45
MONTEVIDEO

election to link Embassy officials with what has become an almost nightly series of bombing attacks by rightist groups against the homes of Frente supporters. Enclosure No. 1 is an editorial in the Communist Party's daily El Popular of March 19 which is illustrative of the Frente's campaign. Frente Congressmen have also demanded a Congressional investigation of their charges that police and military officials have tortured and mistreated suspects, many of whom are Frente members and, as the enclosure indicates, have attempted to link the Embassy with these activities.

COMMENT: The Frente Amplio is obviously seeking to embarrass the Bordaberry Government on the "law and order" issue in an effort to counter the Administration's conciliatory approach aimed at securing congressional approval of a new "National Security Law". In addition, the Frente may be stung by recent disclosures that many of those who have been arrested for terrorist sympathies or activities in interior areas have been well-known Frente supporters. Charges of "foreign involvement" in attacks on the Frente provide good newspaper copy and we expect such charges to increase rather than diminish in the months ahead.

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Enclosure No. 1 to A-45 MONTEVIDEO

EL POPULAR

Director: EDUARDO VIERA
Sub - Directores: S. SCHWARZ (Redactor Responsable)
J. J. MARTINEZ
Administrador: LUIS RODRIGUEZ
18 de Julio 848, 2º Piso - Teléfonos: 98 36 55; 56; 57
Teléfono Sección Espectáculos: 98 71 80
Telex 719 - POPULAR CX

Año XVI - Montevideo, Domingo 19 de Marzo de 1972 - No 5155

EL ACTO CONTRA EL FASCISMO

REVISTE una enorme significación el acto programado para el próximo jueves 23 contra el fascismo, en repudio al asesinato de Ibero Gutiérrez, en defensa de las libertades públicas, contra los ataques a la enseñanza. El acto, al que convoca el plenario de organizaciones obreras, populares, estudiantiles, en cuyo centro están la CNT y la FEUU, es a la vez un punto de partida hacia nuevas demostraciones para denunciar la amenaza fascista, los crímenes de sus bandas armadas, y para frenarlo y derrotarlo con la acción organizada y unida de las masas.

Noche a noche se suceden nuevos atentados de estas bandas fascistas, que arrasan escuelas, locales y domicilios de militantes frenteamplistas, sin que jamás la policía descubra a los asesinos y por el contrario, aparecen de inmediato en el lugar los Maverick, los Opel y los "roperos". Las bestialidades inenarrables cometidas contra Ramos Filippini y contra Ibero Gutiérrez demuestran la existencia en el país de un "Escuadrón de la Muerte" calcado sobre el modelo brasileño o de la Mano guatemalteca. Y a ello se suma, como expresiones de crudo fascismo impulsadas desde las alturas del gobierno, el campo de concentración de Punta Cardal, donde se mantiene a confinados sin o contra las garantías de los jueces; las brutales torturas que se dan en la capital así como en Artigas, en Lavalleja o en donado, en Soriano, en Tacuarembó, en otros departamentos; la protección a las bandas armadas de la aunque los sorprendan metralleta en mano. (En realidad, estos grupos, extraña mezcla de matones y de señores, actúan más bien como tapadera de los organismos policiales, donde intervienen funcionarios y ex-funcionarios de la policía, de Información e Inteligencia y otros aparatos represivos del Estado, vinculados con estos núcleos fascistas para facilitarles armas, entrenamiento y protección).

En otros términos: se llega al extremo de acompañar la prepotencia, la represión, el fascismo organizado oficialmente, con el montaje de estas organizaciones parapoliciales en las cuales intervienen directamente, agentes extranjeros.

En la siguiente página se presentó contra la vida del... el diputado Arismendi denunciaba públicamente, en conferencia de prensa en el Frente Amplio, en un acto público y en el Parlamento, la mano extranjera en esta siniestra provocación tendiente a llevar a la República por la senda del fascismo. Señalaba la presencia de los agentes extranjeros en el propio aparato estatal, la actividad de los agentes de la CIA y del FBI dirigiendo en la policía de Montevideo a los torturadores y organizando los grupos terroristas, desde el conocido inspector Adolfo Saenz y el señor Cantrell, hasta llegar a Mr. Lee Echols, jefe de la misión de la A.I.D. que actúa en la Jefatura de Policía de Montevideo; a los que se suman gente como Anthony G. Barbieri, agregado en la embajada yanqui y "psicólogo" que también actúa en la Jefatura capitalina junto al torturador brasileño Edú, miembro del "Escuadrón de la Muerte" que dirige Fleury; o Donald Gould, director del llamado USIS (United States Information Service) que provee no solo de editoriales a los diarios venales, sino que también paga determinadas campañas de radio y televisión, a veces a nombre de compañías petroleras como la Esso, las cuales, a su vez, abren cuentas bancarias especiales a nombre de estos grupos fascistas. Y se denunciaba otros agentes yanquis más, incluso diplomáticos, y gente a través de los cuales su embajada malgasta los dólares por cuenta del IUES, etc., etc.

Quando se habla de fascismo, se está habiendo de todo esto: se habla también de la organización planificada y sistemática del asesinato como inversión política; y ahí están para certificarlo, vivos en nuestra memoria, Liber, Hugo, Susana, Nieto, Spósito, junto a los arriba nombrados. Y se habla, a la vez, de las conexiones estrechas con el DOPS brasileño, que se pasea por nuestro país como Perico por su casa. Todo esto es fascismo, lo mismo que señalan la tendencia al fascismo la clausura de los diarios, los despidos en masa, los secuestros de libertad, la prohibición de opinar, la censura previa, las prisiones por decenas y otras medidas levantadas solo recientemente por la Asamblea General.

ESDE luego: hay una sola manera de detener al fascismo, que es con la movilización del pueblo. En reciente acto del Frente Amplio, lo decía con palabra lúcida el Gral. Seregni, señalando que el fascismo hay que destruirlo con la movilización organizada de las masas. En ese marco de alerta, de lucha, de organización de pueblo para cerrar paso al fascismo, se inserta el acto del jueves en la explanada universal.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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PSL 12 b

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

2/ Memorandum

TO : For The Record

DATE: March 13, 1972

FROM : ARA/APU/U - Michael M. Skol

1 (3/13/72)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Leon MORELLI

On March 13, Messrs. Stedman, Roush and I talked briefly with Leon Morelli, son-in-law of Blanco Senator Wilson Ferreira Aldunate. Morelli is in the U.S. for a 30-day leader grant to observe primary elections.

Asked about the chances for Blanco cooperation with the new Bordaberry Government. Morelli noted that that would depend on the definition of "cooperation." /Bordaberry attempt to "buy" certain Blancos with ministerial or other positions would lead to failure, as well as vigorous opposition from Ferreira. On the other hand, as long as the Blancos could maintain a separate identity as an effective opposition, there could definitely be cooperation on specific issues. Morelli said he was encouraged by certain Bordaberry moves, as his willingness to consult Ferreira on various appointments and action taken thus far on the medidas de seguridad.

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Morelli thought that while the component groups of the Frente Amplio would continue their activities, their following would rapidly disappear. He indicated that "most" Frente supporters were already moving to the Blancos, the latter representing the only viable opposition. Morelli emphasized that if the Blancos did not maintain a separation from the Government, the Frente Amplio could become the focus of opposition and thereby gain considerable support. Morelli felt that the Ferreira vote was largely an anti-Pacheco vote rather than a pro-Blanco vote.

3 Ferreira and his congressional supporters will be presenting their own legislative package, hoping to secure the support of

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ARA/APU: M S Skol
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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Bordaberry. Major items would be agrarian reform and nationalization of the banks; secondary themes would include reform of the Uruguayan foreign service.

Finally, Morelli indicated that his father-in-law would soon be founding a newspaper, possibly named Por La Patria. He pointed out that while the Frente had four newspapers and one television station, the Colorados six newspapers and two television stations, his party had had no such media support. The deliberately misleading Gallup Poll, he noted, had also hurt the Blancos. Morelli suggested that Senator Muskie, given his recent experience with the Manchester Guardian, would understand why Ferreira was so interested now in securing some newspaper backing.

cc: INR/RAR
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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM
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TO : Department of State
 INFO : Amembassies BRASILIA, BUENOS AIRES, SANTIAGO
 CINCSO for POLAD
 FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO
 SUBJECT : The Communist Party and the Frente Amplio:
 Was It Worth The Effort?
 REF : A-22
 DATE: March 8, 1972
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 HANDLING INDICATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 BUREAU OF
 INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
 MAR 13 1972

SUMMARY

Thirteen months after the founding of the leftist Frente Amplio coalition, and three months after elections, leaders of the Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) are asking themselves and being asked by their membership if the time, energy and money they poured into the Frente was worth the effort. The leadership evidently believes that it was: the membership is not so certain. To many of the rank and file and to outside observers, it appears that the Party bore the burden of the Frente campaign while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the more radical elements in the coalition walked off with such electoral gains as the Frente achieved.

When the Frente Amplio was formed in late 1971 and early 1972, the PCU, the largest and best organized of its component units, stayed in the background while PDC leader Juan Pablo TERRA and ex-Colorado Senator Zelmar MICHELINI took the initiative in organizing the historically fragmented Uruguayan Left. Party leaders had decided that they must avoid giving the impression the Frente was dominated by the PCU. Once the Frente was formed and its electoral campaign launched in March 1971, the PCU began to play an increasingly active role in the coalition. Most observers believe that the PCU provided the bulk of the organizational expertise, most of the brains and nearly all of the money for the lengthy, exhausting and expensive electoral campaign.

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 Contents and Classification Approved by:
 Amb. C.W. Adair, Jr.

Drafted by: POL:TJO'Donnell:bjs
 Clearances: POL:JLTul

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The PCU also provided the traditional Blanco and Colorado Parties with their most effective issue against the Frente Amplio: Communist domination. All politicians in the traditional parties labeled the Frente a creature of the pro-Moscow PCU and warned the public against being misled by the presence of a few non-Communist "dupes" in the coalition. Anti-Frente scare propaganda included scenes of Soviet armies invading eastern European capitals and the Berlin Wall. Frente attempts to counter these charges were largely unsuccessful.

The outcome of the November 28, 1971 election proved a surprise and disappointment to the Frente in general, and the PCU in particular. Overall, the forces composing the Frente increased their percentage of the vote from about 14% in 1966 to 18.3% in 1971. However, most of this increase went to the most radical elements in the coalition and the PDC, while the PCU's electoral front FIDEL only increased its percent of the total vote from 5.7% in 1966 to 6.1%. FIDEL remained the largest component in the Frente, but the positions of the PDC, the more radical "Patria Grande" faction led by former Blanco Deputy Enrique ERRO and the Socialist party were strengthened considerably.

Following are the results of the 1971 election for individual Frente factions with the comparable figures for 1966 given in parenthesis: FIDEL-100,211 (69,750); PDC-61,257 (37,219); Michelini-31,478 (48,022); "Patria Grande"-70,944 (2,655); Socialist Party-35,927 (11,559); total-304,275 (169,205). Thus, FIDEL ended up with roughly one-third of the Frente vote, while the non-Marxist, more moderate PDC and Michelini won slightly less than one third and the more radical "Patria Grande" and Socialists accounted for a bit more than one third. The PCU was jolted by the startling growth of the radical Left. The combined vote of Erro and the Socialists totalled 106,871 - up 92,617 from their combined 14,254 total in 1966, while FIDEL increased its vote by 30,461 (up 44%) and the PDC increased by 24,038 (up 62%).

The PCU was also shocked by the distribution of legislative seats within the Frente Amplio. FIDEL entered the election with two Senators and four Deputies: it emerged with the same number despite an overall Frente increase from four Senators and ten Deputies to five Senators and eighteen Deputies. The distribution of these seats before and after the 1972 election is as follows:

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BEFORE

	<u>FIDEL</u>	<u>PDC</u>	<u>MICHELINI</u>	<u>PATRIA GRANDE</u>	<u>SOCIALISTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Senators	2	--	2	--	--	4
Deputies	4	2	3	1	--	10
TOTAL	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>14</u>

AFTER

Senators	2	1	1	1	--	5
Deputies	4	7	1	5	1	18
TOTAL	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>23</u>

The explanation for this seeming inequity in legislative representation lies in the complex Uruguayan election laws. Under these laws, factions within a party are permitted to enter electoral alliances on both the national and departmental levels which allow them to accumulate their votes together. In the Department of Soriano, for example, FIDEL won 1,776 votes to the Christian Democrats' 1,240. However, the PDC had formed a local coalition within the Frente with Michelini (962 votes), Erro (675 votes), and the Socialists (791 votes), thus ending up with 3,668 of the 5,562 votes cast for the Frente in that Department and electing a Deputy. The PDC employed this tactic throughout the interior and, as a result, elected four interior Deputies while FIDEL elected none, even though it out-pollled the PDC itself by 10,000 votes in the interior.

A word about Enrique Erro and the "Patria Grande". Erro is a radical, highly nationalistic, ex-Blanco Deputy who formed an alliance with the Socialists in the 1962 election and ran as an independent in 1966. He is eccentric and unpredictable, as well as hostile to the orthodox PCU and critical of "Soviet Imperialism". In 1971, he formed the "Patria Grande" faction with former FIDEL Deputy (and MRO leader) Ariel COLLAZO and ran his campaign on a shoestring. He had no radio or TV advertising, no newspaper ads, and few posters. He was supported tacitly by the "March 26 Movement of Independents", a front for the MLN/Tupamaros terrorist organization. He astonished everyone, including probably himself, by winning the second largest vote within the Frente Amplio.

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Erro is expected by all who know him to be a thorne in the side of the PCU in the coming months. Indeed, the non-Frente press has reported that he has already challenged PCU positions on a number of internal Frente issues and his remarks at a post-election Frente rally were so intemperate that both the PCU's El Popular and the PDC's Ahora omitted them from their extensive coverage of that event.

The outcome of the election has caused considerable unhappiness within the PCU. CAS sources have reported criticism of the Party leadership by the rank and file. Many party members feel that they would have been better off outside the Frente, with all Party resources devoted exclusively to FIDEL. The Party's newspaper, El Popular, has devoted considerable space since the election explaining how the PCU benefited from participation in the Frente and why its legislative representation is not commensurate with its vote. The tone of these articles is that the election was a great victory for the Party and members should not be overly concerned by the petty inequities of the electoral system.

Public assurances of satisfaction aside, the PCU leadership must be seriously concerned about its role within the Frente. Its expenditures of time, effort and money on the Frente campaign were disproportionate with its returns. Of particular concern to the leadership must be the questions raised by rapid growth of often unfriendly forces on its left flank. How does it deal with this challenge? Should it adopt more radical positions of opposition to the new government and jeopardize its legal status, or should it continue the safe, relatively moderate opposition of the past? How does the Party deal with its Frente partners when it is clear that both those to its left and to its right prefer alliances with each other than with it? These and other questions should provide the Party with food for thought.

While the PCU did less well than expected in the election, it nonetheless is unlikely seriously to consider leaving the Frente coalition. The PCU is over 50 years old and can afford to take the long view. It will see that its political influence is probably greater now than at any time in the past. It has ended its isolation from the rest of the Uruguayan Left and is in a stronger position to exploit its superior organization, discipline and finances. Moreover it probably expects the conservative BORDABERRY Government to result in a growing trend to the Left which could eventually

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
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work to the Party's advantage. An additional, and probably determining consideration is that Moscow favors the "popular front" approach. No Communist party in Latin America is more responsive to Moscow's wishes than the PCU.

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TO : Department of State

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5/PRS

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: March 1, 1972
ANALYSIS BRANCH

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SUBJECT: Frente Amplio "Political Agreement"

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Attached is an unofficial translation of the "Political Agreement" of the Marxist-dominated Frente Amplio. This is the first formal product of internal discussions undertaken after the November 1972 elections to prepare for the future and to adjust to the post-election balance of power within the organization. Neither a comprehensive nor a particularly forceful document, the Agreement provides for continued unity, cooperation, and coordination of the Frente's component factions. It establishes standards of conduct and discipline and a general system of enforcement, but is frequently hedged by provisions stressing the independence of individual sectors. The Agreement was signed after considerable conflict between the Communist Party and the radical leftist forces of Senator-elect Enrique ERRO, which have received support from the MLN/Tupamaro terrorist organization. Major issues - the role of the Frente's Base Committees and the composition of its directing organs - are left for decision before March 15, 1972.

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Enclosure: A/S

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Drafted by: POL:MMcLean:fim

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: Mr. Ortiz

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Montevideo
Page 1

Political Agreement of the Frente Amplio
(unofficial translation)

Approved unanimously by the National Plenary meeting in Montevideo at 1222 Julio Herrera y Obes Street on February 9, 1972:

I. The political organizations which constitute the Frente Amplio affirm their commitment to abide by and respect the agreements established in the Constituting Declaration, the Programmatic Base, the Rules of Organization, the First Thirty Measures of Government and this Political Agreement, and to fight in order to achieve national and approved departmental programs.

They express their firm resolve to maintain the unity and continuity of the Frente and its character as a popular and militant force, whatever the political alternatives may be. In government as well as in opposition, this will require the combining and coordination of permanent political action in all fields, including mass movements and activities by government officials and blocs in the national and departmental legislatures, in order to achieve the Frente's common objectives.

The directing organs of the Frente Amplio will establish a political strategy and will adopt tactical decisions and plans for the fight for national and social liberation which are appropriate to the circumstances, which will lead to common political action and which all the forces constituting the Frente Amplio are committed to respect.

II. The unity of the Frente Amplio demands strict respect for standards of joint action and discipline. These are, specifically:

a) The acceptance and fulfillment of the Constituting Declaration and Programmatic Base and the struggle to put into practice their provisions, as well as obedience to this Political Agreement and to resolutions of the directing bodies.

b) The acceptance by elected members of the Frente Amplio and those who occupy other positions of political responsibility of resolutions of directing bodies. In all cases, these Frente officials will be given a prior opportunity to express their opinions. A resolution which makes an express order must be adopted in an appropriate body composed of all political organizations constituting the Frente Amplio.

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c) In addition, political conduct (shall be) based on reciprocal solidarity among the forces composing the Frente in the unyielding struggle against the oligarchy and imperialism and for the common objectives as they are defined in the Constituting Declaration and the Programmatic Base.

d) Pure moral conduct, particularly by political leaders and persons occupying elective positions or positions of political responsibility. These leaders must not take advantage of any privilege and must present a publicly sworn declaration of assets before assuming office.

III. The authorities of the Frente Amplio and the Tribunal of Political Conduct shall examine and judge cases of violations of the Political Agreement and the standards of discipline by the component forces or by members of the Frente who occupy jobs with political responsibility. When the existence of such violations is confirmed, appropriate sanctions will be imposed. In individual cases, these may range from a simple warning to a demand for resignation. In the case of (violations by one of the Frente's) components, sanctions may go as far as exclusion from the Frente Amplio. In individual cases, national and departmental legislators are excluded. They can only be sanctioned by their respective political sectors, without affecting the responsibility of those sectors to the authorities of the Frente.

In accordance with the above, candidates of the Frente Amplio to positions of political responsibility will sign a promise to resign in case it should be demanded by the appropriate authorities.

Nevertheless, the common authorities will not rule, direct, or sanction the conduct of members, activists and leaders of component political organizations, which are held responsible for the actions of their members insofar as they affect common discipline.

IV. These commitments do not imply any reduction in the independence and autonomy of the forces forming the Frente in matters of ideology, final objectives, strategy, political positions, organization and discipline, and in all matters which do not conflict with the basic documents and resolutions of the Frente or for which a common position is not determined. Nor do they prevent agreements of any nature among the component forces as long as these do not damage the (overall) political character of the Frente, its standards of conduct and its unity. On the other hand, no component force of the Frente Amplio can make any political agreement with outside forces.

V. Frentist political conduct involves the use of public forums and other methods of communications, both those common to the Frente as a whole, as well as those belonging to each member, in order to foster:

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a) Reciprocal respect of the forces composing the Frente and avoidance of acts and expressions of mutual hostility or deprecation.

b) Positive regard for the Frente, its objectives, its judgments of the political situation and the main strategic orientations expressed in its fundamental documents and resolutions. On the other hand, it will not be considered a violation of discipline to expose either the special reasons which determine the conduct of different component forces that constitute the Frente, the aspects of each ideology or political orientation which do not contradict the common principles expressed in the fundamental documents and resolutions of the Frente, or a healthy polemic, in a climate of cordiality, concerning different points of view.

VI. (Temporary) Regarding the organic structure of the Frente, the component political organizations commit themselves to agree before March 15, 1972 on:

a) Rules to insure the effective participation of Base Committees in the political direction of the Frente Amplio at the national, departmental and local level.

b) Criteria for membership and representation of political groups in the directing bodies of the Frente Amplio.

In order to reach such agreements, the signing organizations will keep in mind, among other criteria, the purposes explained in the second paragraph of Chapter I regarding the role played by the political groups forming the Frente Amplio, considered as a whole, and the permanence of their alliance within the Frente.

The following political organizations composing the Frente Amplio agree to this commitment:

POPULAR NATIONALISTIC ACTION
BATLLISTA DOCTRINE
LEFTIST LIBERATION FRONT
GROUPS OF UNIFYING ACTION
NATIONALIST ACTION MOVEMENT
BLANCO POPULAR AND PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT
26 OF MARCH MOVEMENT OF INDEPENDENTS
INTEGRATION MOVEMENT
MOVEMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE
MOVEMENT PREGON JULIO CESAR GRAUERT

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Montevideo

Attachment to MVD A-26 UNCLASSIFIED

Page 4

- URUGUAYAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
- SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
- NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF INDEPENDENTS (FAI)
- COMMUNIST PARTY
- CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
- REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS PARTY
- REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF THE WORKERS
- SOCIALIST PARTY
- HOMELAND AND PEOPLE
- POPULAR UNION

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ACTION ARA-14

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INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: BLANCOS REJECT CO-PARTICIPATION; AGREE TO
COLLABORATION IN CONGRESS

REF: MVD 2364 ^{POLISUR}
^{XR POL 22 UR} ^{XR EDU 1 UR}

1. SUMMARY: OPPOSITION BLANCO PARTY HAS DECIDED IT WILL NOT ACCEPT PRESIDENT-ELECT BORDABERRY'S INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT HAS OFFERED HIM CONGRESSIONAL COOPERATION. IN REPLY, BORDABERRY REAFFIRMED HIS DESIRE FOR BLANCO PARTICIPATION AND CALLED UPON BLANCOS TO NAME REPRESENTATIVES TO ASSIST IN DRAFTING NEEDED LEGISLATION. END SUMMARY.

② 2. BLANCO PARTY DIRECTORATE EVENING FEBRUARY 23 RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT-ELECT BORDABERRY'S PROPOSALS FOR BLANCO-COLORADO COOPERATION REPORTED REFTEL. BRIEF NOTE ISSUED BY DIRECTORATE MAKES FOUR POINTS.

3. FIRST OF THESE IS BLANCO PARTY COMMITMENT TO "OFFER AND GIVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL ITS FORCES TO STUDY AND APPROVE INITIATIVES LEADING TO SOLUTIONS FOR THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF

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ACTION ARA-14

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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1470
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

Montevideo
2-18-72
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS OPS

SUBJECT: ELEVEN TERRORISTS ARRESTED IN INTERIOR

1. JOINT MILITARY/POLICE PRESS OFFICE FEBRUARY 17 RELEASED COMMUNIQUE REPORTING ARREST OF ELEVEN TERRORISTS IN INTERIOR CITY OF PASO DE LOS TOROS EARLIER IN MONTH. COMMUNIQUE STATES EIGHT OF ELEVEN HAVE ALREADY BEEN PROCESSED BY JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES AND IMPRISONED. POLICE ENCOUNTERED STOLEN ARMS AND AMMUNITION IN THE HOME OF ONE OF THE TERRORISTS.

2. USING NEW PUBLIC RELATIONS TECHNIQUES RECENTLY INTRODUCED BY POLICE OFFICIALS, COMMUNIQUE NOTES THAT GROUP ARRESTED WAS DESCRIBED EARLIER IN WEEK AS "FRENTE AMPLIO WORKERS" BY BOTH PCU'S "EL POPULAR" AND PDC'S "AHORA". WITHOUT DENYING "FRENTE AMPLIO" CONNECTION, COMMUNIQUE STATES THAT PROOF THEY MEMBERS OF MLN/"TUPAMARO" ORGANIZATION IS "IRREFUTABLE" AND CONCLUDES THAT "NEITHER TENDENTIOUS NEWSPAPERS, PHAMPHLETS NOR THREATS CAN HIDE THIS TRUTH FROM THE PEOPLE".
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 0360

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT-ELECT COMPLETES ROUND OF POLITICAL CONVERSA-
TIONS; BLANCO ELECTED PRESIDENT OF CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

1. DURING PAST TEN DAYS, PRESIDENT-ELECT JUAN MARIA BORDA-
BERRY HAS HELD INTENSIVE SERIES OF CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH
COLORADO AND OPPOSITION BLANCO POLITICAL LEADERS IN EFFORT TO
SECURE THEIR BACKING FOR HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION. DURING WEEK
OF FEBRUARY 7, BORDABERRY HELD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH
SENIOR MEMBERS OF JORGE BATLLE'S LIST 15, AT WHICH BORDABERRY
APPARENTLY SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING BATLLE TO PERMIT LIST 15
DEPUTY FRANCESCO FORTEZA TO BECOME MINISTER OF ECONOMICS AND
FINANCE IN NEW CABINET. ON FEBRUARY 11, LIST 15 ISSUED FORMAL
STATEMENT ON THESE CONVERSATIONS, DECLARING IT WAS "DISPOSED
TO OFFER COLLABORATION TO THE GOVERNMENT" ON THE BASIS OF AGREED
FUTURE PROGRAMS. THESE INCLUDED TAX REFORM, A "REALISTIC"
EXCHANGE RATE, A "NATIONAL SECURITY LAW" DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN
GOVERNMENT'S HAND IN DEALING WITH TERRORISTS, REFORM OF EDUCA-
TION SYSTEM AND REPLACEMENT BY LEGISLATION OF THOSE "EMERGENCY
SECURITY MEASURES" NOT SPECIFICALLY PERTAINING TO "THE DEFENSE
OF THE STATE".

2. DURING COURSE OF THIS WEEK, MAJOR PUBLIC ATTENTION WAS

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INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MONTEVIDEO 0270

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: "FRENTE AMPLIO" HOLDS ANNIVERSARY REMLY

1. "FRENTE AMPLIO" COALITION HELD RALLY IN MONTEVIDEO EVENING OF FEBRUARY 4 TO CELEBRATE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF ITS FOUNDING. RALLY INCLUDED A MARCH OF "FRENTE" MILITANTS DOWN MAIN MONTEVIDEO THOROUGHFARE TO CITY HALL AND SPEECHES BY REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL "FRENTE" COMPONENTS AND UNSUCCESSFUL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, GENERAL SEREGNI. ATTENDANCE ESTIMATED BY EMBOFFS AT TWELVE TO FIFTEEN THOUSAND PERSONS WITH ROUGHLY THREE QUARTERS OF THEM UNDER AGE 25. CROWD OF THIS SIZE AT POST-ELECTION POLITICAL ACT IN MIDDLE OF URUGUAYAN SUMMER MUST BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESS BY ORGANIZERS WHO HOPED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DESPITE ELECTORAL SETBACK, "FRENTE AMPLIO" IS ALIVE AND WELL IN MONTEVIDEO. THEME OF RALLY WAS THAT 1972 WILL BE "YEAR OF STRUGGLE" AND ALL SPEAKERS MADE IT CLEAR "FRENTE" WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE ITS VOICE HEARD THROUGH STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND RALLIES IN COMING MONTHS.

2. SEVERAL SPEAKERS, INCLUDING GENERAL SEREGNI, REFERRED

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TO CHARGES OF ELECTORAL "FRAUD" IN VOTE COUNT AND "DIRTYNESS" OF ELECTION. MOST VIOLENT SPEAKER WAS NEWLY-ELECTED SENATOR ENRIQUE ERRO WHO CLAIMED THAT GOU PREPARING "CONCENTRATION CAMPS" FOR "POLITICAL PRISONERS" IN INTERIOR WITH HELP OF "NORTH AMERICAN ADVISORS", AND THAT U.S. ADVISORS OPERATING OF POLICE HEADQUARTERS ARE INSTRUCTING POLICE IN TORTURE METHODS. WHILE BOTH PCU'S "EL POPULAR" AND PDC'S "AHORA" GAVE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO RALLY THE FOLLOWING DAY, NEITHER REPEATED ERRO'S ALLEGATIONS.
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E	P	IO	FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO			RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE FEB 4 8 27 AM 1972		
L	FBO	AID	SUBJECT : List 15 Views of Its Future Relations Toward a Colorado Administration			FEB 8 1972		
AGR	COM	FRB	REF :			RS/AN DATE: February 2, 1972 ANALYSIS BRANCH		
INT	LAB	TAR	Background:			RS/AN file		
TR	XMB	AIR	<p>If the Colorado Party continues to maintain its narrow lead in the tabulation of ballots from the November 1971 general elections, Minister of Agriculture Juan Mariá BORDABERRY will assume the Uruguayan Presidency on March 1. Because his Administration will immediately be confronted by a serious economic crisis, there is considerable speculation here on what type of an economic team he will put together. One of the political groups most frequently mentioned as a possible collaborator with a Bordaberry Administration is Colorado Party leader Jorge BATLLE's List 15 faction. Batlle's group is generally considered to contain most of the Party's economic expertise and many political observers believe that Bordaberry, having few economic experts in his own faction, will turn to Batlle for help. Members of Batlle's organization were prominent in setting up the Administration's 1968 stabilization program which appeared to be succeeding until mid-1970. Their departure from President Pacheco's "economic team" at that time is generally considered to be one of the causes for the serious weakening in stabilization efforts during the past year and one-half.</p> <p>Several Embassy officers have recently had occasion to discuss List 15's views toward a Bordaberry Government with Batlle himself, List 15 Senator Eduardo PAZ Aguirre, Enrique</p>					
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Page 2 of A-17
MONTEVIDEO

PIQUE, Administrator of Batlle's daily newspaper Accion, and Ulysis GRACERAS, Uruguayan doctoral student in sociology at Michigan State who conducted various political research projects for Batlle during the recent Presidential campaign. The following is a summary of their views on List 15's future role.

Bordaberry-Batlle Meeting:

During the week of January 10, Batlle met with Bordaberry at the latter's request. According to all accounts, Bordaberry requested that Batlle and his group virtually take over the economic and financial direction of the next Government. Specifically, this would mean placing top List 15 personnel in the Ministries of Finance and Economy, the Central Bank and Bank of the Republic, the GOU's Wage and Price Control Board (COPRIN) and the Office of Planning and Budget. According to Batlle, Bordaberry made a strong appeal on the basis that, "It is up to our generation to save the country". Both Pique and Graceras also indicated that Bordaberry complained that his own political group was bereft of the necessary economic talent.

List 15 Response:

Batlle replied that although his faction was ready and willing to work with Bordaberry in the formation of a new government, neither he nor any of his senior lieutenants would accept top positions in the economic area. According to Paz and Pique, Batlle's decision was motivated by a desire to avoid direct association by top Batlle supporters in what he expects to be the hard and unpopular measures which the new Government must take during its first year. Pique told us that when Bordaberry sought to overcome Batlle's negative attitude on grounds that such a "sacrifice" was necessary for the good of the nation, Batlle allegedly answered that, "The people elected you, not me, to make this sacrifice". However, Batlle said he would indicate his choice of "technicians", men of no political prominence, for economic and financial posts who would bear the burden - and presumably, the onus - of carrying out the necessary reforms. Should these measures succeed, Batlle indicated his willingness to send his economic "First Team" into the Cabinet during the Administration's second year. However, Batlle and Paz both stated that List 15 would immediately accept four Ministries in the next Government: Deputy Julio SANGUINETTI as Minister of Education and Culture; current Labor Sub-Secretary Julio AMORIN as Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; present Public Works Minister Walter PINTOS Rizzo to continue in that position; and an unnamed engineer

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as Minister of Transport, Communications and Tourism. In commenting on Batlle's decision, Senator Paz Aguirre stressed that List 15 had suffered politically from its close association with the unpopular 1968 stabilization and was determined to avoid being the "fall guy" for a similar effort which he maintains Bordaberry must undertake. Batlle now says that he decided not to take an active role in the Government himself during its first year because he would "overshadow" Bordaberry and thus create additional political difficulties for the new President. However, Graceras claims he is certain that Batlle asked Bordaberry for the Education Ministry, but that Bordaberry only offered it on condition that List 15 take over the Government's economic program.

Personal Views on Bordaberry:

The first reaction of both Batlle and Paz when queried about their views on Bordaberry's personal qualities was to exclaim, "He is a Basque", with all the virtues and defects implied by such ancestry. All agree that he is a man of fierce loyalties, slow to make up his mind but unshakeable once he decides upon a course of action. Batlle has a high regard for Bordaberry with whom he has been friendly since grammar school days. He termed Bordaberry a man of admirable qualities who Batlle felt would make a fine President.

Views on the Electoral Campaign:

Batlle believes that List 15 was licked because many democratic Uruguayans who otherwise would have supported it, voted instead for the strongly anti-Communist Pacheco/Bordaberry image which he apparently does not project. Others in List 15 believe that they suffered because the increasingly polarized views of voters toward the extremes of the right and left. List 15 lost ground accordingly, especially in the interior where much of its expected support went to Blanco candidate FERREIRA Aldunate.

Terrorism:

All these List 15 sources believe that MLN terrorists will increase their activities in the coming months. Batlle said that his public appeal late in the campaign to the Tupamaros to make some sign that they wish to return to peaceful political activities had not evoked a response from them.

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He said this was no surprise since having failed to win the election, he was in no position to offer them any deals. As he has in earlier conversations with us, Batlle repeated that he favors attacking the terrorist problem with a new, small, secret group which would fight the Tupamaros on their own terms. He said such a group would have to be set up outside of legally constituted authorities. Senator Paz Aguirre forecast increasing terrorist efforts to mobilize students and felt that 1972 might see a return to the large-scale student demonstrations and violence of 1967-68.

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A-215 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
 NO. HANDLING INDICATOR
 TO : Department of State
 INFO: Amembassy BRASILIA
 Amembassy BUENOS AIRES
 CINCSO FOR POLAD
 FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO
 SUBJECT: National Congress of Frente Amplio Base Committees
 REF :

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 ANALYSIS BRANCH
 December 29, 1971
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 BUREAU OF
 INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

SUMMARY

The recent National Congress of Frente Amplio Base Committees was the occasion for considerable self-criticism and analysis over the Frente's somewhat disappointing performance in the November 28 general elections. Nevertheless, the leadership, program and organization of the Frente were not fundamentally challenged and a general mood of determination and optimism characterized the proceedings of the Congress.

Background

Even before the November 28 elections, the Marxist-dominated Frente Amplio political coalition began planning a post-election meeting of its grassroots Base Committees to take stock and plan for the future. On December 4, the Frente's leadership announced that a national congress would be held on December 18 and 19 with the following agenda: a) political evaluation, b) past experiences of the Base Committees and ideas for the future, and c) opinions regarding the role of the Committees in the structure of the Frente Amplio. The Congress was designed to have a consultative character only. Delegates from each Base Committee and from the various executive bodies of the Frente were invited to attend. Over 1,500 people actually participated in the meeting held in a downtown Montevideo arena. The Congress began in the afternoon of Saturday,

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December 18, with the distribution of a report by the Frente leadership and an hour-long address by the Frente's recent presidential candidate, retired General Liber SEREGNI. Following his speech, the delegates broke into smaller groups for discussion. Sunday was occupied with hearing almost one hundred speeches from representatives of the various discussion committees. Additionally, the Base Committees themselves presented some five hundred individual written reports.

Issues and Conclusions

The Congress produced a brief five-point resolution, which among other things condemned a recent GOU decree against subversive publications, called for the release of all "political" prisoners, and denounced rightist attacks against Frente clubs and supporters. The conference also declared its "absolute solidarity" with Seregni and expressed a determination to intensify "in all fields" the fight against the Pacheco regime and to maintain the Frente's organization unity.

Seregni's opening speech and the report of the Frente leadership presented the public views of the hierarchy on the election. Both expressed disappointment at the results and the need for continued effort. Seregni opened by saying, "The road that we have in front of us is long and not exactly covered with flowers". The report stressed that the Frente's purpose from the first had been permanent political action and not merely an electoral victory. The Frente vote was not as good as expected but it held promise for future victory. Seregni termed the votes received by Frente candidates a great step forward, and the leadership report repeated claims made in the Frente's press that, compared to 1966, the Frente had advanced while the Blancos had gained only slightly and the Colorados had lost ground. Claims of wide support for the Frente among young people under voting age were noted as a sign of great hope for the future.

The leadership report then turned to the question "Why didn't we go further?" It distinguished between external and internal reasons. Among the external factors (those beyond the control of the organization) were the limited time available to organize the Frente as a cohesive political force, its "lack" of funds, a climate of violence and anti-Communism, and possible "irregularities" in the counting of the vote. Regarding internal problems, the report noted that, "We directed ourselves, in no small way, to those who were already convinced." The leadership report concluded that insufficient concentration had been directed toward undecided voters. Furthermore, the report stressed that the Frente was never able to counteract its opponents'

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propaganda, which cast election issues in terms of law and order vs. sedition and democracy vs. totalitarianism, rather than in terms of the "oligarchy" vs. the people. A lack of central direction in the campaign was also criticized. Neither Seregni nor the leadership report mentioned foreign intervention as a reason for the Frente's showing.

Seregni and the leadership foresaw mounting economic and social problems for the new government. Regardless of which traditional party wins when the vote count is complete, they claimed it will be unable to cope with the nation's problems. However, they did distinguish between Colorado and Blanco candidates, indicating that a Colorado regime under Juan M. BORDABERRY would be more repressive.

The two needs of the Frente for the future were seen as maintaining unity and expanding contact with the masses. Seregni said that the Frente faces an entirely new task now that the electoral campaign, its short-term objective, had passed. Concerning reorganization for this new period, he cautioned against over-emphasizing either of the Frente's constituent elements, the Base Committees or the individual political parties which compose the Frente.

Delegate speeches offered a wider, sometimes conflicting, range of criticisms. For example, some thought that the Base Committees spent too much time in "sterile" talk while others believed greater discussion was needed. Many delegates criticized the Frente's propaganda as too bland and abstract. Some thought the Frente should have been more militant in opposing the "oligarchy", seeking the release of political prisoners and supporting strikers. Two different attitudes developed toward the Frente's future organization. One favored continuation of the present structure, while the other sought a greater role for the Base Committees at the expense of individual political party organizations.

Comment

The pro-Frente press has generally interpreted the Congress as a demonstration of the organization's unity, maturity and determination to continue its activities. Despite some obvious disappointment at the electoral result, no disillusionment was evident. Extensive self-criticism and some divisions regarding the relative importance of the political parties and Base Committees occurred, but the vitality of the organization and the commitment of its members seemed unimpaired. The closing resolution of the Congress reflected continued militance, in spite of the widespread recognition of the success of the anti-Frente propaganda which capitalized on similar expressions

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during the campaign. Seregni's leadership was endorsed without challenge by the Congress. Major changes in Frente leadership, organization, and programs seem unlikely for the immediate future.

As an advisory body, the Congress made no binding decisions and did not attempt to dictate the future course of the Frente activities. Many criticisms and suggestions were made, but it remains to be seen how the Frente's leadership will translate these into action programs during the next five years.

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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2985

CINCSO FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS OPS AND DIA

SUBJECT: WEEKLY CHARGES SEREGNI BODYGUARDS ARE ESCAPED "TUPAMAROS"

1. RIGHTIST WEEKLY "TIEMPO" PUBLISHED DECEMBER 17 CHARGES THAT TWO BODYGUARDS ACCOMPANYING "FRENTE AMPLIO" PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SEREGNI TO VOTE IN NOVEMBER 28 ELECTIONS WERE ESCAPED "TUPAMAROS", JOSE MARIA PEREZ LUTZ AND ALBERTO ANTONIO COCCO PEREZ. TO DOCUMENT CHARGE, "TIEMPO" REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHS OF SEREGNI VOTING PUBLISHED BY ARGENTINE MAGAZINES "GENTE", "SIETE DIAS ILLUSTRADOS" AND "MERCADO". "TIEMPO" COMPARED PHOTOS OF TWO MEN WHO APPEAR TO BE GUARDING SEREGNI IN ALL THREE PUBLICATIONS WITH PHOTOS OF PEREZ AND COCCO RELEASED BY MONTEVIDEO POLICE SHORTLY AFTER THEY ESCAPED FROM PUNTA CARRETTAS PRISON SEPTEMBER 6. THE POLICE PHOTOS BEAR A STRONG RESEMBLANCE TO THE TWO MEN SHOWN IN ARGENTINE PUBLICATIONS. SUBSTANCE OF STORY REPEATED IN AFTERNOON COLORADO DAILY "ACCION" OF SAME DATE.
2. "FRENTE AMPLIO" PRESS THE FOLLOWING DAY STRONGLY REJECTED CHARGES AND IDENTIFIED BODYGUARDS AS AIRLINE PILOT ERCS CARVAJAL AND AGRONOMY STUDENT CARLOS RATTIELLO WHO WERE VOLUNTEER WORKERS IN SEREGNI CAMPAIGN. THIS IDENTIFICATION HAS BEEN PRIVATELY CONFIRMED TO US BY LOCAL POLICE. SEREGNI

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TO : Department of State
 FROM : AmEmbassy, MONTEVIDEO RSOATH: December 15, 1971
 ANALYSIS BRANCH
 SUBJECT : Businessmen Appeal for Government of National Union
 REF :

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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 BUREAU OF
 INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
 DEC 27 1971

The Chamber of Industries of Uruguay, which represents the manufacturing and processing sector issued a statement on December 6 which reflects the general unhappiness of the business community over the past handling the nation's economic affairs and its concern that the future government will cope with the nation's problems. Prominently published in the Montevideo press, the statement is at least discussed in business circles and may have some impact on the political community.

Sources who participated in the drafting of the statement say a weaker text was strengthened partly because of the attacks made by the Blanco party on the election count as announced by the Minister of Interior, which was seen as more of the old political game which has bedevilled Uruguay in the past decades.

An unofficial translation of the statement is enclosed together with the Spanish text.

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Enclosure: As stated
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Montevideo A-208
Enclosure No. 1

Unofficial Translation

From the Chamber of Industries to the Republic

The Chamber of Industries, in these moments of exceptional importance in the life of the country, addresses public opinion, the political parties which have the obligation of interpreting the national interest, and the men who have obtained from their fellow citizens the great honor of participating in Gov't, to set forth a patriotic call for responsibility.

We believe we have the right to do this. We have remained at the helm of our concerns through the most difficult times Uruguay has known from the economic point of view; we have not abandoned the Fatherland and we have financially sustained our enterprises; we have withstood the unsympathetic attitude of many, the visitudes of inflation as well as deflation without economic development and the tremendous difficulties created by the application of new systems of control over economic life; we still are, nevertheless, the largest employers, the most important exporters of traditional and non-traditional products and, therefore, the largest producers of hard currency essential for the maintenance of the life of the nation; we pay the highest government and social levies, although struggling on unequal grounds against organizations employing clandestine labor which compete with us in the market but which does not participate with us in paying taxes and the financing of social security services.

Today we believe that all these considerations give us the right to present our points of view at a time so critical in the life of the Nation.

The Republic has just realized an electoral experience which honors our best civic traditions. That expression of citizenship has been universally acknowledged.

We believe that our people's victory would be jeopardized and its effects defeated if not immediately given serious thought by those who are responsible for the political leadership of this nation.

If the recent balloting is examined closely, it is very clear that our people desire two principal things: on one hand to maintain the democratic system, which establishes peaceful means for resolving differences of opinion and of government; and on the other manifests its will that time-consuming minor disputes among political parties or their leaders be ended. All of us, without distinction, feel we have entered a stage when all the games which have suffocated us for decades must be set aside.

The last elections have been characterized, among other things, by speeches and precise documents by which the various parties

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Page 2

and factions have set their programs. Based on these, the sector of the public opinion we represent believes that it is absolutely indispensable to begin, right now, the studies necessary to establish the administration's program which will inspire action. A government of national union is what our people ask, absolutely convinced that only through the mobilization of the Republic's best men can we find the road of the much sought national reconciliation.

This is the meaning of our patriotic appeal at this hour, in the hope of serving the general interest at a time when the electoral decision has not yet been definitely determined.

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PARTICULAR, EN UNO DE LOS
INSTALACIONES SIN ORDEN

Monterrey A. 23

REMITIDO



Department of State

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TELEGR

LA CAMARA DE A LA RE

La Cámara de Industrias, en estos instantes de excepcional importancia en la vida del país, se dirige a la opinión pública, a los partidos políticos que tienen la obligación de interpretar el interés nacional y a los hombres que han recibido de sus conciudadanos el honor insignie de participar del Gobierno, para formular un patriótico llamado a responsabilidad.

Nos creemos con el derecho de hacerlo. Nos hemos mantenido al frente de nuestras empresas a través de las épocas más difíciles que ha conocido el Uruguay desde el punto de vista económico; no hemos abandonado la Patria y hemos apoyado económicamente a nuestras emprendidas; hemos soportado la incomprensión de muchos, las vicisitudes del proceso inflacionario así como de la deflación sin desarrollo, y las tremendas dificultades derivadas de la aplicación de nuevos sistemas de control sobre la vida económica; seguimos siendo, no obstante, los mayores oferentes de trabajo, los más importantes exportadores de productos tradicionales y no tradicionales y, por consiguiente, los mayores pagadores de las divisas indispensables para mantener la vida nacional; pagamos las más altas cifras por cargas fiscales y sociales, aun luchando, en desigualdad de condiciones, contra quienes mantienen organizaciones clandestinas de trabajo, que compiten con nosotros en el mercado pero que no destinan con nosotros en el esfuerzo que significa el pago de los gastos públicos y el financiamiento de los servicios de seguridad social.

Creemos, por hoy, que todas estas consideraciones nos dan derecho para hacer valer nuestros puntos de vista en un instante tan crítico de la vida de la Nación.

La República acaba de realizar una experiencia electoral que honra nuestras mejores tradiciones cívicas. Esa expresión de conciencia ciudad

LUIS C. BONOMI
Secretario

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"El País" Dec 6, 1971

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dans ha sido universalmente reconocida. Consideramos que esa victoria de nuestro pueblo se vería desconocida y anulada en sus efectos, si no se la interpreta de inmediato en su más profundo sentido por parte de quienes tienen la responsabilidad de conducir las fuerzas políticas nacionales.

Si el proceso electoral reciente es analizado en profundidad, resulta muy claro que nuestro pueblo ha querido dos cosas fundamentalmente: por una parte, afirmar el sistema propio de la democracia representativa, que importa el recurso a medios pacíficos para dilucidar las controversias de opinión y de Gobierno; y, en segundo lugar, hacer expresa su voluntad en el sentido de que se ha terminado definitivamente el tiempo para las disputas menores entre los partidos o sus dirigentes. Todos, sin distinción, sentimos que hemos entrado en una etapa de necesaria superación de todo ese juego que nos ha asfixiado durante decenios.

Las últimas elecciones se han caracterizado, entre otras cosas, por la aparición de exposiciones y documentos precisos en los cuales los distintos partidos y fracciones han fijado los términos de su programa. Sobre la base de tales elementos, el sector de la vida nacional que reunimos entendemos que es absolutamente indispensable iniciar, desde ahora, los estudios necesarios para concretar el programa de gobierno que habrá de inspirar la acción. **EL GOBIERNO DE UNIDAD NACIONAL QUE NUESTRO PUEBLO RECLAMA**, absolutamente convencido de que solamente por la movilización activa de los mejores hombres de la República se podrá alcanzar el camino del anhelado recencuentro nacional.

Es éste el sentido de nuestro patriótico reclamo en la hora actual, en aras de servir al interés general y cuando aún no está definitivamente resuelto el fallo electoral.

JUAN ANGEL MUTIO
Presidente

Montevideo, diciembre 6 de 1971.

3. COMMENT...
ATTRIBUTE TO U.S. EMBASSY...
"FRETE AMPLIO" AND SUPPORT OF ONE OR MORE...
PARTIES AND OF "REPRESSIVE FORCES" (POLICE). THIS...
AND OTHERS WHICH WILL SURELY FOLLOW ARE EVIDENTLY EFFORTS TO

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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2883

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: U.S. EMBASSY ACCUSED OF ATTACKS ON "FRENTE AMPLIO"

1. DECEMBER 5 EDITION OF COMMUNIST DAILY, "EL POPULAR", ACCUSED U.S. EMBASSY OF "LAUNCHING NEW WAVE OF TERROR AND VIOLENCE, MACHINEGUNNING SIX OTHER "FRENTE" CLUBS AT DAYBREAK YESTERDAY". ARTICLE CLAIMS JUP (RIGHTIST YOUTH GROUP) RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE ATTACKS AND THREE OTHERS ON DECEMBER 1, ACTING ON ORDERS OF EMBASSY.
2. "EL POPULAR" ALSO ACCUSES EMBASSY OF HAVING PAID FOR FULL PAGE, UNSIGNED ADVERTISEMENT WHICH APPEARED IN MOST PAPERS DECEMBER 4 WHICH DEPICTS URUGUAY AS HAVING SHATTERED SOVIET BOOT WHICH HAS JUST TRAMPLED CHILE. ATTACKS ON "FRENTE", BOTH AGAINST CLUBS AND IN PRESS, SAID TO BE RESULT OF EMBASSY'S FEAR OF 300,000 VOTES " FRENTE" WILL OBTAIN (I.E., AFTER FINAL COUNT).
3. COMMENT: LEFTIST PRESS HAS REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED IN PAST ATTRIBUTE TO U.S. EMBASSY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATTACKS AGAINST "FRENTE AMPLIO" AND SUPPORT OF ONE OR ANOTHER OF TRADITIONAL PARTIES AND OF "REPRESSIVE FORCES " (POLICE). THIS LATEST CHARGE AND OTHERS WHICH WILL SURELY FOLLOW ARE EVIDENTLY EFFORTS TO

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MONTEVIDEO 2867

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT/STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS, FOURTEEN - INTERIOR MINISTRY
RELEASES "FINAL" PRELIMINARY FIGURES

REF: MVD 2855 - POL 14 UR

1. AT 1700 HOURS TODAY (DECEMBER 31) MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
ISSUED COMMUNIQUE GIVING "FINAL" PRELIMINARY ELECTION RESULTS.
AS SUMMARIZED ON RADIO NEWS REPORTS, TOTALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
COLORADOS-595,570; BLANCOS-585,974; "FRENTE AMPLIO"-271,510;
URC-7402; OTHERS-523. COLORADO LEAD OVER BLANCOS - 9,596.
INITIAL REPORTS DO NOT INCLUDE BREAKDOWNS BETWEEN INTERIOR
DEPARTMENTS AND MONTEVIDEO.

2. ABOVE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE "OBSERVED" VOTES WHICH TODAY'S
PRESS ESTIMATES WILL BE IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF 160-170,000.
IN INTERVIEW IN COLORADO DAILY "EL DIA" TODAY, URUGUAY'S
BEST KNOWN ELECTION EXPERT AND STATISTICIAN, DR. JULIO
FABREGAT, STATES THAT IN THE SEVENTEEN ELECTIONS SINCE
1925, THE "OBSERVED" VOTES HAVE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED

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Montevideo 2796
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: "FRENTE" AND FERREIRA HOLD FINAL RALLIES

1. THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" HELD ITS FINAL MONTEVIDEO RALLY EVENING NOVEMBER 24. RALLY STAGED IN FRONT OF LEGISLATIVE PALACE AND STRETCHED ONE MILE DOWN AVENIDA AGRACIADA TO THE INTERSECTION OF 18 DE JULIO. "FRENTE" MADE ALL-OUT EFFORT TO FILL THIS AREA AND SUCCEEDED IN ATTRACTING A CROWD OF 60-70,000 PERSONS. ACCORDING TO EMBOFFS PRESENT, CROWD PACKED MOST SOLIDLY AT EITHER END OF RALLY AND THINNED OUT CONSIDERABLY AT MID-POINT. EMBOFFS ESTIMATED APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF CROWD UNDER AGE 30. 10-15 PERCENT WERE PROBABLY UNDER VOTER AGE OF 18. VARIOUS "FRENTE" ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS HAD BEEN ASSIGNED SPECIFIC BLOCKS TO COVER AND STAYED IN PLACE THROUGHOUT THE RALLY. SPEAKER SYSTEM WAS POOR AND IN MANY AREAS CROWD AMUSED ITSELF BY DANCING, CHANTING, ETC. CROWD IN EXTREMELY GOOD HUMOR AND GAVE SPEAKERS ENTHUSIASTIC APPLAUSE, PARTICULARLY GENERAL SEREGNI. CARNIVAL-LIKE ATMOSPHERE PREVAILED AND PARTICIPANTS BEGAN DANCING IN STREET AFTER RALLY TERMINATED. IT WAS AN IMPRESSIVE PERFORMANCE AND CAUSED SOME CONCERN AMONG SUPPORTERS OF TRADITIONAL PARTIES WHO WITNESSED IT.

2. FERREIRA ADLUNATE CLOSING RALLY HELD MONTEVIDEO FOLLOWING EVENING, NOVEMBER 25. RALLY HAD BEEN ADVERTISED FOR SEVERAL

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: "FRENTE AMPLIO" CANDIDATES ATTACKED
IN INTERIOR

- AS "FRENTE AMPLIO" CANDIDATES BEGAN THEIR FINAL CAMPAIGN IN INTERIOR OF COUNTRY THIS PAST WEEKEND, THEY ENCOUNTERED SERIES OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS IN DEPARTMENT OF ROCHA WHICH RESULTED IN DEATH BY GUNSHOT OF ONE CHILD, AND SLIGHT SCRATCH FROM KNIFE ATTACK TO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LIBER SEREGNI. INCIDENTS OCCURRED NOVEMBER 7. ELEVEN-YEAR OLD CHILD WOUNDED AND LATER DIED IN VILLAGE OF CASTILLO WHEN "FRENTE" BUS CARAVAN STOPPED AND STONED BY HOSTILE CROWD AS IT LEAVING CITY AFTER RALLY. IN COURSE OF FRACAS, SOMEONE FIRED SHOT WHICH WOUNDED CHILD INSIDE NEIGHBORING HOUSE. ACCORDING TO MOST OF LOCAL PRESS, IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER SHOT FIRED FROM CROWD OR FROM VEHICLES IN CARAVAN. PCU'S "EL POPULAR" ALLEGES SEVERAL SHOTS FIRED BY "FASCISTS" ATTACKING THE "FRENTE" CARAVAN. CARAVAN ALSO STONED IN TOWN OF LASCANO WHERE SEVERAL WINDOWS BROKEN IN CARAVAN BUSES.
- IN CITY OF ROCHA, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SEREGNI ATTACKED BY KNIFE-WIELDING ASSAILANT AS HE PREPARED TO ENTER LOCAL THEATRE FOR

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Montevideo 2653
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: MINISTER OF EDUCATION RESIGNS

REF: MVD 2640 - POL 14 UR XR POL 15-1 UR

1. A FURTHER FRACTURE IN RANKS OF PRESIDENT PACHECO'S POLITICAL FORCES DEVELOPED LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (NOVEMBER 4) WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESIGNATION OF MINISTER EDUCATION AND CULTURE PEDRO W. CERSOSIMO. CERSOSIMO RESIGNATION FROM PACHECO'S CABINET WAS FOLLOWED BY STATEMENT FROM HIM THAT HE HAD ALSO RESIGNED FROM PRESIDENT'S UNR POLITICAL COALITION.

2. IN PRESS INTERVIEW LAST EVENING, CERSOSIMO CONFIRMED THAT HIS RESIGNATION WAS RESULT OF PRESIDENT PACHECO'S DECISION TO REMOVE HIM FROM NUMBER ONE SPOT ON UNR'S LIST OF SENATORIAL CANDIDATES. THROUGHOUT PAST WEEK, THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS THAT PRESIDENT WISHED TO MOVE CERSOSIMO FURTHER DOWN ON SENATE LIST IN FAVOR OF FINANCE MINISTER CARLOS FLEITAS. ACCORDING TO CERSOSIMO, HOWEVER, PRESIDENT HAD ASSURED HIM NOVEMBER 3 THAT HIS TOP POSITION WAS CONFIRMED. NOTWITHSTANDING, CERSOSIMO DECLARED THAT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, UNR LEADER RAUMAR JUDE

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INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO FOR POLAD

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FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

RS DATE: October 27, 1971
ANALYSIS BRANCH

SUBJECT : Labor and the National Elections

REF : Montevideo A-165 of September 15, 1971

Introduction

The "Plan of Government" of the Frente Amplio electoral coalition includes something for everybody except, of course, the nefarious "oligarchy". High among the Frente's targets is the working man, and its promises to him include a redistribution of the country's wealth with higher wages for both the private and public sectors. Without divulging how it will obtain the necessary funds, the Frente says it will provide a better social security system, better health services, more low cost housing, and more jobs. How successful has the Frente been in selling its wares to the urban wage earner? This paper attempts to answer this question and others concerning the role of the labor movement in the November elections.

On the basis of soundings in the interior, we believe that the Frente Amplio will have only modest success in capturing the votes of wage earners of cities such as Paysandú, Salto, and Mercedes. The capital city of Montevideo would appear to be a different proposition at this point.

The CNT as a Political Campaigner

In earlier reports we doubted the existence of a "labor vote" which the Communist-controlled CNT labor confederation could "deliver" en masse to the Frente. We do not think that we are engaging in semantic

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Drafted by: LABATT:SMBlock:fm

Contents and Classification Approved by: Ambassador Charles W. Adams, Jr.

Clearances:

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sallies when we reassert that point, with the observation that there is a difference between "delivering the labor vote" and assiduously campaigning to secure the vote of wage earners. The latter represents, in our opinion, an accurate description of the current work of the CNT on behalf of the Frente Amplio.

In a very systematic manner the CNT has organized Frente Amplio groups in virtually all the factories, businesses, and government offices to which it has access. In addition to establishing these political organizations, CNT unions have made themselves available as platforms for Frente Amplio candidates. Probably the most effective work of the CNT in behalf of the Frente has been the person-to-person contact by CNT activists. They are noted for their persistence and are known to have visited workers in their homes to continue their proselytizing there.

Although it has become fashionable among opponents of the Frente Amplio to say that the Frente currently is losing ground in Montevideo, anti-Frente union leaders, when questioned about their particular industries, admit that the Frente is running strong in Montevideo. On the basis of admittedly impressionistic surveys, we would conclude that the Frente will probably draw a proportionately larger number of its votes in Montevideo from CNT-organized wage earners than from the rest of the city's population.

This is not to predict a clean sweep for the Frente Amplio among CNT members in Montevideo, who could number as high as 200,000. We know of two cases where attempts by the CNT to convert its affiliated unions into Frente campaign organizations have backfired. At the end of August, the Montevideo local of the CNT's primary school teachers federation (FUM) protested the transformation of their headquarters into a Frente center and disaffiliated from FUM-CNT. There is said to be dissatisfaction among members of the CNT's bank workers affiliate (AEBU) for this reason. Although democratic bank workers are attempting to exploit this dissatisfaction, it is not likely that locals of AEBU will in the near future disaffiliate from AEBU, as did the Montevideo school teachers from FUM.

Democratic Unions: No Direct Political Activities

Democratic unions grouped in the AIFLD-supported CUT federation and other independent unions have not been politically active as organizations. This stems both from a philosophy of trade unionism requiring a

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY ANNOUNCES ITS CANDIDATES

REF: MONTEVIDEO 2436 POL 14 UR

1. URUGUAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S (PCU) POLITICAL ARM, "LEFTIST LIBERATION FRONT" (FIDEL), HELD ITS FIRST CITY-WIDE RALLY IN MONTEVIDEO OCTOBER 8. PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO ANNOUNCE FIDEL'S LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR SENATE, DEPUTIES, AND CITY COUNCIL WHO WILL RUN WITH "FRENTE AMPLIO" COALITION'S ALREADY-ANNOUNCED CHOICES FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT AND MAYOR.
2. FIDEL'S CHOICES CONTAINED NO SURPRISES. ITS SENATE LIST WILL BE HEADED BY VETERAN COMMUNIST SENATOR ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ, WITH EX-BLANCO SENATOR RODRIGUEZ CAMUSSO IN SECOND SPOT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND RODRIGUEZ'S SMALL POLITICAL GROUP PREVIOUS WEEK (REFTEL). SAME AGREEMENT PLACED RETIRED GENERAL ARTURO BALINAS, WHO HEADS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2282

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: RESULTS OF INTERNAL ELECTIONS IN COLORADO "UNITY
AND REFORM" FACTION

REF: A-169 Pol 14 UR

1. FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, COLORADO PARTY LEADER JORGE BATLLE AND HIS LIST IS "UNITY AND REFORM" FACTION HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING INTERNAL ELECTIONS TO CHOOSE NEW FACTION AUTHORITIES. EFFORT CULMINATED WITH LIST IS ELECTIONS IN MONTEVIDEO SEPTEMBER 12TH. INITIAL RESULTS ANNOUNCED BY BATLLE FORCES INDICATE THAT SOME 206,000 VOTERS IN THE CAPITAL PARTICIPATED IN THIS INTERNAL CONTEST. VOTE COUNT HAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THIS WEEK WITH LIST IS CLAIMING THAT OVER 360,000 HAVE VOTED IN THIS CAMPAIGN ON A NATIONAL BASIS.

2. BATLLE HAS USED INTERNAL ELECTIONS AS (A) METHOD OF RE-ACTIVATING HIS POLITICAL MACHINE (B) DEVICE TO GIVE NEW MILITANT SUPPORTERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THEIR VOTER APPEAL AND (C) AWAKEN VOTER INTEREST IN OVERALL LIST IS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. MONTEVIDEO EFFORT ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO BATLLE PERSONALLY, SINCE IT HAS WIDELY BEEN HELD HERE THAT HIS POLITICAL FORTUNES WERE IRREVOCABLY DAMAGED BY RUMORS OF HIS "INFIDENCIA", I.E. THAT HE ILLEGALLY PROFITED FROM ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF APRIL 1968 DEVALUATION. ALTHOUGH LIST IS

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TO : Department of State
 INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SANTIAGO
 CINCISO FOR POLAD
 FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO
 SUBJECT : Political Platform of the Frente Amplio
 REF : Montevideo A-43 ARA

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DATE: September 15, 1971

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Enclosed is an unofficial translation of the "Plan of Government" which the Frente Amplio's Presidential candidate, Liber Seregni, announced at an Uruguayan Independence Day rally on August 25.

Although the statements of Frente spokesmen since the party's formation appear to have taken on a more militant and radical tone, this document appears somewhat more moderate than the "Programmatic Base" which appeared in February (Montevideo A-43) as the coalition's statement of common purposes. It restates more specifically what actions a Frente government would take, but some significant elements of the earlier statement do not appear and its rhetoric is more subdued.

The Plan leaves out references to general economic planning and the possibility of widespread nationalizations, although it repeats pledges to take over the banking and export sectors and to fix prices. In the area of foreign policy, the Plan omits attacks on the Organization of American States and the Latin American Free Trade Area, as well as its earlier promise to require reinvestment of the earnings of foreign companies. The new document repeats previous pledges to renegotiate the nation's external debt and renounce Letters of Agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The Frente also states its determination to cancel international petroleum agreements and to restore diplomatic and cultural relations with Cuba. One notable omission is in the Plan's failure to make any reference to the political or electoral system envisioned; the earlier Programmatic Base supported the notion of a "plurality of political parties".

Encl: as stated

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Drafted by:
POL: MCMcLean:fm

Contents and Classification Approved by:
Ambassador C. W. Adair, Jr.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0543

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SUBJECT: LEFTIST PRESS ATTACKS BOR LOAN GUARANTEE TO ACCION
DEPT PASS AMBASSADOR ADAIR

1. PRO-TERRORIST DAILY "LA IDEA" AUGUST 24 CARRIED ALLEGATIONS THAT BANK OF REPUBLIC "GAVE" COLORADO PARTY LIST 15 LEADER JORGE BATLLE \$456,000 TO PURCHASE NEW PRINTING PRESS FOR HIS AFTERNOON NEWSPAPER "ACCION." ARTICLE CLAIMS "GIFT" IS REWARD FOR LIST 15 SUPPORT OF PACHECO GOVERNMENT FOR PAST FOUR YEARS AND REHASHES OLD "INFIDENCIA" CHARGE THAT BATLLE PROFITED FROM DEVALUATION OF APRIL 1968. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE, "ACCION" APPLIED FOR BOR LOAN IN OCTOBER 1970, JUSTIFYING IT ON BASIS THAT EQUIPMENT WOULD PERMIT IT TO REDUCE COSTS, INCREASE AND IMPROVE PRODUCTION. ARTICLE SAYS THAT BOR TECHNICAL STAFF RECOMMENDED LOAN BE REFUSED ON GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY. HOWEVER, DIRECTORS OF BOR, ONE OF WHOM MEMBER OF BATLLE'S LIST 15, OVERRULED TECHNICAL STAFF AND APPROVED LOAN ON AUGUST 5. ARTICLE CONCLUDES WITH CHALLENGE TO BATLLE AND BOR DIRECTORS TO ANSWER TO CHARGES. "EL POPULAR," AUGUST 24, REPEATED SUBSTANCE OF "LA IDEA" ARTICLE.

2. FACT IS THAT BOR HAS AUTHORIZED LOAN GUARANTEE TO COVER PURCHASE OF PRINTING PRESS. "ACCION" OFFICIAL TOLD EMBOFF

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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INFO OCT-01 AID-20 PC-04 SS-14 NSC-10 CIAE-00 DODD-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: BLANCO CANDIDATE OPENS MONTEVIDEO PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN

1. SENATOR WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE, LEADER OF BLANCO PARTY
"POR LA PATRIA" COALITION KICKED OFF HIS PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN
MONTEVIDEO EVENING AUGUST 18 WITH WELL ATTENDED RALLY IN LOWER TO
MIDDLE CLASS BELVEDERE AREA OF CITY. RALLY ORGANIZERS ESTIMATED
ATTENDANCE AT 32,000. HOWEVER, COLORADO DAILY "LA MANANA" PUTS
FIGURE AT 24,000. POLICE ESTIMATE 20,000 AND PCU'S "EL POPULAR"
DROPS IT TO ONLY 7,000. EMBASSY OFFICERS ATTENDING BELIEVE 15,000
WOULD BE A CONSERVATIVE FIGURE.

2. RALLY WAS VERY WELL ORGANIZED WITH ENTHUSIASTIC BRIGADES OF
FERREIRA SUPPORTERS FROM THE VARIOUS SUB-FACTION POLITICAL CLUBS
ARRIVING BY BUS, UNFURLING BANNERS AND ASSUMING PRE-DETERMINED
POSITIONS IN FRONT OF SPEAKER'S STAND WELL IN ADVANCE OF CANDIDATES
ARRIVALS. PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM MORE THAN ADEQUATE FOR SIZE OF
CROWD WHICH APPEARED TO CONSIST PRIMARILY OF WORKING MEN AND
MIDDLE CLASS. SIZABLE PROPORTION OF CROWD APPEARED TO BE UNDER 30.

3. PRINCIPAL SPEAKERS WERE RECENTLY NAMED "POR LA PATRIA"
CANDIDATE FOR "INTENDENTE" (MAYOR) OF MONTEVIDEO LEONEL VIERA,

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TELEGRAM

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ACTION ARA-20

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INFO CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: CASTRO SPEECH

1. COLORADO DAILY "EL DIA" TODAY (JULY 27) HEADLINES UPI REPORT DATED MIAMI IN WHICH FIDEL CASTRO QUOTED AS DISCUSSING PROSPECTS OF URUGUAYAN "FRENTE AMPLIO" POLITICAL COALITION IN COURSE OF SPEECH BROADCAST YESTERDAY. QUOTE IS AS FOLLOWS: "IN THE CASE OF URUGUAY, THE ARMED STRUGGLE IS BECOMING MORE VIGOROUS AS IS THAT OF THE 'FRENTE AMPLIO'". THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE MAY BE A POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN URUGUAY BY THE END OF THE YEAR CANNOT BE RULED OUT. AND WE FEEL OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE VICTORY WHICH THE URUGUAYAN PEOPLE WILL ACHIEVE".

2. "EL DIA" CALLS REPORT INTERVENTION IN URUGUAYAN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY "EL POPULAR" CARRIES SIMILAR REPORT FROM AFP BUT THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE QUOTE IS OMITTED. "POPULAR" CARRIED STORY ON PAGE 10.
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TO	: Department of State	
INFO:	Amembassy BUENOS AIRES Amembassy SANTIAGO CINCSO	
CINCSO FOR POLAD		
FROM	: Amembassy MONTEVIDEO	
DATE:	July 18, 1971	
SUBJECT:	The Second CNT Congress: Unity, but . . .	
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

JUL 27 1971

Introduction and Summary

Meeting in the large gymnasium of the AEBU (bank workers union) headquarters from June 23rd through the 26th, the Communist-controlled Convencion Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) held its Second National Congress. (The first regular congress was held in May of 1969.) In this period prior to national elections in November, the CNT congress takes on important political significance: the Communist Party (PCU) attempted to orchestrate the show to dramatize the size and strength of its labor arm in order to sustain the claim that the CNT will play a preeminent role in behalf of the Marxist-backed Frente Amplio political coalition. While we believe that the CNT emerges from its Second National Congress a strengthened organization, differences among CNT affiliates concerning the political posture and electoral role of the confederation are now more pronounced and more publicly disputed than previously. A vociferous minority in opposition to the Communist line demanded that the CNT engage in more militant programs of "direct action" and not subordinate its union objectives to the PCU's electoral ambitions.

CNT Strength: Whose Figures?

Given the desire by the Communist press to exaggerate the strength of the CNT, figures concerning the number of participants in the congress must be read with caution. The CNT claims that 78 organizations were represented by 681 delegates and 577 alternates.

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		Contents and Classification Approved by: Ambassador C. W. Adair, Jr. <i>CA</i>	
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We are told that at the prior congress only 59 organizations were represented by 502 delegates. The 78 organizations at the latest congress allegedly represented over 500,000 workers. If true, this would be a very important political fact, as 500,000 constitutes 28% of the nation's registered voters. However, on its face, this figure is inflated.

According to the by-laws of the CNT, delegates are named to the congress at the ratio of one for every 200 paid-up union members. From this it would appear that the 681 delegates represented only 136,200 members and not the half-million claimed. If union membership is defined in terms of persons who regularly pay their dues, even the 136,200 figure may be too large. Uruguayans are notoriously unwilling to pay dues voluntarily and the check-off system is not in common usage. A more politically meaningful measure of union membership would include persons who consider themselves "members" of a particular union. With this criterion one can only speculate about the CNT's strength (we have usually used the figure of 200,000 to 300,000); what is probably less subject to doubt is the CNT's claim that it now includes 78 affiliates or a growth of 19 over the last two years.

Also in attendance with "fraternal delegations" were three important non-CNT federations: Railroad Workers, Meat Workers, and Soft Drink Workers. The CNT over the past six months has been courting these groups, and their presence at the congress suggests that the CNT may be successful in obtaining their affiliation. These three federations have attended meetings of their respective industrial federations which the CNT is now organizing.

Opposition to the Communist Party: From the Left

The picture of a fast-growing and powerful CNT was, however, disturbed by a well-publicized schism in the confederation between pro-Communist Party unions and those partisan to a more militant, violent labor movement. This latter group are politically akin to the Socialist Party, the MLN/Tupamaros, and anarchistic factions. Although the PCU's daily, El Popular, denied them a voice, the weekly organ of the Socialist Party, El Oriental, and the MLN-oriented daily, La Idea, provided the minority faction all the space they needed, with the result that El Popular traded insults with its more radical brethren.

The fight within the CNT is essentially a reflection of the conflict between the Communist Party on one side, and the MLN, Socialists,

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and other proponents of violence on the other. The Communist Party at this time is committed to relying primarily on the electoral process as a means of gaining political power and is attempting to avoid any action on its part or on the part of the CNT which would provide the Government a pretext for outlawing it or for postponing or cancelling the November 28 elections. While the PCU presumably does not believe the Frente Amplio will win the offices of President and Vice President this time, they probably are hopeful of establishing a sufficiently strong position for the Frente to win the 1976 elections.

The MLN, the Socialists, and the other allied groups have varying attitudes towards the elections, but none of them share the PCU's belief that elections are the best route to political power. Accordingly, their partisans in the CNT have few or no compunctions about undertaking prolonged general strikes, plant occupations, and other actions which might provoke the Government to take "repressive" action. On the contrary, the MLN is believed to favor provoking the Government in this way as a means of awakening the people's "revolutionary spirit."

Information on the composition of the anti-PCU minority within the CNT is not complete, but we do know that there were at least two "counter reports" in opposition to the Executive Committee's report to the congress. Explaining its decision not to vote for the majority report, COT (textile workers union) denounced the CNT's leadership for not having made good on its plans to force the Government to end its wage freeze, rehire workers fired during labor disputes and counter "repressive" GOU actions such as its emergency security measures. The reasons for the CNT's failures, in COT's opinion, are political: "Certain trade union leaders have preferred to transfer confrontations to the electoral field whereas the only real possibility to define the popular fight depends on the unions and the students as took place in 1968 and 1969 [years in which there were a series of prolonged, bitterly contested strikes]. A large underestimation of the importance of the trade union movement in the life of the country and a lack of confidence in its proven capacity to fight are responsible for these errors, which must be overcome in the future." COT complained that one day general strikes such as took place on April 1 and June 10 of this year were purely symbolic.

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In another "counter report" eleven unions^o including three that attended the congress only as "fraternal delegations" (Giringelli, CICSSA, and SERAL) reiterated the charges made by COT. They blamed US "imperialism" for the problems of Uruguay and denounced the decision to place the CNT "at the service of the elections."

The Opposition Put Down

PCU partisans in the CNT were successful not only in preventing the opposition minority from reading their reports, but in passing an amendment to the CNT's by-laws formalizing the political role of the CNT. Article 49 was changed to permit CNT leaders to be candidates for public office. The amended article states that CNT leaders who are political candidates must not use their CNT position in support of their partisan activities, but this is a meaningless sop to the minority.

The Executive Committee's Report, ratified by the congress, places the CNT squarely on record as considering the holding of the November elections "a matter of first importance." The General Resolution of the Congress threatened that the CNT would meet a coup d'etat with a general strike.

The last stand of the anti-PCU minority was to attempt to frustrate the work of the convention committee responsible for proposing candidates to serve on the Governing Council (Mesa Representativa Nacional). In the past the committee's proposals have been accepted by the congress by unanimous acclamation without a formal balloting. According to the leftist weekly, Marcha, last minute intervention by CNT President José D'Elia was successful in preserving the unified front. The 26 organizations represented on the Mesa Representativa Nacional during the past two years retain their seats, and three affiliates were added: SIMA (pharmaceutical workers), Asociacion de Obreros y Empleados de Conaprole (state milk and dairy products company), and UTAA (sugar workers union).

^oThese are: FUS (employees of mutual medical companies); FUNSA union (tire and rubber products); Sindicato de la Industria del Medicamento y Afines (pharmaceutical products workers); Union de Obreros y Empleados de TEM (a major electrical appliances company); Sindicato de Obreros y Administrativos de General Electric; Sindicato Unico de Enrique Giringelli S. A. (tire company); Union Obrera de ATMA (plastics company); Union de Obreros y Empleados de CICSSA (paper products company); Union de Obreros de SERAL (shoe manufacturer); Sindicato de Frutas y Verduras de Salto (fruit and vegetable workers of Salto); Plenario Intergremial de Mercedes (city of Mercedes Union Council).

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UTAA, which is one of the most radical, MLN-inspired affiliates of the CNT, refused to take its seat on the Governing Council, and URDE (union of plantation workers) was designated as its alternate. The dispute between UTAA and the Communist majority in the CNT provides further light on the nature of the schism within the CNT. For "reasons of security", UTAA refused to inform the CNT of its membership totals on which the number of its delegates to the congress would be determined. UTAA was behind in its dues payments, but according to the CNT this was not the reason UTAA was limited to one voting delegate in the congress. Rejecting this offer, UTAA announced its refusal to participate on the Governing Council and stated that there were others in the congress whose claim to represent a union was doubtful. Given UTAA's propensity to violence, viz. the annual march of the cañeros from Artigas to Montevideo, we conclude that UTAA's refusal to participate in the Mesa Representativa is not unwelcome to the PCU-backed majority within the CNT.

José D'Elia was reelected President of the CNT, reflecting his acceptability to the PCU. As of this writing, the Mesa Representativa is not believed to have selected the Executive Committee (Secretariado). The delay may be a further indication of the schism within the CNT.

While the CNT undoubtedly is weakened by this conflict between the proponents and opponents of a more "militant" (read "violent") program, the minority, with the exception of UTAA, reaffirmed its loyalty to the CNT and trade union unity. We do not expect those on the losing side to disaffiliate.

New Structures

Prior to the CNT congress, many of its affiliates held their own conventions to decide on positions and to choose delegates. In addition, the national congress stimulated the formation of industrial and professional federations which presumably will group the individual unions now directly affiliated to the CNT. A Transportation Workers Federation was formed on June 19 which includes the CNT bus drivers, taxi drivers, and truck drivers affiliates. The formation of a Rural Workers Federation seems less formalized, but presumably would include CNT affiliates such as UTAA and the tobacco workers (field hands) union. The CNT has also been working to create a Food and Drink Workers Federation and in the name of "labor unity" has been wooing non-CNT unions into participation.

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This new structure should strengthen the CNT's ability to mobilize various sectors for strikes and demonstrations (that the Transportation Federation was the first to be formed is easily understood in these terms) and should increase the organizing capacity of the CNT in each of those sectors.

International Issues

The congress' international cause célèbre was the denial by the Government of visas to "fraternal" delegates from the Soviet Union and various Eastern European countries. This was condemned in speeches from the convention floor, and telegrams were sent to the ILO Conference which then was in session.

The report to the congress by the Secretary for International Affairs, Luis Iguini, contained the usual dosage of anti-yanqui tirades, singling out ORIT as the agent of US "imperialism." Iguini lamented CLASC's (the "Christian" Latin American organization) reluctance to meet and cooperate more closely with COPUSTAL (the Soviet-backed Latin American federation). CLASC was represented by Santiago Pereyra who extolled labor unity in his address to the congress.

Without any doubt, the principal foreign guest to the CNT congress was Victor Diaz, representing CUTCH from Chile. He condemned "yanqui" engineers for leaving Chile, not because they were expelled, but because they sought to create problems. Diaz termed the murder of former Interior Minister Pérez Sujovic one of the "provocations of imperialism."

The Domestic Program

The CNT majority adopted a series of general resolutions which are devoid of new programs. The CNT reiterated its "program of solutions" which include:

1. Withdrawing from the IMF and declaring a moratorium on the country's external debt.
2. Nationalization of banking, external commerce, and the meatpacking industry.
3. Defense of "national organizations" and reactivation of national industry.

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- 4. Coordination of transport.
- 5. Agrarian reform.

Conclusions

The CNT's Second National Congress was a clear success for the Communist Party. With its eyes on the November elections, the PCU seeks to demonstrate its own political clout, while avoiding any action which could give the Government an excuse for acting against it. This objective has caused the opposition to the PCU within the CNT to claim that the labor objectives of the CNT are being subordinated to the electoral ambitions of the Communist Party. While we have no information as to whether the opposition minority improved its position at the Second Congress as compared to the First, it was clear that the PCU group was able to dominate the proceedings.

The struggle between the Communists and the advocates of a more violent form of unionism could not, of course, have been carried out without some expense to the CNT. There presumably were delegates to the Congress for whom this fight was not of particular interest and who objected to its being the principal issue on the floor. Notwithstanding, the net impression is of an organization with important resources, both in membership and finances. The CNT was able to reaffirm its claim to being the dominant organization in the Uruguayan labor movement. And the strength of the CNT serves the Communist Party's claim to preeminence within the Frente Amplio.

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TO : Department of State

INFO : Amembassy BUENOS AIRES, CINCSO for POLAD

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, UY

DATE: August 18, 1973

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT: A More Mature Blanco Opposition

REF : MVD 2446

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

SEP 6 1973

Enclosed are two recent Memorandums of Conversation with Blanco Party politicians Guillermo GARCIA Costa (Por la Patria faction) and Luis Alberto LA CALLE (Herrera-Heber faction). These two relatively young members of the Blanco Party Directorate were among those taking the lead in the first rush of conspiratorial opposition to President BORDABERRY's June 27 closing of the Congress. Both remain adamantly opposed to President Bordaberry, but in other respects there is evident in their conversations a new maturity and pragmatism in the Blanco Party's opposition. Civilian/military confrontation is seen now by them as a long term problem which will require patient planning to resolve.

New Efforts to Unify the Blanco Party: Both Garcia and LaCalle indicated a desire for closer cooperation between Blanco Party factions loyal to Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate (PLP and Rocha), Washington BELTRAN (National Blanco Union) and Mario HEBER (Herrera-Heber). Their opposition to the closing of the Congress has provided the basis for two common goals; the removal of President Bordaberry and elections before November 1976. Their shared sense of impotence towards the military probably contributes also to this disposition

- Encl. #1-MemCon with Guillermo Garcia Costa, 8-9-73
- Encl. #2-MemCon with Luis Alberto LaCalle, 8-10-73

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Contents and Classification Approved by:
Charge: Mr. Ortiz

Drafted by: POL:AHEisner:bjs 8-15-73

Clearances: ADCM: Mr. Tolson

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towards new unity. And these Blanco groups share a long party heritage which facilitates cooperation between them (a heritage not present in the recently formed Democratic Front). One potentially divisive issue, however, is the various factions' commitment to Ferreira - those least tied to him might be prepared to reach an accommodation with the military at Ferreira's expense.

Seeking a Better Understanding of the Military: Garcia and LaCalle had somewhat different assessments of the ability of the Blanco Party to reach an eventual accommodation with the military. Nevertheless, both see the Blanco Party's immediate opposition as being primarily directed against President Bordaberry. The disparagement of the military and the belief, especially prevalent in the Por la Patria faction, that the officer corps would back down in any face-to-face confrontation with the politicians has disappeared. Now, both Blanco politicians indicate an interest in a greater understanding of the military - to know their opponent and politicize it towards their position. Both are acutely aware, though the level of their distress appears most intense in proportion to their ties to Ferreira, that the military's political role is not likely to be a short term phenomenon but one with which the politicians will have to live with for years.

Avoiding Commitments with the Marxist Left: There is a consensus among Blanco opposition factions to avoid any formal alliance with the Marxist left. On pragmatic grounds, they realize that such an alliance could damage rather than help their electoral position. However, the no-alliance position is conditioned by a continuing desire to keep open a dialogue with the left and to attract its support. Such dialogue could give rise to a limited cooperation with some factions in the Frente Amplio.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Guillermo GARCIA Costa, Former Blanco Party
(Por la Patria) Deputy and Member of
Party's Directorate
Russell E. Olson, First Secretary
A. Harold Eisner, Second Secretary

PLACE: Downtown Restaurant

DATE: August 9, 1973

1. "No Alliance" Decision:

At a meeting of the Blanco Party Directorate on August 8, it was officially decided that Party members will not co-sponsor public proclamations with other political groups. The proscription against alliances with other political parties was the immediate consequence of the decision of Senator Dardo ORTIZ and four other Por la Patria congressmen to sign the moderate, anti-Administration July 9 proclamation of the Democratic Front. However, since Ortiz and the others had signed the proclamation prior to the decision of the Directorate, it was understood that they would not be disciplined.

The Directorate decision, however, is also directed against those in Por la Patria who want an open alliance with the Frente Amplio. Officially, the Blanco Party Directorate now claims that the declaration issued in late June in the name of the Blanco Party and the Frente Amplio was not authorized. In fact, Garcia noted, only a single member of the Directorate had authorized the joint declaration with the Frente Amplio and, with 2/3's of the Blanco Party's vote in the conservative interior of the country, it is considered politic now to disavow it. Garcia also felt that it would be dangerous for the Blancos to enter into too close an embrace with disciplined Marxist groups (a reference to the Communists). And, according to Garcia, the PLP is sufficiently strong that it does not have to enter into alliances as many on the left and some among supporters of the Colorado Party's List 15 may have no alternative but to support Ferreira in any future election.

The Directorate, at the same time it enjoined alliances, welcomed continued "dialogue" with all sectors. The purpose of such continued contact is to encourage eventual support for Ferreira from individuals within the Frente Amplio.

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2. A Test of Government Regulations on Meetings:

Garcia noted that the August 8 meeting of the Blanco Party Directorate was technically illegal, as the group had not obtained prior governmental authorization. The Blancos, however, plan shortly to test the Administration's decree on such meetings by informing, not requesting permission from, the GOU of a public meeting.

3. Argentina - An Abrazo for Bordaberry:

Garcia had recently returned from a month's self-exile in Buenos Aires. While in Argentina, he and other Blanco leaders had held a number of meetings with high Argentine Government officials. The Argentines expressed concern over Bordaberry's pro-Brazilian bias. Specifically, they were unhappy with Bordaberry's interview with a correspondent from the Buenos Aires newspaper "La Nacion" in which the President expressed "a certain attitude of sympathy with the Brazilian regime" and "mutual interest" (See MVD 2023). While Bordaberry's Secretary of the Presidency denied several days after the publication of the interview that the President had in fact made such statements of sympathy for Brazil (See MVD 2069), the GOA officials had seen the "La Nacion" newsman's notes from the interview - notes corrected and signed by one of Bordaberry's secretaries. To counteract this bias, the Argentines told the Uruguayan Blancos that they might soon expect Peron to issue a very friendly and forthcoming statement on Argentine/Uruguayan relations - in effect to give Bordaberry a warm "abrazo". At the same time, the Argentines also will warn the GOU that while they are prepared to go more than halfway in ensuring good relations with Bordaberry, they are determined to protect what they considered to be critical Argentine strategic interests in the Rio de la Plata.

Comment: While some Blancos may well prefer a more hostile Argentine attitude toward Bordaberry, it was our impression that Garcia was appreciative of the Argentine need to seek good relations with all Uruguayan governments. Garcia also indicated that he thought it important for Uruguay to maintain good relations with both Argentine and Brazil.

4. Understanding the Military:

Garcia was convinced that the military would be forced to remove Bordaberry from the Presidency within a relatively short time. Thus, the big issue for him is the Blanco dealings with the military.

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The Blancos had been greatly impressed by the ability of Uruguayan military intelligence to break up their rather modest effort to oppose the June 27 closing of the Congress. Now Garcia felt that the Blancos must obtain a better appreciation of the Uruguayan military if civilian authority is ever to be reasserted. But he was not hopeful that the military could be quickly evicted from political power. There has emerged a military mystique that they alone are sufficiently honest, nationalistic and decisive to run the nation. The Blancos would not challenge this thesis head on, but would have to let the military learn from experience whether they can, in fact, run the nation any better than the politicians before.

Garcia saw various factions emerging within the military. He was concerned, however, that there is strong antagonism in all of them towards PLP leader, Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate. PLP will try to seek an accommodation with the military, but it is possible that Ferreira, like Peron in Argentina, will have to wait for the military to exhaust itself.

5. Learning to be Conspirators:

Looking back at the first week after the closing of Congress, Garcia was struck by the naivete with which he and his PLP colleagues had opposed President Bordaberry and the military. He recalled sitting in a crowded public restaurant when a Blanco colleague rushed in and announced to everyone present that he had just found a "clandestine press" in such and such a place to publish anti-Administration pamphlets. Senator Walter SANTORO, after his arrest by the military on July 10, was horrified to find that Colonel Ramon TRABAL, Director of the Defense Intelligence Service, could quote back to him almost verbatim remarks that he had made earlier at a "secret" meeting of Por la Patria supporters. In fact, Trabal's knowledge was not all that impressive as the PLP politicians had no sense of security.

Garcia noted that he himself narrowly avoided arrest in the July 6 roundup of several Blanco congressmen (see MVD 2077 for an erroneous report of his arrest). Hearing that the military were looking for him, he went into hiding and self-exile in Buenos Aires for a month. He has not been molested since returning.

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Enclosure No. 2 to A-115
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Luis Alberto LACALLE, Former Blanco (Herrera-Heber faction) Deputy and Member of the Party's Directorate
Russell E. Olson, First Secretary
A. Harold Eisner, Second Secretary

PLACE: Eisner Residence

DATE: August 10, 1973

1. Two Requirements for a Blanco/Military Understanding:

LaCalle stated that there is now general agreement within the Blanco Party Directorate as to the basis for any eventual understanding between the Party and the military; the removal from office of President Bordaberry and the holding of general elections. However, the Blancos are prepared to be flexible on when elections might be held. They realize that they cannot go back to June 27 and demand the immediate restoration of the Congress. Rather, it is necessary to allow the military time to undertake some reforms. Hopefully, the military may be convinced that within a year to a year and one-half, these reforms can be accomplished and elections held. But, in any event, the Blancos are prepared to accept any election date, even if only one day earlier, as long as it is not the November 1976 date that Bordaberry wishes.

LaCalle also stated that there is an appreciation, at least in some sectors of the Blanco Party, that it might be necessary to accept certain military-imposed limitations on who can run in the next elections. LaCalle felt that in particular Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate had badly misjudged the strength and unity of the military and had unnecessarily provoked the personal animosity of high military officers. He noted that the Herrera-Heber faction, which is not personally tied to Ferreira, might be prepared to accept some form of accommodation with the military that excluded Ferreira's candidacy.

Comment: LaCalle noted that as part of the "plan" to harass Bordaberry, the President would be booed when he attended the annual Rural Association Fair August 10. Minister of Agriculture, Benito MADERO, was booed, but Bordaberry, both on August 10 and when he attended the Fair again on August 12, was roundly cheered. For the moment, the Blanco opposition groups will have to be patient in their plans.

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2. Neither An Alliance with the Left Nor Violence:

LaCalle stated that the Blanco Party Directorate was not interested in any formal alliance with the Frente Amplio. Indeed, Ulysses PIVEL Devoto, the Blanco Party Director who had personally authorized the joint Blanco/Frente Amplio declaration after the closing of the Congress, was asked to step down from the Directorate because of this indiscretion. The Blancos will also strongly oppose the Frente Amplio in the September 12 University of the Republic internal elections.

LaCalle, in reply to a question, also denied that there is any Blanco interest in a violent confrontation with the Government. He stated that the group within the Party that supported such action is small and isolated. The Party leadership recognizes that violence cannot be successful.

3. A New Appreciation of the Military:

LaCalle noted that the experience of the last month and one-half has led Blanco politicians to seek to better understand the military. His own personal assessment was that there are now two major factions within the military. One group is a conservative current lead by General Hugo CHIAPPE Posse, Army Commander-in-Chief, and Colonel Nestor BOLENTINI, Minister of Interior. The Chiappe-Bolentini group has ties with a number of important business sectors and can be expected to defend these interests by assuring that any reforms are moderate and limited.

The other major group centers on General Esteban CRISTI, Commander of the First Military Region. Cristi is less ambitious than either Chiappe or Bolentini, but he is also ideologically far more rightist in his convictions. His very determination to eradicate leftist influence and his distrust of businessmen make him more amenable to radical reforms which would assure that the state controls all the levers of the economy (an example being nationalization of the banking sector).

LaCalle has heard that General Gregorio ALVAREZ, Chief of the Joint Staff, has cemented his ties to Cristi. However, Col. Ramon TRABAL, Commander of the Defense Intelligence Service and a close supporter of Alvarez, is not trusted by Cristi.

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Comment: LaCalle indicated that he had no real feeling for which of these two groups within the military might emerge victorious. He strongly indicated, however, that he is seeking to establish ties to the Cristi group.

4. Why Ferreira Remains Abroad:

LaCalle stated that Ferreira has remained in self-exile in Argentina because of fears that he will be prosecuted for criminal violations should he return to Uruguay. The Blancos have received information that military justice has prepared an indictment against Ferreira, charging him with contacts with the MLN/Tupamaros. The Blancos are negotiating with General Cristi and General Eduardo ZUBIA for a guarantee that Ferreira will not be arrested or indicted.

5. LaCalle's Arrest:

LaCalle was arrested on July 6 and held by military authorities until the 22nd. He stated that he had been arrested for publishing the pamphlet Resistencia Blanca. He was blindfolded, pushed and shoved and held in a very cramped cell during the first two days of his detention. But while poorly treated, he and most of the other Blanco congressmen who were arrested, were not physically tortured. One exception was deputy Miguel Angel GALAN, a retired Air Force Lieutenant and Vice President of the Por la Patria faction. Galan had been designated by Ferreira to head the Blanco resistance movement against the closing of the Congress and the military, aware of his position, severely mistreated him after his detention on July 4.

After the first two days of detention, LaCalle and the other Blanco deputies were transferred to the headquarters of the Defense Intelligence Service. Here they were under Col. Trabal's personal supervision and they were treated decently.

Comment: Ironically, LaCalle, who was arrested for his attacks against the dissolution of the Congress, was one of the more prominent civilians attending ceremonies on August 1 commemorating the 100th Anniversary of the birth of Gabriel TERRA. (General Alvarez was the most prominent military representative at the ceremony). Terra, of course, is famed for having dissolved

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the Uruguayan Congress in 1933! But in Uruguay, ideals, personal interest and family traditions (LaCalle's grandfather supported Terra) blend together in often-complex patterns.

6. Blanco Party Unity:

LaCalle noted that an outcome of the detention of the Blanco Party congressmen was that it had brought together in the same cell representatives from diverse currents within the Party. Oscar LOPEZ Balestra, although presently a member of Por la Patria, has historical ties and still remains close to Washington BELTRAN's National Blanco Union faction. Galan and Senator Walter SANTORO represent Por la Patria, Carlos RODRIGUEZ Labruna is from the Rocha Movement and LaCalle from the Herrera-Heber faction. Close proximity during two weeks of detention allowed them to establish the basis for future cooperation between their factions.

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TO : Department of State
PASS LABOR DEPARTMENT

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: May 1971
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JUN 2 - 1971

SUBJECT : Recent Labor Demonstrations and Their Political Implications

Introduction and Summary

This airgram describes the several labor demonstrations and work stoppages which have occurred in recent weeks and examines their political implications in this pre-election period. In the past, the Communist-controlled CNT has unsuccessfully tried to muster a labor vote in behalf of the Communist Party's political front organization, FIDEL. Although the CNT claims to represent upwards of 80% of the organized work force (about 300,000), FIDEL was able to obtain only 5.7% of the vote in the last elections of 1966, or 69,750 ballots in its favor. Despite its inability to deliver the "labor vote" in the past, the CNT has in recent months attempted to demonstrate its political clout. We expect that the CNT will continue staging various kinds of demonstrations for this purpose with increasing frequency until election day, so that when the votes are finally counted, the PCU will be able to claim that its labor arm, the CNT, brought in a "substantial" number of votes for the "Frente Amplio" in which it along with the Christian Democrats and various Socialist and ex-Colorado and Blanco groups are participating.

Workers have rallied to the CNT banner in defense of their particular economic interests, but thus far have failed to respond to the more patently political calls to arms by the CNT. Most observers believe that the number of workers the CNT was able to muster for its recent demonstrations was on the small side. However, in addition to continuing its demonstrations on a regular basis until election time, the CNT will make its meetings available as platforms for "Frente" candidates.

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Contents and Classification Approved by: Ambassador Charles W. Radtke Jr.
DCM: Mr. Ortiz

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Montevideo A-86
Page 2

The legislature probably will adopt a large number of labor/social bills before November for which the CNT can be expected to take credit and to make the claim, if there is a significant vote in favor of the "Frente", that it delivered the "labor vote". Because of the many factors that will influence the "Frente's" final vote, any attempt objectively to substantiate such a CNT claim will be problematical. In the months to come prior to election, we will be following this question carefully.

April 22: Warm Up for May Day

As a follow-up to the successful general strike which the CNT called for April 1 (see A-53) and a preview of the May Day demonstration, the CNT organized "meetings" in front of four ministries on April 22 to publicize a long list of political and economic grievances. The meetings would have taken place without receiving any particular notice from the public, if various non-CNT unions had not chosen to "cooperate" by calling for work stoppages on the 22nd to publicize their particular grievances. The drivers of the privately-owned Montevideo bus line CUTCSA, most of whom are not members of the CNT affiliate, stopped work for two periods for a total of six hours in support of their demand for a 10% wage increase (made in the name of "productivity") and other minor grievances. The drivers, officially still affiliated to the International Transportation Federation (the democratic international trade secretariat for this important sector), chose to stop work all of the 22nd claiming a 20% wage increase (based upon job re-evaluation, a device which the GOU's Wage and Price Board, CORRIN, uses to make exceptions to the wage freeze policy). The railroad workers' platform for the day's stoppage included other demands designed to protect their job security and a list of CNT-type political issues.

Labor Day

May 1, 1971 fell on a Saturday and virtually no one in the capital worked. Vital services - electricity, gas, and water - continued, but practically all else shut down. Anyone without private transportation was obliged to entertain himself at home, as the city buses remained parked at their terminals.

This work stoppage should not, however, be construed as trade union militancy mobilized by the CNT. May 1 is not the property of any union in Uruguay; rather it is "non-denominational" and cuts across class lines, offering another fiesta day to patrón as well as obrero.

A better measure of the CNT's political strength was the size of the meeting it was able to organize at the Legislative Palace in the late afternoon of May 1. Last year the Government, fearful of disturbances,

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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND ON PRESIDENT'S SUMMONING OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR

REF : MONTEVIDEO 1257

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1. SEVERAL SOURCES WITH CONTACTS BOTH TO SENIOR GOV MINISTERS AND TO PRESIDENT'S OFFICE HAVE NOW CONFIRMED TO US PRESS SPECULATION THAT PRESIDENT PACHECO WARNED SOVIET AMBASSADOR DEMIDOV ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF HIS EMBASSY DURING THEIR MAY 17 MEETING (REFTEL). THESE SOURCES AGREE THAT PRESIDENT PACHECO OBJECTED SPECIFICALLY TO ALLEGED SOVIET FUNDING OF LEFTIST "FRENTE AMPLI" POLITICAL COALITION OF WHICH URUGUAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCUU) IS MEMBER. ONE SOURCE, RETIRED ARMY MAJOR ALBERTO CASABO, WHO IS CLOSE TO PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY HECTOR GIORGI AND WHO MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, TOLD DCM THAT PRESIDENT PRESENTED DEMIDOV WITH "PROOF" OF SOVIET FUNDING. ALSO SAID PRESIDENT ACCUSED DEMIDOV OF SUPPORTING GROUPS WHICH HAVE

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SUBJ: VIEWS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

1. AT INTIMATE DINNER NIGHT MAY 10 WHICH INCLUDED LEADERS AMERICAN COMMUNITY, VICE PRESIDENT ABDALA MADE FOLLOWING POINTS: (A) ABDALA SAID HE COULD ASSURE THOSE PRESENT THAT HE HAD BEEN SELECTED AS "OFFICIAL" PARTY CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. HE SAID HE EXPECTED TO RUN ON TWO LISTS. ONE AS VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ON RE-ELECTION TICKET HEADED BY PACHECO, AND ANOTHER TICKET WHICH HE HIMSELF WOULD HEAD. HE SAID HE HAD SUPPORT OF OVER-WHELMING MAJORITY OF COLORADO PARTY LEADERS AND THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT COLORADO PARTY WOULD WIN THE ELECTIONS. HE OBSERVED MORE AND MORE PARTY LEADERS WERE COMING TO CONCLUSION THAT HE WAS "LEAST WORST" CANDIDATE. THROUGHOUT EVENING HE SPOKE ONLY IN HIGHEST TERMS OF PRESIDENT PACHECO AND SAID HE HAS FREQUENT STRATEGY MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT.

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(B) HE SAID IT WAS CERTAIN THAT ALBERTO GALLINAL WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE A BLANCO CANDIDATE AND THAT THE BLANCOS THEREFORE HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF WINNING THE PRESIDENCY.

(C) ABDALA SAID HE HAD MADE IT KNOWN TO BLANCO PARTY LEADERS THAT AS PRESIDENT HE WOULD, AS A MATTER OF POLICY, INCLUDE THE

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS RE PRO-GALLINAL MOVEMENT

REF: MVD 1147 POL 12 UR XR POL 15 UR

1. IN FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS RE POLITICAL STORM CREATED BY SEEMING SUPPORT FOR PRO-GALLINAL MOVEMENT BY PRESIDENT PACHECO (RETELI), SUPPORTERS OF GALLINAL NOW INDICATE INTENTION TO INTEGRATE THEIR GROUP FORMALLY INTO BLANCO PARTY AS NEW BLANCO POLITICAL FACTION. ANNOUNCEMENT CAME AFTER MEETING BETWEEN BLANCO PARTY DIRECTORATE AND TWO GALLINAL DEPUTIES WHO LEFT HIS ROCHA MOVEMENT WHEN MOVEMENT DECIDED SUPPORT CANDIDACY OF SENATOR FERREIRA ALDUNATE. TWO LEGISLATORS (GARCIA PINTOS AND LAPIDO DIAZ) TOLD DIRECTORATE THEY HAD FORMALLY PETITIONED ELECTORAL COURT FOR PERMISSION BECOME "SUB-LEMA" OF BLANCO PARTY. THEY ALSO DECLARED THAT FACT THAT NEW MOVEMENT, "POR LA UNION DEL PAIS", SUPPORTED DR. GALLINAL SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY BE TAKEN AS PROCLAMATION OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY. RATHER, IT INDICATED ONLY ADHERENCE TO HIS PATRIOTIC PRINCIPLES AND IDEALS.

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2. BLANCO PARTY DIRECTORATE AT SAME MEETING ALSO ISSUED DECLARATION THAT PARTY WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY EXTRA-PARTY

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT PACHECO CALLS FOR NATIONAL UNITY ON EXTRA-POLITICAL PARTY BASIS

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT PACHECO IN A SPEECH AT PAYSANDU ON MAY 3 BROKE HIS LONG, SELF-IMPOSED POLITICAL SILENCE BY HINTING AT POSSIBILITY OF NEW POLITICAL MOVEMENT UNIFYING DEMOCRATIC FORCES OUTSIDE TRADITIONAL PARTIES. PRESIDENT HAS SPARKED CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL COMMENT. END SUMMARY

2. PACHECO'S REMARKS CAME IN REFERENCE TO ADVERTISEMENT PUBLISHED MAY 2 IN CONSERVATIVE DAILY "EL PAIS", CALLING FOR POPULAR SUPPORT FOR NEW POLITICAL GROUP TO BE HEADED BY FORMER LEADER OF BALNCO PARTY'S ROCHA MOVEMENT, ALBERTO GALLINAL. DECLARATION OF NEW GROUP, "POR LA UNION DE PAIS", ALSO CONTAINED NAMES OF SOME 650 SUPPORTERS, INCLUDING SEVERAL BLANCO PARTY LEGISLATORS AND SOME WELL-KNOWN COLORADO PARTY MEMBERS. ARTICLE PROPOSED "GATHERING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES UNDER A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT" AND CALLED ON ALL LIKE-MINDED CITIZENS TO DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT.

3. IN PAYSANDU SPEECH, PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD READ DECLARATION AND APPROVED SENTIMENTS IT EXPRESSED, NOT WITHSTANDING FACT THAT NEW MOVEMENT SUPPORTS "A DISTINGUISHED CITIZEN OF THIS

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COUNTRY WHO IS NOT A MEMBER OF MY COLORADO PARTY". PRESIDENT CONTINUED THAT HE HAD GIVEN SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THAT PORTION OF DECLARATION WHICH PROPOSED THAT "THERE MUST BE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL A JOINING OF BOTH DEMOCRATIC PARTIES" AND DECLARED THAT "FACED BY THE WINDS OF CONFUSION NOW BLOWING, I BELIEVE THAT THE HOUR HAS ARRIVED TO LOOK BEYOND SCHEMES EXCLUSIVELY (BASED ON) POLITICAL PARTIES". PRESIDENT CLOSED BY REITERATING, "I AM CONVINCED THAT IN THIS COUNTRY THE (EFFECTIVE) EXERCISE OF DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS DEPENDS UPON ALL CITIZENS, ON ALL THE COUNTRY. IT IS NOT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ONE PARTY, MUCH LESS OF ONE GROUP OF MEN OR ANY SINGLE MAN."

4. THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO GALLINALI GROUP PROVOKED TORRENT OF REACTION BY OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS. COMMUNIST DAILY "EL POPULAR" CHARGED THAT SEEMING CONNECTION BETWEEN GALLINALI GROUP AND PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR PACHECO INTENTION TO CONTINUE HIS ADMINISTRATION. ALSO DECLARED THAT GALLINALI GROUP REPRESENTED "FEARFUL REACTION" ON PART OF "OLIGARCHS" TO POLITICAL EFFORTS OF "FRENTE AMPLIO". ONE OF THE SPONSORS OF CURRENT EFFORT TO PROMOTE RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT PACHECO, DEPUTY RAUMAR JUDEI, APPLAUDED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND SAID HE SUPPORTED IDEA OF NEW MOVEMENT LED BY PACHECO-GALLINALI PRESIDENTIAL SLATE. BLANCO PARTY PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL, SENATOR FERREIRA ALDUNATE, WHO KICKED OFF HIS OWN CAMPAIGN WITH HALF-HOUR RADIO AND TELEVISION ADDRESS MAY 3, CONDEMNED BOTH PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND NEW PRO-GALLINALI MOVEMENT SAYING ANY COMBINATION OF THOSE SEEKING TO SAVE COUNTRY WITH THOSE WHO HAVE "SOLD IT OUT" IS IMPOSSIBLE. COLORADO PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANTS, SENATORS FLORES MORA AND VASCONCELLOS, BOTH REJECTED IDEA OF ANY NEW POLITICAL FRONT OUTSIDE TWO TRADITIONAL PARTIES, SAYING IT WOULD HARM BOTH BLANCO AND COLORADO ORGANIZATIONS. COLORADO PARTY LIST 15 LEADER, JORGE BATLLE, SAID IN RADIO ADDRESS THAT NO ONE COULD OBJECT TO UNIFIED ACTION BY ALL DEMOCRATIC GROUPS BUT TO OBTAIN SUCH COOPERATION THERE SHOULD BE NO ABANDONMENT OR WEAKENING OF THE TRADITIONAL BLANCO/COLORADO PARTY STRUCTURES.

5. IN TELEVISION INTERVIEW EVENING MAY 4, GALLINALI STATED FLATLY SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE HAS NO INTENTION OF RUNNING FOR PRESIDENCY THIS YEAR AND CLAIMED HIS RETIREMENT FROM ROCHA MOVEMENT TWO YEARS AGO MARKED THE END OF HIS POLITICAL CAREER. SAID HE NOW DEVOTING HIMSELF TO NON-POLITICAL CIVIC EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE ALL DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS IN COUNTRY TO BAND TOGETHER FOR ITS SALVATION. SUCH AN

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EFFORT AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY WERE INCOMPATIBLE, HE DECLARED. UNNAMED PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN HAS ALSO ISSUED STATEMENT THAT PRESIDENT PACHECO'S SPEECH IN PAYSANDUJ COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS PRESIDENTIAL ENDORSEMENT OF ANY EXTRA-PARTY POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN.

6. COMMENT: REMARKS OF BOTH GALLINALI AND PACHECO APPEAR TO HAVE INCREASED RATHER THAN DECREASED "WINDS OF CONFUSION" RE PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL INTENTIONS. THOSE SUPPORTING HIS RE-ELECTION, SUCH AS JUDE, HAVE PRIVATELY ADMITTED NEAR-IMPOSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING SUFFICIENT VOTES TO SECURE PASSAGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NECESSARY TO CONTINUE PACHECO IN OFFICE. AT SAME TIME, THEY SPEAK VAGUELY OF NEED FOR ELECTORAL LAW OR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM TO CONTINUE PACHECO ADMINISTRATION. GALLINALI'S OWN INTENTIONS ALSO REMAIN UNCLEAR, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS DENIAL LAST EVENING OF PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS. SHOULD HIS NEW CIVIC ACTION GROUP DECIDE TO PARTICIPATE IN NOVEMBER ELECTIONS AND PRESENT ITS OWN SLATE OF CANDIDATES, THIS COULD HAVE SERIOUS DEBILITATING EFFECT ON BOTH BLANCO AND COLORADO PARTIES.
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TO : Department of State

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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INFO : CINCSO FOR POLAD

AS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: April 18, 1971

SUBJECT : Blanco Party Convention Elects New Directorate

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

REF :

APR 23 1971

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On March 28, 430 delegates from all sections of the Blanco Party convened in Montevideo for the election of a new party Directorate. The convention was the result of over a year's behind-the-scenes work by a small group of Blancos, led by List 400 Senator Washington BELTRAN, to heal a serious split which developed in Party ranks after a convention was held in December 1969, the first in nearly a decade. The head of the Party's large "Alianza" faction, Senator Martin ECHEGOYEN, had pushed for the 1969 meeting in the expectation that it would confirm him as Party leader and Directorate President. However, adroit political footwork by Alberto HEBER, leader of the "Orthodox Herrerista" faction, resulted in Heber's election as Directorate chief and a blow to Echegoyen's prestige from which he has still not recovered. Echegoyen then resigned from the Directorate in a huff, threatened to set up a competing body in his own faction, and took no further part in Directorate activities for nearly a year. As a result of Beltran's mediating activities, Heber and other Directorate members recently announced their resignations in order to pave the way for ^{the} rally on March 28. To emphasize Echegoyen's reconciliation with other Blanco groups, Senator Carlos PENADES of the "Alianza" was selected as convention president.

The new 15-man Directorate is led by Dr. Justo M. ALONSO, a well-known physician and former member of the National Council of Government during the last Blanco administration. The membership of the Directorate is noteworthy in that, although

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Initials: _____
Drafted by: POL: JLTulcajs
Clearances: POL: JHWilson

FORM 10-64 DS-323

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Drafting Date: 4-14-71 Phone No.: 320
Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: Mr. Ortiz

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MONTEVIDEO

it contains representatives from all five Blanco factions, none of those elected are now active Blanco politicians of national prominence.

COMMENT: The importance of the Blanco's recent convention and its election of new central Party authorities is not readily evident to the outside observer. The Directorate has no power to enforce overall Party discipline, its members are not well-known to the public and its election in no way changes the fact that Uruguayan political campaigns pivot on the decisions of individual party faction leaders, rather than those of central party organizations. However, in discussions with Blancos since the March 28 meeting, all have placed great stress on the results of recent Party unity moves. They point out that the convention and election was the first occasion for unanimous all-Party action since the Blancos split over the Presidential nomination of Luis Herrera during the 1928 campaign. These same sources believe that the healing of this 43-year old breach will be of considerable help to Blanco candidates during the forthcoming presidential race. While admitting that the Directorate has no direct disciplinary power, they point out that most of the members of the new Directorate represent the "elder statesman" category in the Party and therefore, they will exercise a strong moral authority over individual factions.

This remains to be seen. In the weeks following the March 28 rally, the new Directorate has met several times with senior faction leaders but little of substance has emerged. If it is to become the central force which many Blancos predict, the Directorate must sooner or later adopt positions on several sensitive political issues, such as the Party's attitude toward President Pacheco's maintenance of emergency security measures during the electoral campaign. On these issues, Blanco faction leaders often disagree and the Directorate will have to seek ways of papering over these differences in arriving at a common Party position. Blanco hopes apparently rest on the idea that after four decades of dissention and infighting, individual faction leaders will probably shy away from positions which might risk the destruction of the Party's newly-found unity, at least for the balance of this electoral year.

Exempt.

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 878
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON SOVIET ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA

REF: CA-826 OF FEBRUARY 19, 1971

FOLLOWING ARE EMBASSY'S COMMENTS ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS RAISED
IN REF INSTRUCTION RE SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN URUGUAY, AS THEY MIGHT
BE INDICATIVE OF OVERALL SOVIET ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA:

1. SOVIET OBJECTIVES: - COMMUNIST PART OF URUGUAY (PCU) WHICH
ADHERES STRICTLY TO CPSU POLICIES, HAS RECENTLY BEGUN INTENSIVE
CAMPAIGN TO CONSTRUCT LEFTIST POLITICAL FRONT, "FRENTE AMPLIO",
COMBINING ITS OWN POLITICAL ARM, FIDEL, WITH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC
PARTY, SOCIALIST GROUPS AND DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF TWO
MAJOR BLANCO AND COLORADO PARTIES. PCU HAS DEVOTED LARGE SUMS
OF MONEY TO PROMOTION OF THIS "FRENTE" AND WE BELIEVE SIGNIFICANT
AMOUNT OF THESE FUNDS HAVE COME FROM SOVIET UNION. SOVIET
OBJECTIVE IS TO CREATE POLITICAL FRONT DOMINATED BY PCU WHICH
IT HOPES ULTIMATELY CAN REPEAT ITS RECENT SUCCESSFUL ELECTORAL
EFFORTS VIA THE "UNIDAD POPULAR" IN CHILE. THIS WOULD BE
CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT SOVIET PUBLIC POLICY OF SEEKING POWER
THROUGH NONVIOLENT MEANS. GIVEN ITS DEVOTION TO SOVIET UNION, PCU
WOULD CERTAINLY NOT HAVE UNDERTAKEN "FRENTE" EFFORT WITHOUT CPSU
APPROVAL AND SUPPORT.

(3)

SECRET 26

Montevideo 878 4/2/71

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FILE DESIGNATION

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : Amembassy BUENOS AIRES, CINCSO FOR POLAD

DATE: March 23, 1971

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT : Political Platform of the "Frente Amplio"

REF :

Enclosed is a free, unofficial translation of the "Program Basis of the 'Frente Amplio'", approved at a Plenary Session of the "Frente's" leadership on February 17, 1971.

ADAM

Enclosure: As Stated

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Clearances: POL: JH/Wilson

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Drafting Date: 3-22-71

Phone No.: 320

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: Mr. [Signature]

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Enclosure No. 1 to A-43
MONTEVIDEO

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

PROGRAM BASIS OF THE "FRENTES AMPLIO"

(Approved at the "Frentes"s" Plenary Session of February 17, 1971)

1. Freedoms, Rights and Guarantees

1) Complete enforcement of constitutional and legal freedoms, rights and guarantees. Guarantee of adequate information to all official and private communications media, without exclusions or pressures of any kind, especially by political or economic power;

Strict observance of the constitutional provisions which regulate education, as well as religious and cultural life;

Complete respect for and development of labor rights and freedoms.

Effective organic, functional and budgetary independence for the judicial Branch; creation of a judicial police.

With highest priority to:

A) Lifting of the emergency security measures ("medidas prontas de seguridad");

B) In relation to this, restitution to their jobs of all discharged or suspended workers, with (restoration of) all their rights; indemnization to those who were sanctioned;

C) Amnesty will be used as an instrument which, together with the stopping of the violent methods which are used by the present (governmental) system, will permit the reintegration into the legal political scene of all sectors of society, in order to assist in the normal development of the political and social life of the country. In order to attain this objective (amnesty) would include those persons accused of political crimes or related offenses, committed with the purpose of changing the present political, economic and social system.

D) Lifting of the intervention of secondary education and restitution to legality of all autonomous entities. Abrogation of all arbitrary measures against teachers and students (which were) adopted during the (Government's) intervention (of the educational system).

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E) Total reestablishment of all rights and guarantees to newspapers, political parties and groups which have been declared illegal by decrees of the Executive Branch.

II. International Policy

2) Defense of nation's sovereignty. Enforcement of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.

Independent foreign policy: actions in international organizations will be undertaken in accordance with this principle. Condemnation of the past and future role of the OAS as an instrument of imperialism. Fight for a free and integrated Latin America, working together to end political, economic, social and cultural dependence.

Support for the entrance of all countries into the United Nations.

Relations with all countries of the world, established by free agreement of the parties concerned.

Solidarity with all peoples of the world who are fighting to free themselves of colonialist, neo-colonialist and imperialist oppression, especially with Latin American peoples.

Reaffirmation of the right of asylum in accordance to the doctrinary criteria and practice traditionally used by the Republic;

Revision and eventual denunciation of all international treaties, agreements and resolutions whenever they contravene the principles defined above.

Reorganization of the diplomatic service so that it will effectively serve the authentic interests of the country.

3) Maintenance of an international economic policy for the Republic, in accordance with its national and popular interests;

Rejection of the policies of the International Monetary Fund and of other international organizations having similar policies;

Denunciation of the false integration policy of LAFTA, which aggravates the dependency of Latin America. Revision and transformation of this policy, so that it will answer the people's interests.

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Renegotiation of (the nation's) external debt, in order to delay its payment and eliminate its unfair conditions, so as to provide time for the mobilization of nation's savings capacity to carry out the economic and social purposes of this program.

In case this renegotiation is not obtained, the adoption of necessary unilateral measures in order to obtain the purposes stated.

Obligatory reinvestment of the earnings obtained by private companies established within the nation's territory.

Restriction and control of royalties, interest and amortizations of debt which are sent abroad. Adoption of measures which will prevent capital flight.

Economic and commercial relations with all countries of the world.

III. Changes in the Economic and Social Structure.

4) Independent planning of the **national** economy with social objectives, in order to contribute to the necessary structural transformations and to the integrated development of the country. In the private sector, this transformation will be strongly guided.

Creation of a planning organization in which labor, productive, technical and political representatives may participate. Cooperation by the University (of the Republic) in determining planning and development strategy.

A policy of nationalization could take the form of (either) state enterprises or other (forms) which will be based on participation by private producers and workers, whichever will provide maximum efficiency and economic dynamism.

Protection, consolidation and development of the commercial and industrial heritage of the State; participation by workers in the management and control of autonomous entities, decentralized services and mixed economic organizations.

5) Agrarian reform which will bring about an integrated transformation of the agrarian structure of the country, in accordance with general (economic) planning. Agrarian reform will eradicate "latifunda" and "minifunda" by replacing them with a fair system of land ownership and use, in order to

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contribute to social and economic development, to increase the earnings of producers and workers, and to guarantee social justice, so that the land will constitute, for the man who works it, the basis of his economic stability and his well-being and a guarantee of his dignity and freedom. Agrarian reform will give protection to small and medium (sized) real estate.

With high priority to:

- A) Assistance to medium and small producers, land tenants and sharecroppers by offering them markets, good prices, remunerative credits, education and technical assistance. Elimination of distorting "middle men".
 - B) Salaries, living and working conditions that will contribute to social progress in the (rural) interior.
 - C) Encouragement for the creation of cattle and (other) agricultural cooperatives by offering them facilities for construction, purchase of machinery, seeds, fertilizers and other items, as well as for the marketing of their products.
 - D) Enforcement of the law which prohibits ownership and exploitation of the land by stock companies.
- 6) A vigorous industrialization policy. The maintenance and enlargement of present sources of employment by utilization, if necessary, of nationalization. Majority participation by the State in those basic industries not nationalized.

Industrialization, to the maximum possible degree, of the country's raw materials and its national agricultural and farm by-products. Particularly in the processing of meat, wool, milk, leather and other cattle by-products, a close public control will be established in order to eliminate all forms of (private) monopoly or foreign penetration. Nationalization of the meat-packing industry.

Intensive research and exploitation of energy as well as mineral and marine resources.

Economic planning will result in an even territorial distribution of industrial activities, expanding the development of these activities to the interior of the country.

Development and coordination of a (national) passenger and cargo transportation policy, in accordance with national and local needs, such service to be considered a public utility. Recuperation of the State Railroad Corporation and creation of a national merchant marine.

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7) Nationalization of banks, of large monopolies and of essential areas of foreign commerce in order to prevent usury and speculation, eliminate national and foreign power groups, and place internal savings, credit and foreign exchange at the service of national development.

Suppression of credit intermediaries (now) undertaken by so-called financing companies and any other form of parallel and collateral parabanking markets.

8) Promotion of cooperatives as a contribution to the economic and social development of agricultural and cattle-raising activities, as well as their encouragement in industrial and service industry areas. Establishment of fiscal and credit policies, and of mechanisms for (economic) integration and control, which will insure the defense of the popular and progressive nature of the (nation's economic) system and will avoid the possibility of its weakening.

9) Promotion of a demographic policy (birth rate, external and internal migration) rationally planned on the basis of raising living and working conditions in order to provide the country with the human resources indispensable for its development, casting aside the coercive purposes of birth control.

10) Radical modification of the tax system in such a way that it will be fundamentally directed toward the accumulation of wealth, unproductive capital, low-income uneconomic activities, social vices and high incomes, progressively reducing taxes to consumers.

Simplification, unity and coherence of the tax structure. Regulation of fiscal policy, not only as a source of income for the State, but also as an instrument for economic guidance and for a fairer distribution of income.

Goods acquired as a product of one's own work, as well as estate transfers, will be treated separately.

IV. Social and Educational Policy.

11) Establishment of a new and fair policy for public and private salaries, based on the principle of equal pay for equal work and in accordance with the cost of living. This policy, as well as that of prices, interests and utilities, will be planned with the basic participation of the sectors involved

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and must lead to a more just distribution of income, in accordance with popular needs and investment requirements.

With high priority to:

- A) Derogation of the COPRIN (wage and price control) law.
- B) Establishment of an effective national minimum salary.

12) Creation of a rational system of standards to insure the individual the necessary well-being and tranquility for the complete development of his personality, covering all vital life cycles from gestation to death. Extension of the social security system to interior and rural workers.

With priority to the need for:

A) Enforcement of the constitutional provision which is designed to integrate into the Board of Directors of the Social Welfare Bank representatives of active and retired workers and of contributing companies. Immediate payment of the debt which the Bank has with its creditors and of the debt which State and private companies have with the Bank. Measures to avoid evasion of payments, to make payments more equal, and to provide (social) services without privilege or undue delays. Adjustments of payments to retired workers to the salaries of active workers.

B) Establishment of a national health insurance which would guarantee (medical) attention to all people, especially those in the poor sectors of the city and in the country.

C) Transformation of living conditions, with priority to the promotion of public housing and the development of housing cooperatives.

D) Creation of nurseries and kindergartens in neighborhoods and in private and public enterprises whenever the number of women working there indicates that such a program would be useful.

13) Democratic reform of the educational system which will raise its humanistic, scientific and technical content and answer the needs arising from the economic, social and political transformations presented in this program, with special attention to the promotion of (education in) rural areas. Adoption of measures by which, on the basis of this transformation, education for the people may be facilitated. Suppression of all forms of imperialistic penetration

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of the educational system.

Safeguard and extend the autonomy of the teaching facilities and coordination of the educational process. Direct and majority representation of teachers on the boards of directors of Primary and Secondary Education, National Trade Schools, and Physical Education. Immediate payment of State debts and adequate attention to the budgetary needs of education.

Effective aid to the University's efforts to fulfill its role in scientific research, cultural development, teaching and assistance to the entire population.

Protection, consolidation and development of the nation's cultural heritage. Material and moral stimulus for the development of sciences and arts. Participation by the popular masses in the enjoyment and development of culture.

Fostering and development of physical education and the collective practice of all sports.

V. Institutional Policy.

14) Integrated functioning of democracy with a plurality of political parties. Consecration of electoral legislation and a political party system which will guarantee respect for the will of the voter. Active participation of and effective control by the citizenry, increasing the use of such institutions as popular initiative, plebiscite and referendum.

15) Enlargement and development of the administrative, political and financial autonomy of municipalities and local organizations, on the following general bases:

- A) Precise delineation of municipal powers in order to strengthen and extend municipal economic, social and cultural roles.
- B) Institutionalization and development of neighborhood committees, both urban and rural, as a means of promoting popular participation in solving local problems.
- C) Revitalization of the institutions of direct democracy, and representation by workers, producers and consumers in the control of municipal services.
- D) Designation by popular vote of the membership of Local Boards. Elections for departmental and local offices should be held on different dates than national elections.
- E) Coordination and harmonization of (local) tax systems.

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16) Creation of legal procedures which would be designed to suppress any connection between public offices and private interests, as well as the use of public jobs for personal advantage.

17) Administrative reform. Effective application of fair recruitment standards, promotion, career status, training for public employees. Modernization of State services.

18) Return of the police force to civilian control and its primary role of crime prevention.

19) Reinforcement of the national character of the Armed Forces, promoting the heritage of "Artiguist" traditions. Concentrate its actions, fundamentally, on its specific commitment to the defense of the (nation's) sovereignty, its territorial integrity, and the independence and honor of the Republic. Integrate the activities of the Armed Forces in the process of national liberation and in the economic, social and cultural development of the country.

Attend, to the highest professional and ethic degree, the improvement of the State based on the national performance concepts of the preceding commitments.

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POL 12 UR

C I O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 0828

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: "FRENTE AMPLIO" NAMES PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

1. URUGUAY'S NEW LEFTIST POLITICAL FRONT, THE "FRENTE AMPLIO", (COMPOSED OF COMMUNIST PARTY (PCU), CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (PDCU) AND DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF MAJOR COLORADO AND BLANCO PARTIES) HELD ITS FIRST PUBLIC MASS RALLY EVENING OF MARCH 26, TO ANNOUNCE ITS TOP CANDIDATES FOR NOVEMBER 1971 ELECTIONS. AS HAD BEEN LONG RUMORED, "FRENTE" NAMED RETIRED ARMY GENERAL LIBER SEREGNI FOR PRESIDENCY, WHILE ITS VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WILL BE WELL-KNOWN URUGUAYAN GYNECOLOGIST, DR. JUAN CROTTOGINI. DR. HUGO VILLAR, HEAD OF UNIVERSITY'S "HOSPITAL DE CLINICAS", CHOSEN AS CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR OF MONTEVIDEO. IN ADDITION TO SEREGNI AND CROTTOGINI, SPEAKERS INCLUDED PCU FIRST SECRETARY RODNEY ARISMENDI, PDC DEPUTY JUAN TERRA, EX-COLORADO SENATORS MICHELINI (LIST 99) AND ROBALLO (LIST 565) AND EX-BLANCO SENATOR RODRIGUEZ CAMUSSO. MAIN THEMES OF ALL SPEECHES WERE BITTER CONDEMNATION OF PACHECO ADMINISTRATION AS MAJOR CAUSE OF VIOLENCE, ECONOMIC DISLOCATION AND SOCIAL DISCONTENT; REPUDIATION OF BLANCO AND COLORADO PARTIES; AND PROCLAMATION OF "FRENTE" AS ONLY "POPULAR" AND "DEMOCRATIC" FORCE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE AND MODERNIZATION. NO REFERENCE TO TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE BY GROUPS SUCH AS TUPAMAROS MADE BY ANY SPEAKERS.

Montevideo 828 3/29/71

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2. ORGANIZATION OF RALLY WAS SPEARHEADED BY PCU WHICH SPENT PREVIOUS MONTH IN CAREFUL PLANNING AND VERY VIGOROUS PUBLICITY EFFORT. MOTOR CARAVANS FROM ALL PARTS OF CITY, ORGANIZED ALONG MUCH SAME LINE AS PCU USED FOR ITS 50TH ANNIVERSARY CEREMONIES LAST YEAR, RESULTED IN LARGE TURNOUT WHICH WE ESTIMATE IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF 30-50,000. HOWEVER, IT DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE THE "FAITHFUL" FROM THE "CURIOUS" SINCE CENTRAL SECTION OF CITY WHERE RALLY HELD IS NORMALLY CROWDED ON WEEKEND EVENINGS.

3. ASIDE FROM PCU'S "EL POPULAR" WHICH CLAIMED THAT "FRENTE" RALLY WAS LARGEST EVER HELD IN NATION'S HISTORY, VIRTUALLY NO MENTION GIVEN TO IT BY OTHER SECTIONS OF MONTEVIDEO MEDIA.

4. COMMENT: THIS FIRST "FRENTE" EFFORT TO RALLY PUBLIC FOR 1971 CAMPAIGN WAS IMPRESSIVE MAINLY BECAUSE OF CAREFUL ORGANIZATION AND WELL-PLANNED EXECUTION BY PCU. ATTENDANCE WAS LARGE THOUGH NOT UNEXPECTEDLY SO CONSIDERING DEMONSTRATED ABILITY OF PCU TO DELIVER LARGE CROWDS ON MAJOR OCCASIONS. RALLY WAS ORDERLY AND PEACEFUL, WITH POLICE ON ALERT BUT REMAINING WELL AWAY FROM SPEAKER'S STAND.

5. FURTHER DETAILS BY AIRGRAM. GP-3.
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HANDLING INDICATOR CONFIDENTIAL NO. 1971 MAR 30 AM 11 44

TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES, CINCSO FOR POLAD *Alba Roballo*

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO DATE: March 19, 1971

SUBJECT : Colorado Splinter Faction Moves to the "Frente Amplio"

REF : Montevideo A-25 of February 18, 1971
POL 14 UR

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BY FLG-PBR

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On March 5, Senator Alba ROBALLO announced that she had resigned from the Colorado Party and intended to lead her small, radical List 565 "Pregon" group into the newly-formed leftist "Frente Amplio" political party. Roballo's announcement came as somewhat of a surprise, since in early December she had declared her intention to remain with the Colorados "as long as one 'Batllista' remains at my side". Roballo's "Pregon" group originated as a small movement within the now defunct "Frente Colorado Batllista" faction which helped elect President GESTIDO in 1966. "Pregon", which contained the furthest left elements of the Colorado Party, is represented in Congress by Senator Roballo and her son, National Deputy Sergio PREVITALI. Most of its small voting strength is in the city of Montevideo.

While leaders of the "Frente Amplio" on March 9 were publicly welcoming Roballo's decision to join them, an opposite reaction was taking place within the rank-and-file of her movement. Juan Carlos GALVAN, leader of some seventy of Roballo's political clubs in Montevideo announced his withdrawal from "Pregon". Galvan's defection was quickly followed by that of veteran "Pregon" politician, Washington PUPPO, as well as Atilio IBARBUES and his group of Batlle Youth Clubs. Galvan has since announced his affiliation with Colorado Senator Amilcar VASCONCELLOS' anti-Pacheco List 315 faction.

At her initial meeting with other members of the "Frente", Senator Roballo declared that she intended to remain a loyal follower of the Colorado Party's great early leader Jose BATLLE, but said that the present Colorado Party had "betrayed" Batlle's principles and left her no alternative but to leave.

FORM 10-64 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL In Out

Drafted by: POL: JHW: djs
Date: 3-18-71 Phone No.: 318 Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: Mr. Ortiz

Clearances: POL: JHW: Wilson

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MONTEVIDEO

COMMENT: Roballo's departure from the Colorado Party was probably caused by the same factors which had earlier led Senator Zelmar MICHELINI and his List 99 to resign in favor of the new "Frente". Because of Uruguay's peculiar election laws, groups so small as Senator Roballo's rarely can survive elections on their own. Instead, they depend for their existence upon the willingness of other small political groups to combine with them and form electoral coalitions. During the past year, however, it became clear that none of the other factions within the Colorado Party were opening their doors to either Michelini or Roballo. Their increasing isolation undoubtedly played a major role in both Roballo's and Michelini's decisions to bolt the Party.

Roballo's affiliation with the "Frente" presents its leaders with a difficult problem. The "Frente" now has four Senators in its ranks: ex-Colorados Roballo and Michelini, ex-Blanco RODRIGUEZ Camusso, and Enrique RODRIGUEZ from the Community Party's FIDEL political arm. All will certainly wish to retain their Senate seats, but only Rodriguez has at this point the necessary 40-45,000 vote minimum needed for Senate membership. Construction of the "Frente's" Senatorial list therefore will undoubtedly cause a serious power struggle among the contenders, only one of which can now carry his own weight. Galvan's defection from "Pregon" places Roballo in a greatly weakened position for this struggle.

Nevertheless, though her vote might be small, Roballo brings to the "Frente" an old and well-known political name. Reputedly one of the best public speakers in the country, Roballo's "batllista" and leftist credentials are both impeccable and she may be able to recoup some of her political strength from new, young, Colorado voters who now claim that a vote for any Colorado politician is a vote for President Pacheco, whom they detest.

Reaction to Roballo's decision in Colorado ranks was one of relief. So independent is she and difficult to work with that even a senior leader of Vasconcellos' List 315 faction, with whom she had often voted, told us privately "better she left than she stayed".

GP-3.

~~ADAM~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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FILE DESIGNATION

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A-241

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

JAN 6 8 30 AM 1971

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 3 - 1971

Alto
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file

DATE: December 23, 1970

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT : Two Senators Leave Their Traditional Parties for the
"Frente Amplio"

REF : Montevideo A-205

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Action Taken:

On December 5, Senator Zelmar MICHELINI's List 99 decided at its Congress of Delegates to withdraw from the Colorado Party. Two days later, Senator Francisco RODRIGUEZ Camusso took similar action by withdrawing his "Popular and Progressive Blanco Movement" from the Blanco Party. Shortly thereafter, the two groups signed a joint manifesto in which they announced their intention of participating in a non-exclusive political front which, they declared, would be "nationalist, progressive, antioligarchic, anti-imperialistic and popular." Thus, what has been predicted by local political observers for some time, the formation of a third-force political front on the left of the Uruguayan political spectrum, has begun to take on reality.

Michelini, looked upon as the young "white hope" of the Colorado Party liberals in the early 1960's, has disillusioned many of his former supporters over the years. Many of these considered him a future president, but his personal life and "talking left while voting right" turned potential support away and his List 99 obtained only some 47,000 votes in 1966, a drop of some 50% from the previous election. Of Michelini's most prominent supporters in the past, only the bright young former President of the Chamber of Deputies, Hugo BATALLA, and one other Deputy remain in

Group 3

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Date:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

Initials:

Drafted by: POL:AIRubenstein:es

Drafting Date:

Phone No.:

Control and Classification Approved by: POL:JLTull;DCM:FVOTIZ

Clearances:

POL:RC/JHWilson

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Montevideo A-241

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List 99. Former followers Aquiles LANZA, who ran for Vice President under Michelini in 1966, and Pedro CERSOSIMO, who has served as Labor Minister and Interior Minister under President Pacheco, have deserted Michelini for other factions of the Colorado Party. Michelini has been more than merely a dissident over the past two to three years and he obviously concluded that he had no future by staying within the Party. A close political friend quotes Michelini as having said recently, "I know I am committing political suicide by leaving the Party, but what choice do I have?"

Rodriguez Camusso was elected to the Senate in 1966 as a member of the Alianza (Echegoyen) faction of the Blanco Party. He had served in Congress previously and had also been a Minister in former Blanco Administrations. For two years after his election, he was visibly uncomfortable at being considered just another Senator in the large conservative Alianza faction and of having to constantly defer to the Alianza's patriarchic leadership of septagenarian Martin Echegoyen. Rodriguez, therefore, broke away from the Alianza to form his own Blanco movement about a year ago. He has long been known as one of those strange species in Uruguayan politics, a "right-wing leftist." He has belonged to a conservative, nationalistic party all his political life, yet gave demagogic support to every left-wing cause on the horizon. It is interesting to note that a substantial number of local leaders in his "Popular and Progressive Blanco Movement" publicly announced their resignations from the Movement within twenty-four hours after his decision to leave the Blanco Party. These men, some of whom had achieved sub-Cabinet rank in previous administrations, were willing to put up with Rodriguez's maverick stances as long as he acted within the overall context of the Blanco Party. Once he decided to leave the Party, they disaffiliated from his Movement immediately.

COMMENT

A "Frente Amplio" or "Broad Front" is clearly on the way to formation in Uruguay. Conversations have been held among various leaders of left-wing groups and all seem to be in basic agreement that a unified third choice, completely separate from the traditional Blanco and Colorado Parties, must be given the Uruguayan voting public. It is probable that such a "Front" will include, in addition to Michelini and Rodriguez, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Communist-front FIDEL, the Social/Party (PSU) and several very small splinter groups such as the Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement (MRO), the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAO) and others.

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Montevideo A-241

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The PCU and FIDEL, its electoral front, are putting forth major efforts in support of the "Frente," both on the organizational level and through the Party's daily, "El Popular," and there is little doubt that ^{they} will continue to do so throughout the 1971 electoral campaign. Figures like General Liber SEREGNI, Deputy TERRA of the PDC, Senators Michelini and Rodriguez Camusso and other non-PCU figures have been getting coverage and publicity that has never before been granted to non-Party politicians. The PCU, while working full speed behind the efforts at organizing the new Front, seems to have made a policy decision to play down its efforts so as to create the impression that it is merely one of many "equal" elements in this new political consolidation on the left.

Since a "Front" has not yet been organized and with the electoral campaign scarcely begun, it is impossible to predict with accuracy the effect of such a group on next year's election results. What appears certain, however, is that any "Front" now anticipated can not win the 1971 elections. We do not believe it will even come close to doing so.

The Uruguayan electoral system as now constituted here takes great pains to give every possible advantage to the two major parties while, on the other hand, allowing sufficient minority participation to keep the smaller groups working within the system. For many elections in the past the Blanco and Colorado Parties have divided ninety percent of the vote, while the other ten percent was split among all other groups. One of these groups might have had a larger percentage in an election than it had in the previous one, but it was at the expense of one of the other small groups and always within the overall figure of ten percent. This year, the most optimistic followers and supporters of the "Frente" are talking about reaching 20-22% of the vote in Montevideo and now accept the fact that they will probably receive less than half of that percentage in the interior of Uruguay. If such calculations are correct, this would give the "Front" perhaps 13-15% nationally and would mean the election of about the same number of Senators and Deputies as presently represent these various groups in Congress.

However, if the "Front" makes an acceptable showing in 1971 and if it is able to overcome its internal strains during the succeeding five years, two very big "ifs," it could have a major impact on the 1976 elections in this country.

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Department of State

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ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 AID-28 SC9-04 SCA-01 O-03 OPR-02 SY-03 USSS-08
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H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01
SS-20 NIC-01 RSR-01 1118 W 101146

*Montevideo 2927
12/18/70*

O 182037Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9055

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2927

SUBJECT: FLY KIDNAPPING - RECENT GOU DECREES

REF: STATE 205158 *Pal 23-8 ur*

1. REPORT AND ANALYSIS ON PRESIDENTIAL DECREES (A) LIFTING BAN ON SEVEN SMALL RADICAL LEFTIST GROUPS, AND (B) EXEMPTION OF POLITICAL RALLIES FROM POLICE CONTROLS OVER PUBLIC MEETINGS, ARE CONTAINED OUR A-236 OF DECEMBER 16. IN ADDITION TO LEFTIST GROUPS CITED IN PARA 1 REFTEL WHICH WILL BE LEGALIZED EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1971, DECREE ALSO INCLUDED TROTSKYITE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS PARTY (POR) AND URUGUAYAN POPULAR ACTION MOVEMENT (MAPU).
2. PRESIDENTIAL DECREES ISSUED WHEN MINISTER OF INTERIOR FRANCESE WAS FACING CENSURE IN SENATE AND WERE WELL RECEIVED BY LEGISLATURE WHICH THEREUPON DROPPED CENSURE EFFORTS.
3. WE DO NOT RPT NO BELIEVE THAT THESE DECREES MEAN THAT GOU IS RECONSIDERING POSITION WITH REGARD TO PUBLICATION OF MLN MANIFESTO. PRIOR CENSORSHIP OF ALL NEWS MEDIA REMAINS IN EFFECT. HOWEVER, IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE HAD HERE WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF PACHECO ADMINISTRATION (INCLUDING PIRAN AND GIORGI), WE HAVE RECEIVED IMPRESSION THAT PRESIDENT INTENDS SOFTEN USE OF EMERGENCY SECURITY DECREE

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FILE DESIGNATION
CONFIDENTIAL [6] **Montevideo A-236**

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SecState WASHDC

INFO : CINCSO

CINCSO for POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT : GOU Lifts Ban on Outlawed Leftist Parties; Modifies Rules on Political Rallies

REF :

RECEIVED
JAN 2 10 24 AM 1971
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 3 - 1970
DATE: December 16, 1970

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FILE

Action Taken:

Following the Uruguayan Senate's decision earlier this month to interpellate the Minister of Interior, General Antonio FRANCESE, over charges of alleged favoritism toward pro-Administration politicians, President Jorge PACHECO on December 14 signed decrees liberalizing the Government's rules regarding the holding of political meetings and legalizing seven small radical leftist groups which were outlawed in December 1967.

The signing of these two decrees was well-timed to coincide with Minister Francese's appearance at the Senate. His interpellation had originally been requested by dissident Colorado Senator Amilcar VASCONCELLOS who charged that although Montevideo police officials had permitted pro-Pacheco Deputy Angel RATH to hold a political rally on one of the city's main streets in support of efforts to promote the President's re-election next year, these same officials forbade a motor caravan of Senator Vasconcellos' own List 315 faction a few days later. In his interpellating statement, Vasconcellos declared that the Ministry of Interior was guilty of using a presidential decree of June 16, 1969, which severely limited the areas available for political meetings, to favor President Pacheco and his supporters while suppressing opposition voices.

In reply, Minister Francese strongly denied any connivance on the part of his Ministry or police officials to favor pro-Pacheco forces. He declared that Deputy Rath's rally had been cleared

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FORM 10-64 DS-323

Drafted by: **POL:JLTulkes**

Drafting Date: **12/15/70** Phone No.: **318** Contents and Classification Approved by: **DCM:FVOrtiz**

Clearances: **POL:RSSampson**

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POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

Montevideo A-236

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by the police on the understanding that it would be held inside Rath's headquarters. However, as the meeting began, Rath supporters moved out into one of the city's central thoroughfares and Rath failed to respond to police telephone requests to move. Once the rally began, police decided that there would be greater danger from attempting to break it up than to simply reroute traffic around it. Francese was strongly critical of Rath, saying that his breach of the Government's decree seemed deliberate. The Minister then went on to say that fears of partiality by the Government toward one political group or another were groundless, as were rumors that the Pacheco Administration would seek to suspend or delay national elections due in November 1971. He said, in the name of the Government, he could give absolute assurances that elections would be held as scheduled and that all political groups would be given the fullest possible protection and legal guarantees.

Francese then announced the signing of the two decrees. The first specifically exempts the meetings and rallies of all legally-recognized political groups from the strict controls of the President's decree of June 1969. The second declared that effective January 1, 1971, seven small radical leftist groups which were outlawed in December 1967 would again be legalized in order to allow them to participate in the electoral process. The seven, which had been declared illegal after they had openly advocated the violent overthrow of the Government, include:

1. The Socialist Party of Uruguay (PSU) ✓
2. The Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU) ✓
3. The Uruguayan Popular Action Movement (MAPU) ✓
4. The Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) ✓
5. The Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement (MRO) ✓
6. The Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) ✓
7. The "Epoca" Independent Movement

Following the Minister's statement, Senator Vasconcellos pronounced himself "satisfied" and said he would not intend to press for Senate censure action. Other legislators joined in statements of approval and as one daily reported, "Immediately, the session ended and the Minister and Sub-Secretary, who many had forecast would be censured, were warmly congratulated by Senators of many political sectors."

COMMENT: The Administration's adroit handling of this issue was in sharp contrast to its clumsy and often heavy-handed responses to political problems during the past year. The Government's decision to rehabilitate

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the seven outlawed leftist groups came as no particular surprise, since Minister Francese had already so indicated to Senator Vasconcellos in a letter to him made public last month. However, the issuance of the two Presidential decrees at the moment when Minister Francese appeared to be under serious attack in the Senate was a clever move which completely deflated his critics. Speaking for the opposition Blanco Party, Senator Felipe GIL said he particularly welcomed the Minister's declaration that President Pacheco had never mentioned re-election to Francese, noting that if only the President himself would make such a declaration, many politicians would be greatly relieved. The only unhappiness remaining after the session was in the ranks of those pro-Pacheco legislators who have sought the President's backing for their re-election efforts. The Minister's attack on Deputy Rath, who has consistently been one of Pacheco's most fervent supporters, came as a considerable surprise to all concerned, especially to Rath who declared his honor had been insulted and later sent his dueling seconds to Francese.

Among the leftist groups which will be legalized on the first of January, the MIR supports a pro-Communist Chinese line, the "Epoca" and MAPU groups are collections of assorted radical leftists of all types, the POR represents a Trotskyite/Marxist movement, and the MRO is the radical pro-Cuban faction led by Deputy Ariel COLLAZO. The MRO's action arm, FARO, was responsible for a number of bank robberies and other holdups here during the first half of 1970, but was severely damaged by the arrest of a number of its top leaders just before and after the murder of USAID Public Safety Advisor Dan Mitrione in early August. These seven groups probably represent about 15, 000 votes, 10-12, 000 of which belong to the Socialist Party.

The relaxation of controls on political meetings applies only to political parties and does not extend to non-party groups such as the Communist-controlled National Convention of Workers (CNT) labor federation or student organizations, both of which in the past have been responsible for street demonstrations and clashes with police forces.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

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Pol 12 Chile

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CONFIDENTIAL A-205

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: USCINCSO for POIAD *22 8 15 AM 1970*

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO DATE: October 18, 1970

SUBJECT : "Leftist Front" - A Chilean Echo in Uruguay

REF :

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 26 1970
ANALYSIS BRANCH

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File

The past month has seen a three-way public discussion and private dialogue between Uruguay's small Christian Democratic Party (PDC), leaders of the Moscow-line Communist Party (PCU), and an assortment of non-PCU leftists clustered around the editorial policy of the radical Marxist weekly "Marcha". Debate has centered on the presidential victory of Chilean Senator Salvador ALLENDE and his "Unidad Popular" political front and its possible applicability to Uruguay as the nation prepares for next year's political campaign and November 1971 general elections. The idea of a popular leftist front is not new to Uruguay, but after years of wandering in the political wilderness, Allende's surprising victory has rekindled hopes in the non-Communist left for a unified movement to confront the country's two major centrist parties, the Colorados and Blancos, who traditionally have divided 90% of the vote.

Although the PCU's political arm, Frente Izquierdista de la Liberación (FIDEL), pretends to act as the umbrella for all leftist movements, its obvious total control by the well-disciplined PCU has caused many intellectuals as well as the PDC to be wary of joining it. PDC President Juan Pablo TERRA has told us several times and has publicly announced that his group has no intention of entering into any direct bilateral combination with FIDEL, while leaving open the possibility of PDC participation in a wider group not subject to PCU domination. The "Marcha" group has likewise shield

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FORM 0-64 DS-323

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Drafted by: **POL:JLTull** Drafting Date: **10/15/70** Phone No.: Contents and Classification Approved by: **POL:JLTull**

Clearances: **DCM - Mr. Ortiz**

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Montevideo A-205
Page 2

away from FIDEL, claiming that it is ideologically over-rigid and too closely aligned with the Soviet Union. The PCU has responded by publicly protesting and rejecting the idea of any leftist front in which it did not occupy a major position, although we understand Party leaders have themselves been concerned with playing down the PCU's rigid pro-Moscow line.

After a month of public discussions by these three groups in their respective press organs - the PCU's daily "El Popular", the intellectuals' "Marcha" and the PDC's sporadically-published "Flecha" - the "Marcha" group issued a declaration on October 8 calling for "an agreement without exclusion among all political forces in the country that oppose the anti-popular and anti-national conduct of the present government". The six-point declaration declared that unification of all "democratic" elements was the only solution to Uruguay's current problems and condemned the nation's present electoral law as an obstacle to a true expression of popular sentiment. It was signed by "Marcha" director Dr. Carlos QUIJANO and fifty-two non-PCU leftists and Marxists, including a scattering of little-known retired military officers.

The October 8 declaration promises to be only the first round in what looks to be a serious effort by leftist groups here to form some sort of electoral alliance. Despite its public expressions of unhappiness over the anti-Party views of the "Marcha" group and Christian Democrats, the PCU's "El Popular" gave prominent and favorable coverage to the declaration. However, it is clear that the key to any success which these groups might have in establishing a meaningful political "third force" lies not so much in a combination of their present forces, but rather in the possibility of adding liberal elements of the Blanco and Colorado parties to their strength.

On the Blanco side, the only prospective candidate now appears to be Senator Francisco RODRIGUEZ Camusso who earlier this year split with that Party's largest faction, the "Alianza", and established his own tiny radical nationalist group. However, his own vote pulling power is uncertain and most political observers rate Rodriguez' chances of re-election to either chamber of Legislature as doubtful.

Much more attractive to the supporters of a leftist front are the dissident elements of the Colorado Party - Senator Amilcar VASCONCELLOS' List 315, Senator Alba ROBALLO's small "Pregon" group, and Senator Zelmar MICHELINI's List 99, all of which polled a combined total of approximately

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Page 3

125,000 votes in the 1966 elections or double that which FIDEL itself gained. However, although front supporters have cheered Vasconcellos' strong blasts at the Pacheco Administration as an indication of his imminent departure from the Party, it appears that they have mistaken his anti-Pacheco stand for an anti-Party position. Both Vasconcellos and members of his faction have stressed to Embassy officers several times that Vasconcellos has no intention of leading his List 315 out of Colorado ranks. Vasconcellos himself summed up his position on this point very well when he pointed out to us that, "I am more of a Colorado, more of a batllista, than Pacheco ever was. If someone must leave the Party, it ought to be him".

Roballo, the only female representative in Congress and an old Colorado war horse, has been flirting in recent months with leftist groups of all stripes and proclaiming the need for a unification of all "democrats". However, in a recent "Marcha" interview, she also backed away from the idea of an open split with the Party at the present time, saying that, "After forty years as a batllista, I have no intention of leaving the Party so long as one supporter remains at my side".

All of which leaves Senator Michelini, the bright young liberal hope of the early sixties whose reputation and promise has since been tarnished by doubts about his honesty and integrity, as the most likely new face in a unified left movement. Although he has been under strong pressure in recent weeks to declare his intentions, he has thus far side-stepped announcing any final decision, claiming that this must await further discussions inside his List 99 faction and an official decision by faction leaders later this month or in early November. Michelini's basic problem is his deepening alienation from other Colorado groups to the point where some batllista leaders consider it might be better if he and his faction leave and thereby remove one source of friction and strident criticism from within Party ranks. Michelini's decision will finally be made on the basis of whether he sees his influence and power in the Party to be on the verge of disappearance and how much of his political organization will follow him out of Colorado ranks. Although he pulled nearly 50,000 votes in 1966, we think it doubtful that he could take much more than one-half of this with him, should he decide to leave -- and 25,000 votes is not sufficient to elect a Senator.

With visions of a unified left no more than a gleam in the eyes of its most ardent supporters, it is somewhat premature to speak of possible candidates for the top leftist spot. However, even at this early point,

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Page 4

some possibilities occur: first, Michelini himself could head such a slate since he is a nationally-known figure who has been much in the public eye during the past ten years. However, he would be hard for the Communist Party to swallow, inasmuch as they too have suffered from his sharp attacks and his record even in the loosely-knit Colorado Party shows that he is hardly amenable to discipline from others. As a compromise candidate attractive to most leftist groups, "Marcha" director Quijano appears as an obvious choice. Although his weekly's anti-Party stands have irritated the PCU, his Marxist credentials are impeccable. In fact, his anti-Party pronouncements might go a long way in reassuring Christian Democrats that they would not be swamped by the Communists in a front effort. As a "dark horse", the candidacy by General Liber SEREGNI is just possible. He has been busily engaged in talking to all anti-GOU groups in the hope of promoting his well-known presidential aspirations and his liberal beliefs are a matter of record. However, he would bring no political organization of his own into a new leftist ticket and could hardly be expected to lend much personal weight to its voter appeal unless front supporters can mount a major public relations effort behind him.

Allende's victory in Chile and a start of efforts to duplicate it here have aroused some interest but no deep short-term concern on the part of Colorado and Blanco leaders. They rightly point out that there is no figure in the Uruguayan left with the personal appeal and drawing power of an Allende and that the unified left has never succeeded here in drawing even 10% of the votes. Additionally, Uruguayan electoral laws are heavily weighted in favor of the two major parties and any decision by a political faction to break with them must be taken in full knowledge of possible serious financial and electoral reverses. Most observers here now view the threat of a unified left more in terms of its long-range potential than an immediate danger in next year's election. If such a movement is able to get off the ground now and make a creditable showing in 1971, say, 15% of the vote, its chances for a major electoral success in 1976 would be greatly enhanced.

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Authority: *MND 969045*

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RS/AN

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 14 7 03 AM 1970
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ANALYSIS BRANCH

HANDLING INDICATOR
TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassies BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, MOSCOW, SANTIAGO

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: October 10, 1970

SUBJECT : Communist Party of Uruguay Celebrates 50th Anniversary

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 16 1970

The Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) celebrated its 50th anniversary on October 3 with an impressive rally staged in Montevideo's Peñarol Palace, the city's largest sports arena. Guests of honor from the Soviet Union and Chile heard an estimated (by police) 7,500 to 8,000 faithful cheer PCU First Secretary Rodney ARISMENDI as he proclaimed the Party's latest slogan, "Now It's Uruguay's Turn" (Ahora le toca al Uruguay).

The anniversary celebration marked the successful climax of a maximum Party effort on which, according to reliable sources, it spent more than U.S. \$40,000. Bunting was in place, placards painted and regulars turned out to applaud the speakers and chant "Cuba, si; Yankis, no!"; Vietnam si; Yankis, no!; or "Chile, si; Yankis, no!", as appropriate. Messages of congratulations from fraternal parties, including the Communist Party of San Marino but excluding the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China, were received and reported. A congratulatory letter from Chilean Senator and/President-elect Salvador ALLENDE was also read to the enthusiastic crowd.

Speakers, in addition to PCU First Secretary Arismendi, included Piotr RODIONOV, alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, and Senator Luis CORVALON, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Chile.

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Arismendi, in his keynote address, stressed the "crisis of the traditional parties", the failure of the Government and the need to achieve "a greater unity" of the people. He spoke of the "thousands and hundreds of thousands" of Blancos, Colorados, Catholics, atheists and independents who want an alternative to the two traditional parties and called for the unification of all progressive Blancos and Colorados with FIDEL, the Socialists, the Christian Democrats and independents behind an "advanced program of profound social reform". As is standard, Arismendi acknowledged the great debt of the PCU to the inspiration of the Soviet Revolution.

Visiting Soviet Rodionov first praised the solidarity of the Uruguayan and Soviet Communist Parties and later the accomplishments of the PCU. He described the PCU as "one of the most combative and organized detachments of the Communist movement". He also lauded the growing power of the Soviet Union which "defends the principle of peaceful co-existence" while supporting the people of Vietnam and the Middle East in their struggles against "American and Israeli imperialism". However, the highlight of the evening was the address of Chilean Senator Corvalon who spoke of the victory of Chile's Popular Unity front in that nation's recent elections and the UP's plans for governing. In the foreign policy sphere, Corvalon declared that the new Chilean government expected to maintain good relations with its neighbors, including Argentina, on the basis of non-intervention while it also hoped to maintain friendly relations with all countries, including the U.S., on the basis of "respect for the right of the Chilean people to choose the government they have chosen and carry out their program of revolutionary transformation". Corvalon said the new UP government would strengthen relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, resume relations with Cuba and establish diplomatic relations with East Germany, Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. He also gave a detailed exposition of the trials and triumphs of the UP victory in Chile.

All in all, the PCU appears to have given itself a fairly successful birthday party. It invited all its friends and most of them seem to have come and had a good time. However, despite the best efforts of the PCU's daily "El Popular", it was pretty much a private party, ignored by other political groups and most of the local media except the afternoon tabloid "Ya" and the conservative "El Pais", the latter of which commented acidly on "the anniversary of the local branch of the Soviet party".

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TO : Department of State
INFO : BUENOS AIRES, MONTEVIDEO, RIO DE JANEIRO, SANTIAGO
FROM : Amembassy MOSCOW
SUBJECT : Pravda Praises Uruguayan CP
REF : Moscow A-999 of June 15, 1970

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ANALYSIS BRANCH
DATE: August 12, 1970

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In three articles by V. Korionov, its special correspondent in Montevideo, Pravda* lavishes praise on the Uruguayan Communist Party for being a defender of the country's toiling masses as well as a bulwark of proletarian internationalism. Korionov dwells on the party's active role in past strikes, its intensive recruitment activities, and its defense of national interests against the "imperialists". While the emphasis is on the party's non-violent tactics, the Communist role at the Montevideo University in 1968 is also lauded. The message quite obviously is that the CP is as courageous and militant as anyone else, but that legal and organizational tactics are the correct line at present.

Another theme is the growing menace of US imperialism, the harm it has done to the Uruguayan economy, and the threat it poses to neighboring countries. The deterioration of the livestock industry, the difficulties of the nationalized electrical/telephone organization, and the country's financial woes are all attributed to North American machinations. US monopolies are accused of planning to capture control of the livestock and meatpacking industries of Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay under the guise of the "southern cone plan". Also coming in for attack is the La Plata river basin plan, which is seen as primarily profiting American monopolies and Washington's strategic designs in the region.

The response of Uruguay's "reactionary circles" and their "foreign supporters" to the country's economic problems, writes Korionov, was to put forward a bill in Parliament which will suppress the country's "democratic forces" and eliminate democratic liberties.

* July 31, August 4, August 7

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POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

Moscow A-1378

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Armando Piriz, Counselor of the Uruguayan Embassy here, was very upset by the articles and has informally complained to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs about them. He hinted to the reporting officer that he had recommended that the GOU expel Korionov.

Comment: It appears to us that Korionov's primary target is not the GOU or US monopolies, but rather other LA communist parties who have not been as rigorous as the Uruguayan party in their adherence to non-violent tactics. Despite his attempt to portray the Uruguayan example as a profitable one for other communist parties to follow, Korionov is unable to cite many concrete Uruguayan CP accomplishments. In fact, his approach is to portray the US imperialist menace as growing, whereas other recent articles published here have held to the theme that the United States is on the defensive in the hemisphere. Korionov does not delve into the question of why American monopolies are doing so well in Uruguay if communist party tactics there have been so effective.

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TO : Department of State

INFO : BUENOS AIRES, MONTEVIDEO, RIO DE JANEIRO

RECEIVED
JUN 17 8 45 AM 1970

FROM : Amembassy MOSCOW

DATE: June 15, 1970

SUBJECT : Arismendi Spells Out Current Thinking of Uruguayan CP

REF :

Rodney ARISMENDI, First Secretary of the Uruguayan CP, outlined his party's views on the Latin American revolution in a speech made recently to the Komsomol CC. Excerpts of the address, appearing in Komsomol'skaya Pravda June 9, indicate Uruguayan communists are not interested in armed conflict at this time and believe their view now prevails over unspecified "leftist elements", which advocate a more militant approach.

Arismendi's speech rather neatly sums up the dilemma currently facing pro-Soviet Latin American CPs, which want to control left-wing action, but find themselves continually outflanked by more extremist movements. He points out the key role of students in Uruguay's "democratic struggle", but implies that they are often misled or mistaken. For example, against strong misgivings the CP sent its young cadres to the Montevideo University barricades in 1968 even though the party knew the tactic to be in error. This was necessary, argues Arismendi, to show the students that Communists do not shrink from a fight. The action also served to "neutralize" the "leftists" trying to lead the mass movement, according to Arismendi. But the cost was great - 3 Communist students killed and 27 wounded.

Turning to the Cuban example, Arismendi declares revolution by armed conflict is fine in those countries where American "imperialism" interferes heavily, the military and bureaucratic apparatus is strong, "gorillas" rule, and revolution constantly percolates. By implication, he concedes that such conditions do not exist in Uruguay and he says quite clearly that his CP has found it necessary to work out

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POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

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Page 2
Moscow A-999

an alternative to partisan warfare. It is not true that armed struggle is the only recipe for revolution, he declares. Using obscure language and without flatly so stating, Arismendi gives the impression the Uruguayan Communists have prevailed over "the leftists" in devising a revolutionary program which eschews violence. However, he does not spell out in any detail his non-violent program. Furthermore, his example of the barricades indicates that violence is not completely ruled out.

Discussing the domestic scene in Uruguay, Arismendi warns that some danger exists of a takeover in Montevideo by the "gorillas." However, he also emphasizes that "democratically inclined" elements exist within Uruguay's army, and he claims the CP views them as "potential allies." To understand fully Uruguay's "revolutionary" potential, Arismendi continues, one must realize that the country is geographically far away from "the socialist camp", and also is hemmed in by Argentina and Brazil - two huge neighbors in which "American imperialism" has great influence.

Comment: Although the Embassy is in no position to judge the significance of Arismendi's speech in terms of Uruguay's internal situation, its publication here provides Moscow with a timely endorsement of revolution by a path other than armed conflict. As the Soviets continue to expand diplomatic and economic ties with Latin America, these words by a well-known Communist "moderate" could serve to lessen fears that the continent's CPs are basically (if secretly) bent on violence to effect "progressive" change.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO DATE: April 8, 1970

SUBJECT : New Blanco Party Directorate Holds Inaugural Meeting

REF : M-0427; A-066

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
APR 4 1970

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In a brief but well-attended ceremony on April 1 at Party headquarters, the newly-elected Blanco Party Directorate held its inaugural session. The meeting, presided over by Party President, Alberto HEBER, formally installed the fifteen-man Directorate elected in the Blanco Convention last March 14 (see reftel and refile).

Not unexpectedly, Dr. Martin ECHEGOYEN, former Party President and leader of the largest Blanco faction, the "Alianza", did not attend. However, during his brief inaugural speech, Heber emphasized that the new Directorate is both legitimate and open to all Blancos. El Pais, the Blanco newspaper directed by List 400 leader Senator Washington BELTRAN, lamented the absence of Echegoyen, but also affirmed the legitimacy of the new Party leadership and called for a reinvigoration of the Party structure.

The new Directorate has already experienced some changes in membership. Two delegates from the combined Rocha and Por la Patria factions, Juan ZEBALLOS and Alfredo J. SOLARES, resigned their seats prior to the meeting and were immediately replaced by others from these groups. In addition, the administrative secretary of the Directorate, Nelson SIMONETTI, also resigned before the session began, citing his solidarity with Echegoyen. The Directorate is now composed of the following members: Alberto HEBER, Deputy Walter SANTORO, Deputy

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
Montevideo A-071
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Mario HEBER, Senator Alejandro ZORILLA DE SAN MARTIN and Pablo CHIESSA, all Heberistas; Carlos MIGUES Baron, a follower of Senator Francisco RODRIGUEZ Camusso, who is presently allied with Heber; ; six delegates from the combined Rocha and Por la Patria factions: Professor Juan PIVEL DE VOTO, Deputy Alembert VAZ, Eladio FERNANDEZ Mendez, Horacio A. POLLA and the two new representatives, Guillermo GARCIA Costa and Wilson ELSO Goni; List 400 leader Beltran and his follower Victor BECEIRO; and finally, the leader of the Alianza splinter group, Deputy Bari GONZALEZ Modernell.

The next meeting of the Directorate is scheduled for April 6 and is expected to be a full working session, aimed at the eventual development of Party policies toward the Pacheco Administration which are supported by all Blanco groups.

Comment: So far, the facade of unity built up during the Convention is unbroken. The absence of Echegoyen and the Alianza, while mourned, has not prevented the new Party leadership from acting nor has it caused challenges to the new Directorate's legitimacy. In fact, some Blancos have told us that resentment at Echegoyen's petulant conduct is growing among the rank and file and that he is discrediting himself by his boycott of Party functions.

Despite the progress achieved thus far, it is clear that all is not harmonious within the new leadership. While Heber is making obvious efforts to speak as Party President and not just as leader of his faction, we have already heard grumbles from members of other Blanco groups that he is not fit to be Party leader. Some say that if he presses his own ambitions too hard, he could split that part of the Party which accepts the new Directorate into pro and anti-Heber wings. Other faction leaders, especially Senator Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate of "Por la Patria", visibly chafe at Heber's efforts to assume the role of Party leader. It remains to be seen whether these strains can be kept under control while the Directorate attempts to develop a Party policy toward the Government, or whether they will destroy the fragile unity now achieved and divide the Party even more than it was before the Convention.


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USCINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: BLANCO PARTY CONGRESS ELECTS NEW PRESIDENT

1. AT THE FIRST PARTY CONGRESS IN MORE THAN FORTY YEARS, THE NATIONAL (BLANCO) PARTY MARCH 14 ELECTED FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENT, ALBERTO HEBER USHER, AS PRESIDENT OF PARTY DIRECTORATE, SUCCEEDING SENATOR MARTIN ECHEGOYEN. ECHEGOYEN, WHO HAD HELD POSITION FOR YEARS, WITH-DREW HIS CANDIDACY FOR RE-ELECTION ONE WEEK BEFORE CONGRESS WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT HIS PROSPECTS WERE NIL AS THE LOSSE "GROUP OF FOUR" COALITION OF HEBER, FERREIRA ALDUNATE, ROCHA MOVEMENT AND RODRIGUEZ CAMUSSO FORCES HELD FIRM IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO OUST HIM FROM THE PARTY PRESIDENCY. THE SURPRISE IN THE ELECTION WAS THAT WITHIN THE GROUP OF FOUR, HEBER, SUPPORTED BY RODRIGUEZ CAMUSSO, WAS ABLE TO OUTPOLL BY ONE VOTE HISTORIAN JUAN PIVEL DEVOTO, SUPPORTED BY FERREIRA ALDUNATE AND THE ROCHA MOVEMENT.

2. GOAL OF CONGRESS, CALLED BY ECHEGOYEN IN NOVEMBER 1969, WAS TO ACHIEVE PARTY UNITY AND LAY BASIS FOR COORDINATED OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO 1971 ELECTIONS. RESULT MAY WELL BE TO EXACERBATE DIVISIONS. SUPPORTERS OF ECHEGOYEN MANY OF WHOM BOYCOTTED CONGRESS ALREADY TALKING OF ELECTING THEIR OWN "PARTY DIRECTORATE". ADDITIONALLY, GROUP OF FOUR

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COALITION, WHOSE CHIEF PURPOSE WAS TO DUMP ECHEGOYEN, MAY FALL APART NOW THAT THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

3. PARTY CONGRESS CLEAR SETBACK TO ECHEGOYEN WHO ORIGINALLY EXPECTED IT TO RATIFY HIS LEADERSHIP AND SENATOR FERREIRA ALDUNATE WHO HOPED TO REPLACE ECHEGOYEN WITH PIVEL DEVOTO TO FIGHTER HIS OWN CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENCY OF COUNTRY IN 1971. HEBER, THE UNEXPECTED VICTOR, BECOMES TITULAR HEAD OF BLANCO PARTY, GETS CONTROL OF SOME PARTY MACHINERY AND ASSETS AND SOME INCREASED PRESTIGE WITHIN THE PARTY RANKS. AIRGRAM FOLLOWS.
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HANDLING INDICATOR
 TO : Department of State

INFO: USCINCSO for POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT : A Year-End Look at the Colorado Party

REF :
SUMMARY

The return in November 1969 of Jorge BATLLE, leader of the Colorado Party's powerful List 15, from an extended European vacation and the simultaneous announcement by Vice President Alberto ABDALA of his presidential candidacy, triggered the first serious maneuverings within the Party toward the general elections due in November 1971. President PACHECO continued to gain popular strength throughout 1969 and by the close of the year, clearly occupied the center of attention for both Colorados and Blancos. 1970 promises to be a year of constant maneuvering and temporary groupings within the Colorado Party, the outcome of which will finally depend upon the decisions of both the President and Batlle with regard to the forthcoming presidential campaign.

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Only a year ago, the future of the Colorado Party seemed primarily in the hands of Dr. Jorge BATLLE, youthful leader of the Party's largest group, List 15 ("Unity and Reform"). However, 1969 saw President Jorge PACHECO Areco gain steadily in popular appeal and political influence and by year's end, there was no doubt that he was the leading figure in what is still a badly fragmented and disorganized Party. His uncompromising attitude toward the need for economic reform

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JAN 20 9 32 AM 1970
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
 JAN 30 1970
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POL 12 UR 1 JAN 1970

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Montevideo A-017
Page 2

and modernization, coupled with a relatively successful financial stabilization effort, his "hard line" with regard to labor and student agitation and leftist-terrorism, and above all his evident willingness to use every bit of authority available to him to drive the government along the path he deems correct, have all contributed to the President's surprising emergence as the nation's top political leader. At the same time, however, he has exerted practically no effort to unify the disparate and disoriented elements of his party. With the continuing support of Batlle's List 15 for his economic and public order programs, he has adopted a "go it alone" attitude new to Uruguayan politics, disdaining compromise or even serious discussion with dissident Colorados as a sign of weakness and a threat to his main programs.

Although the President is forbidden by the 1967 Constitution from re-election, his emergence as an important political force has generated a movement within his own UCB faction for a constitutional amendment which would permit his candidacy in 1971. Thus far, the President has been silent toward such a possibility and in private conversations speaks only of his determination to carry on his programs through the end of his term. He need not hurry any such decision, however, since an amendment of this type can be submitted at any time up to six months prior to the election. In any case, it is clear that President Pacheco will have a leading voice in the selection of any pro-administration candidate, whether it be himself, one of the old pros of the UCB such as U.N. Ambassador Augusto LEGNANI, Batlle, or a compromise UCB/List 15 candidate.

Jorge Batlle, the "bright young man" of the Party, who came close to winning the Presidency in 1966, has slipped noticeably from his prominence a year ago. His image continues to suffer from charges that either he or his cohorts profitted unethically (and perhaps illegally) in the April 1968 devaluation. Also, his calculated risk of throwing his large congressional delegation behind the economic austerity measures of the President has cost him substantial popular support, at least for the time being. Batlle traveled to Europe early in 1969 and stayed there for over seven months. He apparently intended to allow the smoke to clear a bit from the rumored scandals of 1968 and also to disassociate himself from any devaluation which might have proved necessary in 1969. This long absence not only took him out of the public eye for some time and removed him from direct control of his own faction, but also created the impression that he was "running out" at a critical period in the nation's history.

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Page 3

Battle returned to Uruguay in late November, reaffirming his support for the President's programs but dodging questions about his own future. When asked for his views on a constitutional amendment permitting President Pacheco to run again, he said that it would not be "traditional" but noted that because the President has done such a good job it was natural that his supporters would like to see him continue in office. Since his return, Battle has spent most of his time mending political fences and solidifying his control of List 15. He will most likely spend 1970 feeling his way, trying to determine the President's intentions, and deciding whether or not his own popularity has recovered sufficiently to seek the Presidency again. Most political observers outside his faction now believe he will stand aside in 1971 and seek election in 1976. Despite his current problems, however, he still controls the largest, best financed political machine in Uruguay and is heir to the magic Battle name. Battle, should he decide not to run in 1971, will probably support an "administration" candidate jointly with the UCB, though not a List 15 member of sufficient strength to endanger his own control of the faction. He himself has mentioned Senators PAZ Aguirre and HIERRO Gambardella, List 15 light-weights, as "grand candidates". Another possibility might be the present Minister of Public Works, Walter PINTOS RISSO, who has become a confidant of President Pacheco while maintaining his List 15 identity.

Aside from their own factions, the decisions which the President and Battle ultimately make with regard to the 1971 campaign will have an important affect upon the future groupings of several other Colorado political figures. The first of these is Vice President Alberto ABDALA, who announced in November that he had accepted the presidential "draft" of his own unofficial "Movimiento Extrasectorial". Abdala, often dismissed by other than his few close friends as a political clown, has shown himself nevertheless to be one of the most skillful coat-tail riders in recent Uruguayan history. He has never backed a losing candidate and is an assiduous political activist. He speaks confidently of his support by "70% of the Party", his candidacy has evoked favorable murmurings from some Colorado politicians outside the UCB and List 15 groups, and he is even now undertaking a modest but continuing press and television campaign. At this point, he probably seeks to build a personal organization of sufficient vote-pulling power to trade off his support for a high position on the voting list of a more likely candidate. However, in the event of a Battle-Pacheco rift, Abdala will be waiting his chance to bid seriously for the number one office.

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Drifting around the center of the Party is an amorphous collection of Senators, Deputies and political leaders, waiting to see which way the President and Batlle will move. This group, or collection of individuals since no ties really unite them, is something akin to the Colorado Unity Front or "Senators' Group" of the 1966 elections. Former Senator, Minister and Mayor of Montevideo, Glauco SEGOVIA, for example, claims control of about 100,000 votes with his List 515. Since Segovia's support was a major factor in President GESTIDO's victory in 1966, he and his followers bear watching in the coming year. Segovia's present policy is one of "wait and see", until a potential winner emerges to whom he could attach his organization. As of now, it appears that he would willingly join forces with President Pacheco or a Pacheco candidate, less willingly support Jorge Batlle, or possibly even oppose a UCB/List 15 candidate with an alliance with left-wing forces in the Party. Others maneuvering around this broad center are men like Senators CARRERE Sapriza, FLORES Mora and PINTOS, all of whom have small personal followings but who are capable of delivering up to twenty to twenty-five thousand votes each at election time. Their importance will increase as elections approach.

Finally, on the left of the Party is another loose collection of political leaders, united only by their unremitting opposition to President Pacheco and the fact that their opposition has placed them beyond the pale, so far as the present administration is concerned. Senator Amilcar VASCONCELLOS and his List 315, represent the traditional Colorado "Batllismo", the difficult-to-define nationalistic, liberal, semi-socialism of bygone days. His intense opposition to the President has cost him the support of several of his most prestigious colleagues and the political importance of List 315 has dropped noticeably in 1969. Senator Zelmar MICHELINI and his List 99, are frequently more leftist than the strongly anti-Communist List 315 and probably have lost more support in the past year than any other Colorado group. In the early 1960's, Michelini was looked upon as the liberal hope of Colorado voters but his image and influence have badly eroded in recent years and his future seems dim. Senator Alba ROBALLO, a demagogic war horse, continues to command her small "Pregon" faction but she represents little in the way of voting power.

There has been considerable speculation here about the possibility of the Colorado left uniting behind a single "anti-administration" candidate in 1971, such as General Liber SEREGNI. Such a move is within the realm of possibility and, in fact, Seregni has already had conversations

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
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with leftist Colorado politicians. Less likely is a move outside the Party by Vasconcellos, Michelini and Roballo. Rumors of such a move and the formation of a common front by these Colorados with the tiny Christian Democratic Party (PDC) surfaced from time to time in 1969, mainly from PDC sources. However, to date, none of the leaders of the Colorado left have indicated the slightest willingness to gamble their already shaky political fortunes on the electoral chances of a minority party.

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Pol 14 UR
A-016

HANDLING INDICATOR
TO : Department of State

INFO: USCINCSO for POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: January 22, 1970

SUBJECT : A Year-End Look at the Blanco Party

REF :

SUMMARY

The close of 1969 found the Blancos paradoxically more fragmented yet closer to the long-sought goal of Party unity than at any time in recent years. The cause of both of these tendencies has been the efforts by Blanco leaders to resolve what has emerged as their party's number one question: what should be the basic Blanco position with regard to President Pacheco and his Colorado Administration. Attempts to resolve this issue revealed Senator Martin ECHEGOYEN's "leadership" of the Party to be far less dominant than previously supposed. At the same time, new leaders and factions have emerged. A full-scale Party conference is now scheduled for March 1970 and Blanco leaders hope that from it will emerge a general Party consensus and unity which will set the stage for the electoral campaign of 1971.

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Factionalism, the chronic debility of the Blanco Party, continued throughout 1969. By the end of the year, the four main Party factions had split into six, with Senator Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate of Beltran's List 400, establishing his own unofficial but highly active "Por La Patria" group and the organization of a "Movimiento Popular Blanco y Progresista" by leftist Senator Francisco RODRIGUEZ Camusso, formerly of the

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Party's "Alianza" faction. Additionally, other fissures appeared in Senator Martin ECHEGOYEN's "Alianza" which could result in the eventual splitting of the Party's largest faction into two or more groups.

These regroupings were caused in part by the efforts of the 78 year old Echegoyen in mid-1969 to arrive at some cooperative arrangement with President Pacheco in which Blanco support for some of the President's legislative proposals would be traded for patronage in his Administration, including several cabinet positions. According to Blancos and Colorados with whom we have spoken, Echegoyen has been obsessed by the minority position of his Party and believes that some way must be found to institutionalize Blanco participation in future governments. There was also general agreement that Echegoyen's "cooperation" venture was only the first step by him in an effort toward constitutional reform aimed at reintroducing a modified form of the collegial concept found in the 1952 Constitution. As a trade-off for the President's support for such a reform, it was rumored that Echegoyen was willing to back a constitutional amendment permitting the President to stand for re-election.

As negotiations between Pacheco and Echegoyen emissaries dragged on from July to October, it became increasingly evident that other Blanco factions opposed "cooperation". They were particularly incensed by the fact that the President, in dangling the prospect of participation before the patronage-starved eyes of Echegoyen's supporters, effectively neutralized the "Alianza" as a source of political opposition. Additionally, a substantial portion of Echegoyen's own faction, in addition to Senator Rodriguez Camusso, made clear that it would bolt the "Alianza" if agreement were reached. Faced with this choice of continued negotiations or the integrity of the "Alianza", Echegoyen chose the latter. The end result was to considerably diminish the old Senator's stature within the Party.

At the same time, however, all Blanco leaders have now admitted the need for some general agreement on a unified Party attitude toward the Pacheco Administration and the elections of 1971. Echegoyen himself now denies that he ever favored any constitutional proposal which would permit Pacheco's re-election and has declared that at the next Congress, he will lead a revival of 1969 Blanco efforts to limit the President's powers to act under the emergency security provisions of the Constitution. This agreement has led to the scheduling of a Party conference on March 14, 1970, to ratify several revisions in the Blanco constitution

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aimed at making it more representative of the various factions and to elect a new national directorate. It now appears that all Blanco factions will participate in the March convention and action now centers on jockeying for positions on the new directorate. The Heber, Rocha, Ferreira Aldunate and Rodriguez Camusso groups have reached a tentative agreement to support a common list of candidates to ease Echegoyen out of formal Party leadership, while the "Alianza", reflecting its internal splits, will probably offer two or more lists, all headed by Echegoyen. The position of Senator BELTRAN and his List 400 is not yet clear. What does seem clear, however, is the present determination of all the Party's leaders to present at least the facade of unity to the public in anticipation of the 1971 elections, which most Blancos believe their Party can win if it holds itself together.

It should be noted that Senator Echegoyen was not the only Blanco leader to lose ground during the past year. Alberto GALLINAL, founder of the Rocha Movement and former presidential candidate, virtually disappeared from politics during the year, repeatedly declaring that he has no further plans for public office. Most Blanco politicians take him at his word and Rocha Senator Carlos PEREIRA has increasingly assumed the leadership of that sector. In contrast with Gallinal, Pereira seems inclined to negotiate and form coalitions with other Blanco factions. Senator Washington Beltran, leader of the UNB-List 400, also suffered a setback when Senator Ferreira left his group with several List 400 deputies to form his own group. Ferreira will probably attract additional Beltran support and, at this early date, appears to be emerging as the strongest potential presidential candidate of the Blancos. The Heber faction, led by old-time Herrerista and former President Alberto HEBER, maintained a position of strong opposition throughout the year and probably benefitted from this within the Party and, to a certain extent, with the public at large. One frequently mentioned Blanco electoral ticket would pair Alberto's younger brother, Mario, a fiery Herrerista deputy and the faction's legislative strategist, as the Vice Presidential candidate with Senator Ferreira.

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FILE DESIGNATION: A-238

HANDLING INDICATOR: CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Department of State

INFO : CINCSO for POLAD, MOSCOW

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO DATE: December 22, 1970

SUBJECT : 20th Congress of Uruguayan Communist Party

REF :

The Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU) held its 20th Party Congress in Montevideo December 11-15. 780 delegates, 179 alternates, 11 foreign Communist Party delegations and other invited guests saw the PCU strongly endorse the formation of a leftist political front or Frente Amplio for the November 1971 elections. The tone of the Congress was businesslike and optimistic, most likely designed not to scare off the Party's potential electoral allies but rather to show its dedication and seriousness. It was a fairly impressive show.

The Congress opened and closed with addresses by Party First Secretary Rodney ARISMENDI. Speakers between amplified his initial presentation of the report of the Central Committee. That report, as summarized in the PCU's daily "El Popular" on December 12, provides a comprehensive statement of the PCU's weltanschauung as it prepares for the upcoming elections. It is an important document because it contains the Party's evaluation of the present international and Uruguayan situation, lists the Party's aims and spells out its tactics for the next several years. An abstract of Arismendi's report is attached as Enclosure 1.

- Enclosures: *all in 1*
1. Abstract of Arismendi Report
 2. Leaders of Foreign Delegations
 3. New Executive Committee of PCU

Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
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Of primary interest to the U.S. is the Party's renewed commitment to "peaceful" revolution. While Arismendi took pains to laud the Cuban revolution, it is clearly the "Chilean experience" which he prefers as a model for Uruguay. To achieve the peaceful revolution, the PCU promised to work "with all our heart" for the formation of a Frente Amplio which will include the Christian Democrats, breakaway elements from the two major parties, other "Marxists and non-Marxists, believers and non-believers," etc. The basic program which Arismendi proposed for the Frente, while generally leftist in nature, contains nothing that will not be included in the platforms of one or more of the factions of the major Blanco and Colorado parties. Nationalization of the banks, for example, has been proposed by Blanco Senator Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate; rejection of the IMF and a moratorium on external debts are regularly suggested by politicians of all parties; and the stimulation of industrial and agricultural production are standard fare even with GOU spokesmen. The PCU's objective clearly is to rally the widest possible number of those opposed to the present Government behind the non-Marxist, reformist banner of the new Front.

Speaking of the Frente, Arismendi warned that "the oligarchy and Yankee agencies" have already launched a "campaign of terror" similar to the recent one in Chile. Apparently referring to recent acts of vandalism by rightist groups against the relatives and lawyers of imprisoned Tupamaro terrorists, he said, "Terrorism is already being organized by rightist groups connected to the police and the Yankee Embassy." (We can expect to hear this charge repeated as the election campaign warms up.)

On the international scene, Arismendi reaffirmed the PCU's devotion to Moscow and the primacy of the Soviet Union in the Socialist camp. He praised the 1969 World Communist Conference for its contribution to unity and he welcomed the new "anti-imperialist" governments of Chile, Peru and Bolivia, which he described as forming a zone of "anti-imperialist, advanced, and patriotic resistance" in the south of the South American continent to compliment developments in Cuba. U.S. policies around the world came in for their usual drubbing.

Arismendi shied away from direct condemnation of the Uruguayan terrorist group, the MLN/Tupamaros, but said rather obliquely that the Party "has adopted a position of principal and noted its differences with this tactical road." At the same time, he condemned the "hysteria organized by oligarchic and imperialist propaganda." However, Alberto SUAREZ, one of the four Party Secretaries, speaking December 12, strongly criticized

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"the corrupting trends of voluntaryism and political sensationalism" which downplay the role of the Party and deny the validity of Marxist-Leninism.

Arismendi devoted the final chapter of his report to "The Enlargement of the Communist Party," where he dealt at length with the organizational problems of Party growth. He stressed the necessity of breaking "organizational tabus" and insuring that new party members had adequate and prompt training. He also warned against self-complacency and urged the strengthening of the Party in the Interior, with youth and among women. He announced that the Central Committee would be reorganized to facilitate the accomplishment of these tasks. A list of the new Central Committee elected at the 20th Congress is attached as Enclosure 3.

Delegations from the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, France, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Paraguay attended the Congress. A list of the delegation members as reported in El Popular is attached as Enclosure 2. According to Popular, the GOU refused visas to delegations from North Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, and East Germany because it has no diplomatic relations with those regimes.

The most relevant speech from a foreign delegation came from the representative of the Communist Party of Chile, Senador Volodia TEITELBOIM, who conveyed the good wishes of President Salvador ALLENDE and reported at length on the "Chilean experience." He noted that "as you applaud the Chile of today, you are foreseeing and preparing Uruguay's tomorrow." He chided those critics who maintain that it is impossible to achieve power without the use of arms. Rather, he said, the revolutionaries of each country must decide the characteristics of their own revolution in the light of their own conditions and realities. He also ridiculed those who claim that the Communist Parties devour their non-Communist collaborators, stating that the other parties of Allende's Unión Popular are alive, enjoying good health and stronger than ever before. This speech was given very prominent coverage by El Popular.

The address by the leader of the Soviet Party Delegation, Din mujamed Kunaev, (Spanish spelling) First Secretary of the Kazajstan Party and Candidate Member of the CPSU Politburo, held considerably less interest for the Uruguayan audience. Kunaev praised the PCU and relations between the two parties and then launched into a lengthy description of the

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
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accomplishments of the Soviet Union with special attention given to the post revolutionary development of Kazajstan where, he reported, the production of cereals has doubled since 1913. It was a speech to put the most dedicated PCU activist to sleep and ended with a call for international party unity. Other delegation leaders also spoke of the accomplishments of their individual parties and the sum total was probably a great deal more data on the world movement than the delegates needed or cared to learn.

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Enclosure 1, Page 1

ABSTRACT

Report of First Secretary Arismendi to
20th Party Congress of CPU

INTRODUCTION: Since the 19th Party Congress in 1966, the PCU has been firm in its opposition to the Pacheco Government at the cost of several martyrs, arrest and torture of party members, and strong efforts by the Government to destroy it. Conditions are now ripe for a higher stage of unity among the people in an anti-imperialist front to fight for an "advanced" democratic government. The possibility of assuming power by unifying the people in a Frente Amplio is real and potentially close.

I - UNITY OF SOCIALIST CAMP, COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, & ANTI-IMPERIALIST FORCES: While Capitalism and Socialism are coexisting peacefully, the process of revolutionary change and national liberation is proceeding at unprecedented pace, supported by the USSR and Socialist system. The Socialist revolution does not need war to triumph. The building of Socialism strengthens the powers opposed to a threat of Imperialist war. It is stupid to maintain, for example, that because the Cuban revolution is concentrating on the building of its economy, it has lost its radiation in the Latin American revolution.

The global aggressive strategy of Imperialism is expressed by the war in Vietnam and its extension into Laos and Cambodia; by conspiracies against Cuba; by the continued division of Korea; attempts to isolate the GDR; promotion of conflicts in the Middle East and support of Israel; opposition of admission of China to the U.N.; and the continued support for colonialism in Africa. In Latin America, there are the "political crimes" in Chile and the frustrated coup in Bolivia. However, the internal contradictions of capitalistic societies, especially the U.S. have never been so great and they are exacerbated by the brutal U.S. policies.

Since the 19th Party Congress, in this world struggle several partial defeats and strategic retreats have been experienced by the Socialist forces. Errors in direction, revisionist leadership and Imperialist conspiracy endangered the Socialist government of Czechoslovakia. But on balance, the Socialist world, supported by the USSR has had many victories: in Vietnam, in Laos and in Cambodia. In Latin America, this can be seen in the valiant struggle of the Cuban people and developments in Peru, Bolivia and Chile. Imperialism has lost the initiative and the World Revolution is on the march.

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Anti-Imperialism is growing world-wide, in the Church, in certain military sectors and among technicians and intellectuals. The conditions for a new offensive against Imperialism have been created and the key is unity. The fundamental role in the unity of Anti-Imperialist forces falls on the Socialist Camp and the International Proletariat, with the USSR as the historical center of the Socialist System. Particularly within the Socialist Camp, unity is fundamental. Difficulties within the movement in the past 10 years have resulted in the "segregation" of China. Nonetheless, convergence has been the characteristic of the past several years and the 1969 World Conference was a great step forward. Now the fight is to continue searching for unity.

II - THE ADVANCE OF THE REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA: At the present time, the people of Latin America are struggling to liberate themselves from U.S. Imperialism. Ten years after the feat of Cuba, Peru, Chile and Bolivia in rapid succession have taken basic steps toward liberation. In Chile, the ideological maturity of the deep unity of the people is noteworthy. In Peru, the armed forces lead the democratic and independence-minded process with an independent foreign policy and basic democratic transformations. In Bolivia, a revolutionary general strike and the actions of the Armed Forces frustrated a coup planned by the U.S. and initiated a "national leftist" government. The Anti-Imperialist, democratic victory in these three countries gives a powerful boost to the Latin American revolution. It is a qualitative strategic advance in the saga of our second independence. It is an important change in the relation of forces between the peoples of Latin America and Yankee Imperialism. Faced with this new reality, the myth of inevitable Imperialist domination of our continent is shattered. This new reality provides for a new acceleration in the revolutionary process.

A sharpening of the struggle is foreseeable. In many places, the Imperialists will doubtless attempt to deny the people access to power by violence and this will preordain the armed road to revolution. We (the PCU) have always said that we prefer the less painful path but we cannot forget the aggressive interference of Imperialism in large parts of Latin America. On the other hand, it would be absurd to scorn all possibility of a "peaceful" advance of the revolution as long as there is any probability of gaining power without paying the terrible price of a civil war. In this sense, Chile offers a valuable experience which can be repeated under the right conditions. The reality of each one of our countries fits into the picture of Latin America in which the objective conditions for revolutionary change mature. The goals of popular power today are historically concrete

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objectives. And the problem of the unity of the people, of the subjective factors -in particular the problem of the Party- appear increasingly as the cardinal questions of the victory of the revolution. The historical imperative today, in this hour of change in Latin America, is for each people (country) to find its own road to unity, to examine the possible ways of bringing the revolution nearer, to build the unity of the working class and the great mass of patriotic, democratic and advanced. We are participating in prophetic events. Adding itself to Socialist Cuba and its heroic example, there is beginning to form in the south of the Continent a zone of anti-imperialist, advanced, patriotic resistance.

III - AN ALTERNATIVE OF DEMOCRATIC, ADVANCED GOVERNMENT:-

As this Congress meets, Uruguay is entering a higher phase of revolutionary development. Conditions are ripe for the alternative of democratic and advanced government. The principal characteristics of the new situation are the following: the heroic role of the proletariat; the size and continuity of its struggles; the growing revolutionary consciousness of thousands of new troops; the consolidation of the role of the Party as the basic directing force of the working class; the growing adhesion of salaried workers, intellectuals, etc., to the working class; and the creation of conditions for a broad political unity, as seen in the recent statements of (Colorado Party) List 99, the PDC, the Rodriguez Camusso (Blanco Party) group, the group led by General BALIÑAS and the declarations of General SEREGNI. There is widespread support for the unity movement. It is not a simple electoral front, but a coming together of people for radical transformations. If we are able to speed up the building of this unity, to free it from small sectarian conflicts, if it adopts the character of a permanent movement, if it supports the great masses and comes forth with an adequate program, if it reaches a political compromise which codifies the common obligations such as collective participation in the struggle and the work of the government, then it will be able today to win the battle against Pacheco, the oligarchy and the two-party system.

The government of Pacheco is entreguista, anti-democratic and anti-popular, serving only the interests of the oligarchs and Yankee Imperialism. The deepening structural crisis faces the country with two alternatives: radical economic change and progressive transformation or further economic retrogression. The working classes are growing increasingly combative and the dominant classes can no longer control them. The traditional political parties are in crisis and unable to lead the country. The popular masses through their just struggle will play the decisive role.

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During the period under review, a certain movement has carried out a number of actions, some of which have had sensational repercussions abroad. Our Party, without paying attention to the hysteria organized by oligarchic and imperialist propaganda, has adopted a position of principal and noted its differences with this tactical road, according to well-known teachings of Lenin.

Everything indicates that a Frente Amplio presents a new alternative for power, and the FIDEL (the PCU's political front) and our Party have decided to join it. While the program will have to be the fruit of negotiation between all the participating sectors, there exists a basic program which includes things such as an independent foreign policy, the recuperation of the state-owned enterprises, the nationalization of the banks and the meat industry, a moratorium on external debts, rejection of the dictates of the IMF, measures for agricultural reform, stimulation of industrial and agricultural production, recovery of the social security system, attention to the demands of the people for housing, and medical care, employment for youth, the abandonment of COPRIN (wage-price board) and an authentic policy of wages and prices, the defense of public education and its autonomy and the restoration of democratic liberties with effective participation by the people in the government.

This will not be a coalition formed only for the election, but an authentic popular movement connected to the daily struggle of the working class and the people. In it will participate Blancos and Colorados, Marxists and non-Marxists, believers and non-believers, intellectuals, labor leaders, students, women, etc. The Front will correspond to the political-social phase on the country. Our participation and support of the Front is not only for tactical reasons, nor for transitory motives, but because we believe it is a basic answer to the present situation in the context of revolutionary changes which the country needs.

We want with all our heart to contribute to the formation of this Front and we agree with the resolution of FIDEL which states that it must be based on the following requirements: a common program; a political pact which guarantees collective responsibility in all plans, as well as obligations and rules of common political action; and permanent support for the mobilization of the people.

In the elections of 1971, it is necessary to present common Front candidates for the Presidency, Vice Presidency and for the municipal mayors.

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The coming days will provide a stiff test for which all progressive forces must prepare. Emergency security measures are still in effect, despite the fact that we are about to enter an election year. The campaign to reelect Pacheco is a decoy, but also has a potential golpista (coup) factor. The oligarchy and the Yankee agencies and certain services connected to the police and military have already begun a campaign against the Front in the style found in Chile under the name "campaign of terror," whose distinguishing feature is stupid anti-communism. Terrorism is already being organized by rightest groups connected to the police and the Yankee Embassy. (These are) also intervening in the growing provocations of the Israeli Embassy and certain Zionist groups. Anti-Sovietism is their specialty and they act together with the CIA. All of this must be met with action by the masses and also with full agitation and propaganda.

IV - THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY: Since the 1966 Congress the party has been growing rapidly: 26,087 new members of whom 22,479 are in Montevideo. The Party is characterized by deep ideological unity and full internal democracy, free of all friction and sustained by the lofty authority of the Central Committee. The Party has a high percentage of workers, youths and women. In recent years, the readership of El Popular and the listeners of our radio stations have grown. In particular, the Party has grown in the interior of the country.

Of course, we have certain weaknesses and shortcomings in several fields which we have not yet totally overcome, many of them due to our rapid growth. Of particular interest are the problems of the direction of member groups. Direct contact with these groups should use vertical communication, utilizing the press, radio, etc., to transmit the principal decisions of the Central Committee to Party members. Faced with growing membership, we must follow the dictates of Lenin in the sense that first they must be organized, trained, and choose their secretary. Each intermediate organization must form small commissions with the exclusive mission of training new members and placing the proper materials in their hands. This will require the breaking of organizational tabus.

The new tasks of the Party must correspond to the new political period. We must eliminate self-complacency, accommodation to difficulties and the tendency to hide specific setbacks with general advances. The development and strengthening of the Party in the Interior, especially in the countryside, is one of the primary obligations of the new Central Committee. The same is true of the work among intellectuals and certain sectors of education. Special reports on work among women and youths will be

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presented at this Congress. The membership of the new Central Committee will include comrades specifically charged with these important fields.

The principal directions of Party work are the following: the intensification and improvement of agitation and propaganda among the broad masses; the greater growth of the Party; the advancement of the national political role of the Party; the work of education and ideological labor through the newspaper, radios and publications are especially important; success in Party finances; aid to the UJC (Communist Youth) by all Party organizations; and attention to the recruitment of women.

The national tasks and the development of the Party require better political direction and qualification of the work of the Central Committee. The Committee must amplify its theoretical work and it must reflect the changing conditions of the Party by paying more attention to youth and women.

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Leaders of Foreign Party Delegations
to XXth Congress of PCU
(Spanish Spelling)

USSR

Dinmujamed Kunáev
First Secretary of Central Committee of C. P.
Kazajstan and Candidate Member of CPSU Central
Committee

Bulgaria

Yivko Yivkov
Vice President of Council of Ministers
and member of Politburo

Romania

Dmitri Balalia
Member, Central Committee

Chile

Volodia Teiteboim
Senator of Communist Party of Chile

Peru

Felix Arias Schreiber
Member of Central Committee

Colombia

Gilberto Viera
First Secretary of the Communist Party
of Colombia

Ecuador

Pedro Saad
Secretary General of the Communist Party
of Ecuador

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France

Jean Garcia
Member of Central Committee of
Communist Party of France

Italy

Sergio Cavina

Argentina

Name not published

Paraguay

Name not published

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Executive Committee of
Central Committee of PCU
Elected December 15, 1971

First Secretary: Rodney Arismendi

Secretaries and Members of Executive Committee:

Enrique Pastorino
Jaime Perez
Enrique Rodriguez
Alberto Suarez

Members of the Executive Committee:

Alberto Altesor
Leopoldo Bruera
Gerardo Cuesta
Felix Dias
Jose Luis Massera
Jorge Mazzarovich
Rosario Pietraroia
Cesar Reyes Daglio
Vladimir I. Turiansky
Eduardo Viera

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PH-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04

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INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS 44
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SUBJ: VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST SPLIT AND URUGUAYAN CP CONGRESS

REF: CARACAS 5615 ✓ POL 12 VEN

1. FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ARTICLE ON VENEZUELAN CP PLENUM IS TASS DESPATCH PUBLISHED PRAVDA DEC 17 WHICH QUOTES "UNANIMOUSLY-ADOPTED". DECISION TO EXPEL DISSIDENTS AND STATEMENT SIGNED BY 46 CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS WHICH EXPRESSES CONFIDENCE THAT PARTY WILL OVERCOME CURRENT CRISIS. ARTICLE CITES APPROPRIATE PORTIONS FROM PLENUM RESOLUTIONS TO EXPLAIN WHY EXPULSIONS CARRIED OUT.

2. APPARENTLY MORE PLEASED WITH DEVELOPMENTS AT URUGUAYAN CP CONGRESS, PRESS HAS PUBLISHED SEVERAL FAIRLY LONG TASS ACCOUNTS OF ITS PROCEEDINGS. COVERAGE HAS STRESSED CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN SOVIET AND URUGUAYAN PARTIES WITH HEAD OF SOVIET DELEGATION KUNAYEV QUOTED AS SAYING THESE TIES EXAMPLE OF STRONG AND TRULY FRATERNAL FRIENDSHIP. FIRST SECRETARY ARISHMENDI'S SPEECH WAS SUMMARIZED AT LENGTH IN DEC 15 PRAVDA WHICH QUOTED HIM AS SAYING THAT 1969 WORLD CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES WAS BIG STEP FORWARD AND CALLING FOR GREATER UNITY AMONG LA PARTIES. DECON AFTER 12/18/71.

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INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PH-00 H-02 INR-09 L-03 NSAE-00

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: BATLLE RELEASED

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2954 ✓

1. AFTER 24 DAYS' DETENTION, POLITICAL LEADER JORGE BATLLE WAS PROVISIONALLY RELEASED NOVEMBER 2 BY MILITARY JUDGE. BATLLE'S DELIRIOUS SUPPORTERS ACCLAIMED HIS RELEASE IN A WIDELY-TELEVISED PRESS CONFERENCE THE SAME NIGHT. WHEN QUESTIONED WHETHER HE WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN HIS CHARGES OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES BY SOME MILITARY OFFICERS, BATLLE INDICATED HE HAD NO INTENTION OF RETRACTING THEM. HE WENT ON TO DECLARE THAT HE HAD ISSUED A "CHALLENGE" WHICH "TO THIS DAY HAS NOT BEEN ANSWERED." WITH SOME IRONY, HE REFERRED TO HAVING BEEN ARRESTED DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF HIS "EX-BOYHOOD CLASSMATE" PRESIDENT BORDABERRY, BUT MAJOR POINT MADE BY BATLLE TO PRESS AND TELEVISION AUDIENCE WAS REAFFIRMATION THAT HIS LIST IS POLITICAL GROUP WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT. HE COMPLIMENTED MILITARY ON HIS GOOD TREATMENT, AND APPEARED FIT AND RESTED.

2. TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS SPECULATE THAT LIST IS DEPUTY JULIO MARIA SANGUINETTI MAY SHORTLY REJOIN THE CABINET AS MINISTER OF EDUCATION.

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INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 PM-00 H-02 INR-09 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
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 CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: BATLLE DETENTION BY MILITARY CONTINUES
 REF: MVD 2753

- AS OF 11 HOURS TODAY (OCTOBER 28), COLORADO POLITICAL LEADER JORGE BATLLE CONTINUES TO BE DETAINED INCOMMUNICADO AT MONTEVIDEO HEADQUARTERS OF MILITARY REGION IM. ARMY AUTHORITIES HAVE ISSUED COMMUNIQUE DECLARING BATLLE DETAINED AS RESULT OF CHARGES ARISING FROM HIS SPEECH OCTOBER 25. CHARGES INVOLVE ALLEGATIONS THAT BATLLE MADE STATEMENT ABOUT SUBVERSION WITHOUT PRIOR MILITARY PERMISSION; THAT HE VIOLATED ARTICLE 58 OF MILITARY CODE: "ATTACKS ON THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES"; THAT HE SUGGESTED ACTIONS BY MILITARY OFFICERS AT ADVICE OF TERRORIST AMODIO PEREZ WHICH IMPLIES "ESPIONAGE" ON PART OF SUCH OFFICERS; AND FINALLY THAT HIS STATEMENTS CONSTITUTED "PUBLIC VILIFICATION AND UNJUSTIFIED ATTACK UPON ARMED FORCES" IN VIOLATION OF NEW NATIONAL SECURITY LAW PASSED LAST JULY.
- BATLLE'S LIST 15 FACTION HAS ISSUED ENERGETIC DEMAND FOR HIS RELEASE AND REPORTEDLY THREE BATLLE MINISTERS IN BORDABERRY CABINET

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INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 PM-02 H-02 INR-09 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: JORGE BATLLE CHALLENGES MILITARY

REF : MONTEVIDEO 3062 — MC

1. SUMMARY: IN STRONG RESPONSE TO MILITARY INVESTIGATIONS RE "ECONOMIC CRIMES", PRO-GOVERNMENT POLITICAL LEADER, JORGE BATLLE, LAST NIGHT PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED WHAT HE TERMED WAVE OF RUMORS ARISING FROM THESE INVESTIGATIONS IMPLICATING POLITICIANS WITH ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. SENIOR ARMY LEADERS MET AFTER SPEECH TO CONSIDER WHAT COURSE OF ACTION IF ANY MILITARY SHOULD TAKE. AS OF TODAY, THEY APPARENTLY WILL SEEK TO RESPOND IN SOME MANNER TO BATLLE'S CHARGES IN A FEW DAYS. END SUMMARY

2. IN TEN MINUTE SPEECH ON NATIONAL RADIO AND TV CHAIN EVENING OCTOBER 25, JORGE BATLLE, LEADER OF COLORADO LIST 15 FACTION, PUBLICLY CHALLENGED MILITARY ROLE IN URUGUAY'S POLITICAL LIFE MORE STRONGLY THAN ANY OTHER POLITICIAN HAS DONE UP TO THIS POINT. SPEAKING WITH EMOTION, BATLLE ATTACKED WAVE OF RUMORS WHICH HE SAID DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE PRESTIGE OF POLITICIANS

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